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  ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis explores the contemporary mass social and political process in 
Venezuela referred to as the Bolivarian Revolution.  Through a historical sociological 
approach that stresses the inseparability of history and sociology in understanding 
social reality, I attempt to discover the transformative nature of this socialist transition.  
Thus I take the 1989 Caracazo as the starting point of the Bolivarian Revolution that 
triumphantly took state power just one decade later, while accounting for the multiple 
historical influences that shaped and allowed the transformative processes to take 
place.   
An examination of the socio-historical context of Venezuela from the colonial 
period to 1935 reveals a unique case of a weak working-class, fragmented landowning 
elite, and passive peasantry.  When this particular social configuration is combined 
with the overwhelming dominance of the oil industry, the relative social stability that 
makes Venezuela such a special case in Latin America becomes clear.  The overview 
of the socio-political trajectory of Venezuela from 1935 to 1989 demonstrates how a 
liberal bourgeois governing system was able to exist for nearly four decades, before 
the demise of the neo-liberal model made possible the development of the mass 
popular Bolivarian movement.  The implementation of IMF-approved economic 
policies, discrediting of the two traditional Venezuelan political parties, increased 
misery of the poor and working-class, and growing social consciousness and 
mobilization all paved the way for the political opening that allowed the diverse and 
mass popular Chavista movement to take power in 1999 via the electoral road.  
 Coming to terms with Venezuela’s particular social configuration and 
historical socio-political dynamics and the legacy of Latin American attempts at social 
transformation enables us to accurately analyze the current construction of the new 
form of socialism known as Socialismo del Siglo XXI, or ‘21st century socialism’, 
which forms part of the new cycle of anti-capitalist struggles in Latin America.  An 
analysis of the combination of social, economic, and political reforms of this new form 
of socialism shows that comprehensive strategies have been put into place to tackle the 
overconcentration of capital, class division and antagonisms, ecological degradation, 
racism, exploitation, and overall agony faced by the working-class and poor majority - 
all of which are inherent to the capitalist ideology and practice (and its neo-liberal 
form).  Among the social transformations that have been initiated are the creation of 
new communal forms of property relations, a dismantling of the old elite’s structures 
of power, and increased democratization and participation in the ownership of the 
means of production and in local and national authority.   
Venezuela’s ‘21st century socialism’, therefore, is in fact creating the 
possibilities for alternative anti-capitalist forms of social organization and political-
economic models.  Despite incorporating a series of transformative reforms, however, 
the Bolivarian Revolution represents a ‘development alternative’ since it continues to 
operate under the global capitalist framework based on the accumulation of capital and 
economic growth.  At the same time, however, certain transformative elements of this 
process combined together as a package (specifically the establishment of communal 
property, self-governed communal councils and self-managed enterprises) do 
constitute an ‘alternative to development’ since they reject the concept of economic 
growth altogether and replace the logic of capital with a functioning rationality based 
on the satisfaction of human needs and the full development of human potentialities 
(Fagen et al. 1986).  Significant progress has thus been made in terms of replacing the 
painfully alienated and solitary human being with new revolutionary and socialist 
women and men selflessly dedicated to the collective will and betterment of society, 
as described by Che Guevara in his 1965 book Man and Socialism in Cuba.   
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION: THEORY & METHOD 
 
No hay otra definición del socialismo, válida para nosotros, que la abolición 
de la explotación del hombre por el hombre. Mientras esto no se produzca, se 
está en el período de construcción de la sociedad socialista y, si en vez de 
producirse este fenómeno, la tarea de la supresión de la explotación se estanca 
o, aún, retrocede en ella, no es válido hablar siquiera de la construcción del 
socialismo. 
(...) 
No puede existir socialismo si en las conciencias no se opera un cambio que 
provoque una nueva actitud fraternal frente a la humanidad, tanto de índole 
individual, en la sociedad en que se construye o está construído el socialismo, 
como de índole mundial en relación a todos los pueblos que sufren la opresión 
imperialista. 
 
    Discurso de Argel 
    Ernesto Che Guevara. Argel. 24 de febrero de 1965. 
 
On the morning of February 27, 1989 thousands of Venezuelans took to the 
streets to protest the neo-liberal economic reforms introduced by president Carlos 
Andres Perez. Subsequently known as the Caracazo – this represented the first mass 
action since the 1958 overthrow of the Perez Jimenez dictatorship.  This “prolonged 
and mighty rebellion” (Gott, 2005: 43) against the government’s imposition of the 
structural adjustment program, or ‘el paquete’ (‘the package’) took the lives of several 
hundred people, while also marking the beginning of the crisis and loss of legitimacy 
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of neo-liberalism in Venezuela.  One decade later, in the December 6, 1998 
Venezuelan presidential election, Hugo Chavez was elected by a majority of the 
Venezuelan people (56.2%, the largest percentage of the popular vote in four decades) 
to lead their country and bring about a change to the half-century dominance of 
Venezuela’s old political system, puntofijismo.  The people had spoken assertively in 
favor of ending the corruption and poverty fostered by the established interests of the 
elite, and ultimately, creating the possibility for far-reaching structural changes and a 
better future.   
This electoral triumph of Chavismo, which traces its beginnings to the 
Caracazo, has been regarded by some as constituting the rise of the most serious 
challenge to the hegemonic neo-liberal model of development. Undeniably, an 
awakening has occurred in search of viable alternative political and economic models 
that challenge the unjust societal and ecological destruction inherent in the capitalist 
system’s modus operandi of ceaseless accumulation.  Politically these alternative 
initiatives range from the autonomist ‘anti-power’ thesis of Holloway (2002) and the 
Zapatistas to the more radical seizing of state power that we have witnessed by 
movements in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia.  Economically they span the 
spectrum from “ambitious proposals for neo-Keynesian, progressive macro-economic 
capital controls” to “micro-initiatives undertaken by marginalized sectors in the global 
South […] organizing into cooperatives of informal workers (De Sousa Santos 2006: 
p.xviii).  
By employing a historical sociological approach that stresses the inseparability 
of history and sociology in understanding social reality, this thesis hopes to uncover 
the complexity of the Bolivarian Revolution’s project for social transformation.  Thus 
it situates the Bolivarian Revolution within the context of Venezuela’s overall history 
and socio-political dynamics, and argues that the Bolivarian Revolution is greatly 
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shaped by the international conjuncture within which it unfolds. 
  The overall goal is explore the Bolivarian Revolution’s social transformations 
in order to determine if it represents the development of an alternative political-
economic framework and production system.  In other words, is this contemporary 
counter-movement creating opportunities and mechanisms for dismantling the neo-
liberal model of development (both its discourse and practice), and possibly even 
capitalism itself?  Ultimately, I seek to assess whether the Bolivarian Revolution 
constitutes a development alternative, in which economic growth is not rejected but 
complemented by various alternative tools, and/or an alternative to development that 
rejects the concept of an exclusive focus on economic growth as the means to improve 
livelihoods (De Sousa Santos 2006).     
The importance of this study is underscored by recent social and political 
protests against the technocratic neo-liberal reforms that have spread across the Latin 
American continent.  Most importantly, these mass protests have sought to move 
beyond simply attacking the neo-liberal development model, and towards formulating 
and implementing an alternative vision.  So in 2005 Bolivians elected their first 
indigenous head of state, Evo Morales, and shortly thereafter Rafael Correa was 
elected president of Ecuador.  Moreover, the growth and mobilization of social 
movements throughout the region have helped other left-of-center candidates reach the 
presidency in other Latin American nations -Brazil, Uruguay, Chile, Argentina, 
Paraguay, and El Salvador. The demand for an end to the free-market neo-liberal 
orthodoxy is thus clearly evident across the continent, as discontent grows and causes 
a wide array of social forces to unite in opposition.   
 
Literature Review 
 My research takes into account the overall literature that has been made 
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available since the commencement of the social transformation in Venezuela in 
December 1998.  To date a large portion of what has been written on the subject of the 
Bolivarian Revolution has taken the form of an ongoing debate among critics and 
supporters over whether to characterize the policies of the Venezuelan Government 
and the character of its leader Hugo Chavez, as authoritarian, democratic, or 
somewhere in between.  I have tended to concentrate specifically on literature that 
provides a more nuanced, historical analysis of the process of deepening social change 
and transformation within Venezuela.  In order to truly understand the nature and 
complexity of the current situation one needs to examine the past and look closely at 
the series of events that took place over time in Venezuela, and that made this 
contemporary socialist experiment possible.  
 For the most part there is consensus in the literature that the implementation of 
the 1989 structural adjustment programs, or el paquete (“the package”), and the 
immediate mass popular uprising mark a significant turning point in Venezuela that 
galvanized large sectors of the population to demand change in the status quo (Coronil 
1997; Gott 2000, Ellner and Hellinger, 2003; Lebowitz 2006; Wilpert 2007).  Wilpert 
(2007: p.16) refers to it as the, “first real crack in the system,” that allowed a process 
of change in Venezuela to commence.  The economic hardships experienced by the 
majority of Venezuelans in the fluid political interlude of the 1990s following the 
implementation of the Washington Consensus led to what Marquez (2003) 
characterizes as complete disenchantment and mistrust of politicians and political 
parties, and increased social polarization.  
 It is in the examination of what took place post 1998, following the election of 
Hugo Chavez, that the opinions within the literature greatly diverge.  On one side 
there are those that claim that the policies of the Chavez administration have only led 
to the over-centralization of power, emergence of social polarization, curtailment of 
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freedom, militarization of Venezuelan society, and economic instability (Garrido 
2002; Blanco 2002; Heydra 2003).  Some refer to President Chavez’s extension of 
presidential powers and the dominance of pro-Chavez officials in government as 
evidence of Chavez’s strong desire for, and subsequent centralization of power 
(Marcano et al. 2007).  Norden (2003) asserts that both, the substantial presence of 
officials with military backgrounds in various government positions, and that the 
important role that has been given to the military in civilian matters, demonstrate the 
militarization of Venezuelan society and politicization of the Venezuelan military.  
More recently, the governments decision not to renew the broadcast license of Radio 
Caracas Television (RCTV), the attempt to consolidate all of the political groups of 
the left into one pro-Chavez party (PSUV), and the December 2007 national 
referendum on the constitutional reforms, that included the indefinite presidential re-
election to office, have all been used to label the Venezuelan government as a regime 
with autocratic tendencies (WOLA Conference Report July, 2007). 
 It is clear that like any other attempt at socio-political transformation the 
Bolivarian Revolution has its own contradictions, which impede its successful 
advancement.  Wilpert (2007) specifically refers to the proposed changing of the 
Constitution to allow for unlimited terms and the consolidation of leftist political 
parties as plans that, “directly undermine efforts to create a progressive social 
movement that is self-sustaining and capable of pushing twenty-first century socialism 
because of the force of its ideas and not because of the force of Chavez’s personality” 
(p.39).  Additionally, Marquez (2003) stresses the need to move beyond Chavez as 
some supernatural agent of change.  Both Wilpert (2007) and Marquez (2003) suggest 
that the solution to this problem lies in transforming Venezuela’s political culture, so 
that the clientilistic practices and culture of paternalism of the past four decades can be 
overcome.   
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Yet, as Ellner and Hellinger (2003) point out, it is exactly this attempt by the 
Chavez government to take on clientelism and corruption that has naturally produced 
the charges of interference and authoritarianism by the opposition.  Two other obvious 
reasons for the criticism and opposition to the Chavez government have been its 
attempts to slowly wrestle away the bourgeoisie’s power and to destroy its repressive 
and bureaucratic apparatus, and its systematic attempts to break down the racial and 
gender injustices that the old political system actively reinforced.    
The reality is that the past two decades in Venezuela were times of deep social 
polarization, with chronic decadence of the economy and an increase in inequalities 
(Roberts 2003).  Moreover, centralization of power had been a long-standing reality 
much before the arrival of President Chavez.  The state and the two political parties 
that dominated it, AD and COPEI, maintained complete control over the oil-dependant 
nation’s wealth through a corporatist and clientelist culture (Coronil 1997).  The 
argument presented by several authors of the new so-called suppression of freedom by 
the Chavez government does not withstand the evidence either.  Catala and Rangel 
(2003) point out that press freedom was in fact very limited before Chavez, during the 
so-called democratic period of Venezuelan history, and that in fact what has actually 
been taking place is an expansion of press freedom.  
What the Chavez government has sought to accomplish is to break not only the 
tight economic control of the elite through the nationalization of key industries, but 
also the media monopoly that the political elites have long enjoyed, and which Petras 
says amounts to “ownership of 90% of the major television networks and print media 
and most of the major radio stations” (Petras 2003; p. vii).  This democratization is 
illustrated in the latest Latinobarometro poll, in which Venezuela is among the top 
three countries (along with Costa Rica and Uruguay) in Latin America whose citizens 
rate their country as most democratic (WOLA Conference Report July, 2007).  This 
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suggests that Venezuelans’ notion of democracy is quite different from that of the 
occidental liberal camp, so that it is not enough to just have a representative 
democracy, but that social justice must also be guaranteed.  For most Venezuelans the 
feeling is that for the first time in their lives they are benefiting from the policies of the 
government and are being included in the political decision-making of their country 
(WOLA Conference Report July, 2007).    
Drawing on Fagen et al.’s (1986) insight into experiments in transition to 
socialism, I investigate the various policies of the Bolivarian Revolution, both on 
paper and on the ground, in order to understand exactly how it is shifting Venezuela 
from a neo-liberal development strategy to an alternative path towards socialism.  
Essentially, I am interested in learning whether the primary focus is the traditional 
satisfaction of the needs of capital, or whether this is being replaced by the satisfaction 
of the needs of human beings (Lebowitz 2006).  The ongoing and complex experiment 
in Venezuela places heavy emphasis on many important ideas that are aiding its 
development towards socialism, such as participatory democracy, justice, human 
development, agrarian reform, self-governance, self-management, and regional 
integration.   
The most comprehensive examination of the Chavez government’s policies 
relating to governance is provided by Wilpert (2007) who looks specifically at the 
constitution, judiciary, military, and participatory democracy.  His critical analysis of 
the new 1999 constitution and the reforms of Venezuela’s entire polity shows that the 
constitution is not merely a formality on paper as some have suggested.  Instead 
Wilpert (2007) maintains that it provides for broad citizen participation and that 
constitutional reforms are in fact being implemented, thus advancing the social 
transformation in Venezuela towards a more participatory and just society.  Yet he 
also notes that some of these advances are being undermined through centralization of 
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power, lack of institutionalization, and delay in the passing of laws that support 
participatory democracy (Wilpert 2007).      
I stress Lebowitz’s (2006) view that the satisfaction of people’s basic needs, 
such as health care, housing, food, and education, will in large part be used by 
Venezuelans to judge the Bolivarian Revolution.  In order to accomplish these difficult 
tasks, the Venezuelan government has taken up an endogenous development approach.  
Due to the specific needs and conditions of Venezuela, the Bolivarian Revolution has 
created its own conception of endogenous development.  One of its main strategies is 
providing education in cooperation and self-management in order to prepare its 
citizens for new productive relations (Lebowitz 2006).  The goal of this approach is to 
emphasize collective property, reject wage-labor, and “attack the division between 
those who think and those who do” (Lebowitz 2006; p.100).  The government’s strong 
promotion of the formation of cooperatives, through education, loans, and technical 
support, has meant the existence of 84,000 cooperatives and nearly one million 
members by August 2005 (Lebowitz 2006).       
In addition to self-management, the idea of self-governance is also central to 
the social transformation of Venezuela.  While local planning councils had been 
developing prior to 2006, it was not until April of that year that the new communal 
council law was passed (Wilpert 2007).  The empowerment that these communal 
councils have given local communities is undeniable.  For the first time communities 
are allowed to manage their own affairs and budgets as they see fit.  To date, close to 
20,000 councils have been registered throughout the entire country, and federal grants 
have been provided for 653 community improvement projects (Wilpert 2007).  
Moreover, the government plans to increase the funds for communal councils from $5 
billion in 2007, or 30% of total funds for local and regional governments, to 50% in 
the upcoming years (Wilpert 2007).  The goal now, however, must be on promoting 
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and further institutionalizing these councils in order to include them into decision-
making at the federal level.           
As Lebowitz cleverly points out, socialism does not fall from the sky, instead it 
must be built (2006).  Therefore, there is no consensus about what twenty-first century 
socialism exactly looks like.  Wilpert (2007) is the first to attempt to specifically 
outline what twenty-first century socialism could look like in Venezuela.  My study 
undertakes the difficult task of envisioning what this new socialism, distinctly 
different from state socialism, might entail.  I seek to show how Venezuela’s historical 
trajectory has made it possible for a socialist agenda to emerge in this Latin American 
nation. Most importantly, through a careful examination of the new social formations 
in Venezuela, this thesis demonstrates and strongly promotes one alternative to neo-
liberal capitalist development, and serves to show the possibilities that are available to 
the many other similar alternatives that exist and are in the process of developing.         
 
Research Questions 
In my attempt to assess the transformative potential of the Bolivarian 
Revolution, I concentrate on the extent to which the ‘logic of capital’ (endless 
accumulation of capital at the cost of human and ecological habitats) is being replaced 
with a functioning social rationality (Fagen et al. 1986).  Moreover, to determine this I 
take into account Fagen et al.’s three basic goals of socialist transformations: “1- 
production and distribution oriented towards meeting the basic needs of the majority 
of the population; (2) an ending of class, gender, racial, ethnic, and other forms of 
privilege in access to ‘valued goods’ like income, culture, justice, and recreation; and 
(3) the reconstitution of state-society relations such that the popular classes have a 
high degree of participation in determining public policy at all levels” (1986: p.10).    
Some pertinent questions are:  Is Venezuela moving towards a new type of 
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socialism, or is it simply becoming a kind of state capitalism with a developmentalist 
perspective? Are property relations being changed? How does the attempt at social 
transformation in Venezuela compare with other such experiments throughout the 
history of Latin America? Is the struggle in Venezuela one that is defined by class 
conflict? Besides class, how does gender and racial injustice also contribute to the 
conflictual nature of this transition? Is an autonomous, alternative popular power 
developing that is capable of challenging existing state structures? Or is the motor 
behind transformations state power itself? What is the possibility for institutionalizing 
participatory communal power at the national level? What are the consequences of a 
failure to nationally institutionalize popular participation? What is the relationship 
between the revolutionary vanguard and mass organizations in Venezuela?  How is 
Venezuela dealing with the destabilizing interference of the elite and U.S. 
imperialism? What attempts at regional and global integration/cooperation are being 
formulated to promote, support, and defend the socialist transition of Venezuela?   
 
Methodology and Guiding Theoretical Concepts 
In order to carry out my study and find answers to the questions stated above, I 
employ a historical sociological approach that stresses the inseparability of history and 
sociology in understanding social reality.  This methodological approach specifically 
borrows from Abrams’ (1982) understanding of ‘analytical structuring,’ which refers 
to the critical examination and theorization of the process of ‘becoming’ in order to 
achieve a deeper understanding of social reality.  Essentially, it entails pursuing close 
analysis of the interacting process of structure and action that allows for the 
elucidation of the meaning of historical occurrences.  Thus it is a combination of 
empirical and theoretical analysis.  This of course, is strikingly opposed to the 
unsatisfactory method of trying to discover social realities simply through empirical 
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observation of social appearances.   
This historical sociological approach enables a more comprehensive 
understanding of the contemporary Venezuelan counter-movement, since it takes into 
account the complex two-sided relationship that Abrams (1982) argues exists in 
society between social structure and social action – the influence of each on one 
another.  It does not regard social structures as natural, but instead understands them 
as shaped by a complex series of social processes.  Social processes are in turn 
influenced and shaped by the existing social structures.  Therefore instead of looking 
at the Bolivarian Revolution as simply a social appearance or direct representation, I 
seek to discover the social reality by using analytical structuring, whereby one takes 
into account multiple historical influences and then analyzes the complex ways in 
which these interact with one another, thus shaping and allowing for ‘the becoming’ of 
a historical occurrence; in this case the Bolivarian Revolution.   
In following the methodological approach advocated by Abrams (1982), I 
commence and center my research around an event; “a transformation device between 
past and future,” that serves as the principal point of access to the structuring and 
meaning of social action (p.191).  In addition to trying to elucidate the longue duree, 
examination of particular events becomes of central importance in historical analysis 
since they are full of empirical content and provide us with a lens to better perceive 
and make sense of social structure and process.  For the purpose of this study, I 
designate the 1989 Caracazo as the crucial ‘event’ in Venezuela in which the 
‘becoming’ of the Bolivarian Revolution is crystallized in a moment of being.  In other 
words, this event represents the peculiarly forceful and transparent meeting of action 
and structure that signifies the starting point of the mass popular movement known as 
the Bolivarian Revolution that triumphantly took state power just one decade later.   
 Abrams (1982) argues that when analyzing events problems of method arise; 
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specifically those of detail, concreteness, and uniqueness arise.  In fact, he maintains 
that the event is “constituted by its details; it is a specific, bounded happening to be 
studied, elucidated and explained in terms of other specific, bounded happenings that 
precede, surround and compose it” (p.192).  Moreover, he points out that in 
constructing an event as an object of study the researcher will naturally have to select 
particular details from a wide range of available details, and that it is the criteria of 
selecting detail that gives the work its force and validity.   
According to Abrams (1982), the importance of the concreteness of events is 
their significance as “markers of transition” (Abrams 1982: p.195).  In the case of the 
Caracazo this significant happening marked a historic transition in Venezuela, in 
which the demise of the traditional liberal bourgeois political system was effectively 
completed and the construction of a participatory democratic model commenced 
through the birth of a mass popular movement.  Additionally, Abrams (1982) argues 
that what gives an event its uniqueness is the conjunction of elements that it embodies.  
Therefore in terms of the Caracazo what marks its uniqueness is the spontaneous 
eruption of a mass popular movement in Venezuela (the first of its kind in nearly four 
decades) against both the imposition of neo-liberal structural adjustments and the 
continuing deterioration of the well-being of the poor and working-class majority.   
In the methodological process of constructing the Caracazo, I identify details 
that I feel accurately account for the multiple historical and global influences that 
shaped and allowed this event to take place.  Thus I believe that only by way of 
historical analysis can we study and comprehend the numerous interactive influences 
that contributed to the decision of the popular Venezuelan forces to rebel in February 
of 1989.  More specifically, the combination of various social, political, and economic 
factors opened the door for the development and strengthening of a popular movement 
that sought to change the status quo in Venezuela.  Additionally it is important to see 
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that instead of regarding revolution as inevitable, or as being the only inevitable 
option, it must be understood as only one among many possible courses of action (i.e. 
continuing to be servile, employing reformist tactics of social change, etc). Thus 
revolution must be viewed as an option that emerged among many others because of 
various historical factors.  
In taking the above methodological considerations into account, an 
examination of the historical context of Venezuela from the colonial period to 1935 
reveals that a unique social configuration developed in Venezuela.  That is, the relative 
decline in the importance of land and agriculture due to the overwhelming dominance 
of the oil industry impeded the development of an industrial base in Venezuela, and 
thus also of a strong and organized working-class.  It also meant that the consolidation 
of a powerful landowning elite and the organization of a forceful peasant movement 
failed to materialize.  What this particular social configuration (weak working-class, 
fragmented landowning elite, and passive peasantry) resulted in was relative social 
stability in the country.  As will be demonstrated, this in turn allowed for the creation 
and long-term maintenance of a liberal bourgeois governing system.  Yet it also made 
possible the coalescing of diverse sectors of the population and the subsequent 
development of the mass popular movement known as the Bolivarian Revolution that 
has as its goal the creation of a homegrown form of socialism for the 21st century.  
Besides providing the evidence to answer my research questions this 
methodological approach is utilized to adjudicate the successes and limitations of 
Venezuela’s Bolivarian Revolution.  It accomplishes these tasks by focusing on and 
using the specific societal structural changes and socio-political transformations that 
the Bolivarian Revolution has achieved in Venezuela.  The nature and extent of these 
social and political transformations therefore serve as the ‘data’ or evidence used in 
order to assess the success and failure of the Bolivarian Revolution. 
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The focus of the study is thus to assess the policies of the government and their 
impact on the structures of Venezuela society. I hope to discover how much indeed the 
current government has been able to move away from neo-liberal policies (and 
capitalist ones in general). Thus I examine the governance, social, economic, and 
foreign policies of the government. I will analyze to what extent the previous elite 
structure of power has been dismantled and the transformations that have occurred in 
the ownership of the means of production and in local and national authority.  I want 
to understand how the balance of power between social forces has changed.  I also 
provide quantitative data from various sources showing changes in levels of poverty, 
unemployment, informality, extent of land reform, access to social services, wages, 
and other indicators.  
My research therefore consists of a qualitative analysis of the Bolivarian 
Revolution.  It primarily makes use of secondary sources such as scholarly journals, 
books, and internet resources.  Additionally it uses primary data from various sources: 
literature from Venezuelan non-governmental organizations; documents, speeches, 
and newsletters from the government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela; 
statistical information on Latin America from the United Nations; documents from 
Venezuelan cooperatives and citizen-run communal councils; and articles from 
Venezuelan newspapers and magazines.    
 Finally, in accepting C. Wright Mills’ argument that, “there is no way in which 
any social scientist can avoid assuming choices of value and implying them in his 
work as a whole” (1959, p.177), I wish to openly state my critical support for counter-
movements to the neo-liberal order, particularly that of the Bolivarian Revolution, 
which in this case will be the object of my study.  This explicit and honest 
acknowledgement of my values does not in any way diminish the validity of my 
research.  Instead, being forthright as a researcher regarding my values and position 
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helps readers to understand where I am situated in relation to my investigation, while 
also contributing a unique perspective to current political debates regarding the revival 
of socialism in Latin American.  Therefore this study is both a theoretical and political 
intervention.  By placing the current attempt at social transformation in Venezuela 
within its spatio-temporal, cultural, and socio-historical context, and by highlighting 
the contradictions of the dominant economic orthodoxy, my intention is to influence 
the current debate and struggle in formulating alternatives to the hegemonic neo-
liberal model of development.    
 
Chapter Outlines 
In the following chapter I carry out a socio-historical analysis from the colonial 
period to 1935, when Venezuela liberated itself from the long Gomez dictatorship.  
The purpose of this chapter is to allow us to understand the emergence and 
development of the current attempt at social transformation in Venezuela, by 
demonstrating how the Bolivarian Revolution is shaped by, and constitutive of, the 
country’s broader socio-historical trajectory. The analysis of the complex socio-
political trajectories not only helps to explain the creation of a stable liberal bourgeois 
democracy in Venezuela, but also sheds light into the country’s contemporary reality.  
What emerges is a complex social configuration in the country that is quite unique to 
Latin America, and that is crucial in helping to comprehend how today’s transition 
towards ‘twenty-first century socialism’ in Venezuela was made possible.  
In the third chapter, I trace Venezuela’s socio-political trajectory from the end 
of the Gomez regime in 1935 until the Caracazo uprising of 1989.  The chapter begins 
with the political opening that came about with the fall of the Gomez dictatorship in 
1935, and which signaled the start of important socio-political economic 
transformations in Venezuela.  This momentous event occurred in the context of the 
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historical conjuncture that saw the entire world gripped by the most severe economic 
crisis of modern times that dismantled the entire global financial and trading system. 
In this chapter I attempt to uncover the meaning, cause, and significance of the 
exclusionary two-party pact known as puntofijismo, which allowed the old political 
system (through systematical exclusion of all leftist parties) to rule for four decades, 
while also situating Venezuela within the larger historical context of the Cold War era, 
and dominance of the Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) development strategy 
in Latin American from 1930-1970.    
In the fourth chapter of the thesis, I analyze the beginning of the neo-liberal 
era, which I maintain is just simply another phase of capitalist accumulation and 
exploitation.  It begins by studying the implication of the collapse of the development 
framework, and of the economic stagnation and debt crisis that gripped Latin America. 
This is followed by an overview of the specific kinds of neo-liberal policies that were 
carried out in Venezuela, and what their effects on Venezuelan society were.  Rising 
insecurity among the working-class and poor, increased ecological damage, and a 
growing informal economy are among the effects that are examined.   
The fifth chapter analyzes the crisis of neo-liberalism, and situates Chavismo 
within the Latin American experience of resistance.  We will examine the social 
backlash to both this economic deterioration and to the subsequent imposition of a 
pattern of neo-liberal development that profoundly restructured Latin American 
economic systems. We are then able to study the popular response to neo-liberalism in 
Venezuela in particular that manifested itself in the form of Chavismo and the rise of 
the Bolivarian Revolution more generally. 
The sixth and final chapter of this thesis explores the uniqueness and 
complexity of the Bolivarian Revolution, as well as the specific social transformations 
that have been accomplished and those that have yet to be achieved.  It acknowledges 
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the new Constitution as the clearest example of the progressive nature of the socially 
transformative processes underway in Venezuela.  Moreover it is argued that while 
broad citizen participation is advancing, it still needs to be further institutionalization 
at the national level.  The chapter also deals with the question of whether the 
constitution moves beyond its formality on paper, to its actual implementation for the 
advancement of social transformation.  It particularly concentrates on two fundamental 
concepts of social transformation - self-management and self-governance.  These two 
ideas that are based on the principles of sovereignty, cooperation, and justice are 
regarded as direct challenges to the neo-liberal model of development and to the logic 
of capital.  A larger theme that emerges from the institutionalization of these concepts 
is that of human development; a quintessential aspect and goal of the Bolivarian 
Revolution.  
 In the concluding remarks, I suggest that the transition towards socialism in 
Venezuela is in fact creating new paths toward the construction of alternative forms of 
social organization and political-economic decision-making and management that 
need to be carefully examined worldwide by others seeking more just and sustainable 
societies.  The failure of the capitalist model of development to create an equitable and 
sustainable society where everyone is able to fulfill their human potentials (and its 
neo-liberal form) has become blatantly evident, as has the need for real and profound 
change to the current world order.  The Bolivarian Revolution has brought to light the 
failures of the capitalist model of development and to the need for anti-capitalist 
alternatives that stop the pillaging and plundering of the planet and exploitation of 
workers.  I argue that while the Bolivarian Revolution has achieved significant social 
and political-economic transformations that challenge capitalist values, there still has 
yet to be a fundamental overcoming of the capitalist system. 
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     CHAPTER 2  
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
 
In order to comprehend the emergence and development of the current attempt 
at social transformation in Venezuela it is necessary to examine how the Bolivarian 
Revolution is shaped by the country’s broader socio-historical trajectory.  This chapter 
therefore historicizes the current situation by closely examining Venezuela’s overall 
socio-political dynamics since the colonial period.  What emerges is a complex social 
configuration in the country that is quite unique to Latin America, and that is crucial 
for explaining the particular social configuration of the Bolivarian transformation 
under Hugo Chavez.  
 
‘Coloniality of Power’ 
The rapid growth of colonial society in Venezuela, and in the New World in 
general, meant the simultaneous struggle to create and implement institutions of 
government by imperial Spain (Tarver and Frederick, 2005).  This colonial period also 
witnessed the establishment of the Catholic Church as an institution and the setting up 
of Latin grammar schools in Venezuela, in addition to the Christianization and so-
called education of the indigenous peoples by missionaries.  Most important, however, 
was the commencement of a process of mestizaje, or increased racial mixing, which 
generated a complex system of social stratification that would become a “crucial 
element of the territory’s mature colonial identity” (Tarver and Frederick, 2005: p.31).  
One key aspect of this process was the forced introduction of enslaved Africans and 
the influx of Spanish and Portuguese immigrants, which led to quick and intense 
transformations in the demographics of colonial Venezuela.   
Here it is important to note Quijano’s concept of the ‘coloniality of power’ that 
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stipulates that the idea of race in its modern meaning seems to have begun with the 
colonization of America and the “phenotypic differences between conquerors and 
conquered” (Quijano, 2000: 534). The larger significance of this was the subsequent 
construction of race as a category to distinguish between the supposedly differential 
biological structures of European colonialists and American natives, thereby 
producing new historical social identities- Indians, blacks, and mestizos.  At first, 
racial mixing was confined to the creation of the mestizo ethnic group that emerged 
from the mixing of white males and Indian women.  However, after the forced 
introduction of people from Africa, racial mixing also created the mulato or pardo 
ethnic group (between white men and black women) and zambo or sambo (between 
Indian men and black women).   
This complex racial mix led to a high level of stratification within the country 
based on skin color, whereby the white criollos purposely and forcefully fought to 
maintain their elite status by restricting the social mobility of so-called inferiors, like 
the majority pardo ethnic group.  In other words, the imposition of this new model of 
colonial domination that saw race and racial identity as “instruments of basic social 
classification,” allowed the white criollo elites to maintain dominance over so-called 
inferior races, thus greatly influencing the shaping of Venezuela’s identity and social 
configuration (Quijano, 2000: 534).   
The Eurocentric system based on the idea of race saw the confinement of 
Indians to serfdom, blacks to slavery, dominant white class of Spaniards and 
Portuguese to independent commodity production, and white European nobility to 
military and civil colonial administrative positions (Quijano, 2000).  This 
“antagonistic social environment” and hierarchy, in which oppressed ethnic groups 
would struggle for equal rights with criollos, would persist all throughout Venezuelan 
history and help to shape overall the socio-political landscape of the country (Tarver 
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and Frederick, 2005: p.44).  We will now see how this systematic racist division of 
labor and model of power set up by European colonialists played a central role in the 
expansion of the process of accumulation and the maintenance of the colonial 
mercantilist economy. 
 
Social Structure of Colonial Society 
The formation and maintenance of this colonial economy was facilitated by the 
pre-conquest social organization of the indigenous populations, which provided 
Spaniards with an exploitable source of labor (Roseberry, 1983).  The colonial era saw 
the subjugation and extraction of indigenous labor by Spanish settlers through 
encomiendas (tracts of land together with their Indian inhabitants granted to colonists), 
whereby latifundia (large estates of agricultural land) were set up to maintain the 
country’s predominantly agricultural plantation economy based on the production of 
cacao, tobacco, wheat flour, and cowhides for internal consumption back in the 
motherland.  The development of the base for colonial towns in Venezuela entailed 
subduing the indigenous populations and forcing them to submit to Spanish rule, 
thereby enabling the establishment of towns in particular locations and their 
subsequent division into encomiendas.  Thus entire indigenous communities were 
granted in encomienda to Spanish colonialists who settled in Venezuelan towns.  The 
encomenderos were then allowed to extract indigenous labor, which included the 
appropriation of several days of labor per week from each Indian of his encomienda 
(Roseberry, 1983).  Perhaps the only concession bestowed by the colonialists to the 
Indian communities was the granting of plots for the growing of traditional crops for 
their own subsistence.   
Important to note, however, is that the encomienda did not necessarily mean 
ownership of land, but simply a right to labor tribute.  Ultimately, the Spanish Crown 
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remained the sole owner of the land.  This encomienda system would continue to exist 
in Venezuela for about a century after the establishment of private property in 1591.  It 
wasn’t until 1687 when a royal order outlawed the labor service by Indians, greatly 
reducing the importance of the indigenous population as a source of labor, that the 
encomienda came to an end and gave way to the rise of the privately-owned hacienda.  
During this time production relations would undergo a constant process of 
transformation as vast amounts of lands were sold throughout the country.   
What resulted was a new pattern of land use that established two forms of 
landed property (Roseberry, 1983).  The first of these was private property, or 
posesiones, which were essentially large, indivisible parcels of land that were sold to 
Spanish colonialists.  The second was community reserve land, or resguardos, for 
indigenous populations.  Throughout the colonial era, posesiones and resguardos 
either remained intact or were divided with the passing of generations and further 
selling of land and land rights.     
This pattern of land ownership and of production relations would persist until 
the nineteenth century, when the indigenous population lost even more of its 
importance as a source of labor due to its displacement by the non-Indian Spanish and 
mestizo populations.  In fact, the land that had been granted to indigenous populations 
back in the sixteenth century was subject to forced expropriations throughout the 
eighteenth century, causing both the displacement of many indigenous communities 
and the overall alienation of Indian land by the nineteenth century (Roseberry, 1983).  
Thus the basic class relationship in colonial Venezuela was transformed from one that 
included a landowning elite and a class of agricultural producers who were either 
landless or owned land in community, to one in which the landowning class sought 
labor for their haciendas from agricultural producers that were unable to provide for 
their own subsistence (Roseberry, 1983).  The basic nature of class division was also 
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transformed.  Previously, this division had been exclusively between Europeans and 
indigenous communities, but this changed as mestizos and late-arriving Europeans 
constituted an ever greater segment of the labor force.  As it turned out, colonial 
commerce in Venezuela based on these exploitative relationships was quite successful, 
especially due to the boom in cacao trade that allowed for impressive economic 
growth.           
 
Wars of Independence and Oligarchic Factionalism 
This intertwined examination of the ‘coloniality of power’ (Quijano, 2000) and 
the social structure of colonial society allows for a more complete understanding of 
the development of Venezuela’s social composition throughout the 19th century.  
Along with the economic success of colonial commerce came a growing demand for 
greater participation in provincial affairs by the country’s white criollo population, 
some of which was eventually granted by the recently inaugurated Bourbon dynasty of 
Spain.  Yet, an increasing desire among the Venezuelan colonial elite for an expanded 
role in the management of their government would only continue intensifying 
throughout the years.  In addition to this struggle by the colonial elites against the 
Spanish Crown, agitation amongst themselves had also been brewing for years so that 
eventually two camps emerged in the independence movement: one of pro-autonomy 
loyalists who enjoyed the backing of the Spanish troops and another that demanded 
complete independence from the Spanish Crown and self-government.   
Events in Europe also played a significant role in triggering this split.  
Napolean Bonaparte unilaterally placed his brother on the Spanish throne in 1808, 
after forcing Spanish King Carlos IV and his heir to the throne, Fernando VII, on 
house arrest.  In retaliation to this imposition by Napolean many Spaniards created 
juntas in the name of Fernando VII.  This struggle culminated with the events that 
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transpired on April 19, 1810 on the streets of Caracas, Venezuela, which signaled the 
beginning of the end of Spanish rule in the country.  On this day the white criollo 
population organized itself peacefully in a demonstration and set up a national junta to 
rule Venezuela, while also demanding the end of the colonial Venezuelan government 
and forcing the removal of its captain-general, Juan de Casas. 
Among the actions of the newly created junta, was the opening up of 
Venezuelan ports to free trade and the putting to an end of the slave trade.  However, 
these actions were seen by many in Venezuela as authoritarian, thereby fueling 
polarization within the country between groups who supported the junta and others 
that wished to remain loyal to the Spanish Crown.  Eventually on July 5, 1811 the pro-
independence leaders announced the break with Spanish Crown rule and the 
establishment of the first Venezuelan Republic.  While the new constitution included 
the elimination of many feudal traditions and the abolishment of slavery (many white 
criollos planters however still refused to free their slaves), it only granted limited 
rights of citizenship to free blacks and pardos (full citizenship was reserved only for 
property owners).  Moreover, it arbitrarily placed restrictions on llaneros, or ranchers 
from the grasslands, such as requiring them to possess documents proving their 
employment at haciendas (large estates) and instituting vagrancy laws against those 
who were unemployed (Tarver and Frederick, 2005). The announcement of 
independence also meant that revolutionary action on the part of patriots was both 
necessary and imminent.   
 Two of the principal patriots seeking independence were leading white 
criollos, Simon Bolivar and Francisco de Miranda, both of whom had already been 
involved in the planning of various revolutionary plots.  These two figures represented 
the independence group, which called for revolution and self-government.  There had 
also though, previously been other attempted revolts like the one in 1795 led by Jose 
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Leonardo Chirino, a zambo who had been inspired by the Haitian Revolution.  In fact, 
both the Haitian and American Revolutions and their ideals of liberty, sovereignty, 
and equality provided a source of inspiration and motivation to those seeking Spanish 
American independence (Tarver and Frederick, 2005).  On the other side, in 
opposition to the pro-independence faction, were the pro-autonomy loyalists who 
enjoyed the backing of the Spanish troops.  Finally, in July of 1821, the two decade 
long military struggle that combined uprisings, revolution, and war came to an end 
with the achievement of Venezuelan independence.  The devastating wars of 
independence in Venezuela had a debilitating effect on the colonial elite, which 
besides fighting off the shackles of Spanish dominance had also engaged in brutal 
confrontations with itself 
Unsurprisingly, independence had not brought with it an end to the internal 
elite struggle in the country. Instead oligarchic factionalism persisted and manifested 
itself in the form of regional caudillo battles for political power and constant civil 
wars.  While the causes of these long civil wars were many and complex in nature, 
they dealt largely with the desire of the victorious caudillos to maintain the status-quo 
oligarchic system of governance, which among its ranks included both the ruling 
conservative elites and caudillos from the earlier emancipation wars.  The criollo 
landowning oligarchy, much of which supported and fought in the independence 
struggles, was able to maintain its position and power following the liberation from 
Spain.  In this sense, the socio-political structure in Venezuela remained relatively 
unchanged for years after independence as conservative rule dominated.     
Throughout the country caudillos had been rewarded with plentiful tracts of 
land from the Spanish colonial latifundias, and they now demanded assurances of the 
protection of their prestige and privilege through increased political authority.  
Unsurprisingly, they fought fiercely to maintain the regionalistic caudillo system that 
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gave them control over entire regions of the country.  Determined to expand their 
political-economic autonomy, these regional landowning caudillos also sought to 
prevent the centralization of power by the post-independence Paez government (1831-
1848) and ruling elites (Tarver and Frederick, 2005).  A growing movement of liberal 
landlords in favor of a strong centralized government stood in sharp opposition to a 
more conservative group that preferred a decentralized government and regional 
autonomy.  The division among the oligarchy between conservatives and liberals 
would only continue to intensify throughout the years.  Overall, the remainder of the 
nineteenth century in Venezuela was characterized by political personalism, continued 
division and polarization of the country’s political landscape and oligarchy due to 
opposing regional identities, and the absence of a state-building apparatus.   
 
Break and Reintegration with World Economy: The Rise of Venezuela’s Coffee 
Economy 
Following independence Latin American nations experienced a temporary 
break with the international economy and a subsequent restructuring of their 
economies, resulting in a complete shift away from colonial mercantilism and towards 
a model of outward economic growth based entirely on the export of primary goods. 
For Venezuela its liberation from colonial ties and the end of Spain’s commercial 
monopoly meant the country’s reintegration into the world capitalist economy and 
global division of labor, mainly as a supplier of coffee for export.  It also represented 
the elite’s (both foreign and national) new method of exploitation and capital 
accumulation.  Thus the development of the nineteenth century coffee economy in 
Venezuela must be understood in terms of the global capitalist economic system of 
which it forms a part.   
Post-independence Venezuela signaled the country’s coming into direct 
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contact with the “developing centers of capitalist production” through the export and 
sale of its agricultural commodities in “international markets at the center of the 
capitalist system” (Roseberry 1983: p.100).  As the Venezuela economy experienced a 
steady conversion towards coffee production in the first half of the nineteenth century 
cacao’s reign as the main export commodity slowly eroded.  Yet it was not until the 
second half of the nineteenth century that coffee would overtake cacao and become the 
dominant export commodity in the Venezuela economy, with its key production center 
in the Andes constituting more than half of the country’s total production (Roseberry, 
1983).  The increasing dependence on coffee throughout the nineteenth century forced 
the country to “confront the international market as a monocrop producer and 
exporter, subject to price fluctuations on that market” (Roseberry 1983: p.72).     
The post-war Venezuelan coffee boom saw an influx of migrants from 
southern Europe, ready to become growers and traders of coffee in the market towns.  
Consequently, the development of the coffee economy was very much dependent on 
immigration.  This was true for almost all of Latin America, where a favorable 
immigration policy allowed for a massive influx of European peasants who served to 
maintain sufficient labor supply for large export-oriented coffee estates and cattle 
ranches (Llambi, 1989).  Coffee’s profitability enriched recently arrived British 
merchants, while also benefiting already established German, British, and Italian 
entrepreneurs of the trading companies in the major port city of Maracaibo.  Despite 
the presence and influence of these foreigners, Venezuelan coffee production and 
marketing remained under local control.  The Venezuelan Andes saw the increased 
exploitation of land for coffee production, and the establishment of new towns and 
cities serving as centers of production and commercialization.  This expansion of the 
export sector also entailed the development of a more complex transportation network 
in which new road systems and railroads were constructed to link production centers 
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with port towns like Maracaibo, with local merchants serving as intermediaries 
between the two. 
 
Land and Social Configuration in 19th Century Venezuela 
The development and success of the nineteenth century coffee economy 
created further transformations to the social configuration of Venezuela.  Most 
importantly, were the new relationships and tensions that arose between social actors 
as a result of the emergence of two new social classes in the country – a local 
merchant class closely linked with the Maracaibo commercial trading firms that 
bought coffee and transported it to the ports, and that of a “property-holding, 
commodity-producing peasantry” (Roseberry 1983: p.76).  To help us understand 
these new dynamics Roseberry (1983) makes reference to an analysis of the coffee 
economy done by Carvallo and Rios de Hernandez (1979) in which the authors make 
the important observation that the hacendados (owners of haciendas) continued being 
the dominant class in Venezuela in the nineteenth century just as they had been 
throughout the colonial era.  That is, the ability of the large landowning farmers of the 
central and coastal areas of the country to incorporate coffee into the traditional 
hacienda structure, allowed the maintenance and reinforcement of the basic class 
structure (Roseberry, 1983).  Carvallo and Hernandez (1979) describe this structure as 
being constituted by a plantation sector and conuco sector.  They classify the former as 
being controlled by the hacienda owners and specializing in commercial crops like 
cacao and coffee, while the concuco sector was managed by tenant farmers and used 
exclusively for subsistence crops.   
Yet, the dominance of large landowners that existed in the central regions of 
the country was not characteristic of the Venezuela Andes, where instead there tended 
to be a decline in the hacendados as a political class and the ascendance of a new 
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export-merchant class.  Therefore, throughout the nineteenth century these two groups 
would engage in a fierce power struggle with the overall result being the “social 
eclipse” of the landlord class (Roseberry 1983: p.96).  Although the political and 
economic power of large landowners persisted they now had to contend with the 
growing influence of a merchant class.  The success of the coffee economy elevated 
the importance of trading companies in port cities like Maracaibo, and thus also of the 
group of large merchants that specialized in coffee.  As we will now see, this group of 
large wealthy merchants accumulated their capital by either supplying producers of 
coffee with production and consumption goods and credit in exchange for the coffee 
that they would later sell, or by simply buying the coffee directly from intermediaries 
such as petty merchants and then selling it for a profit.   
 
Land and the Peasantry 
Along with rise of the coffee economy also came further changes to the nature 
of landed property in Venezuela.  Since the eighteenth century a series of laws had 
begun instituting the sanctity of private property, and negatively impacting the lives of 
small farmers.  Judicial demarcations now allowed large landowners to buy large plots 
of land and restrict access to their properties.  These large landlords usually divided 
their farms into smaller family units, so that small farmers held control over small 
coffee plots and paid the landlords a share of the yield in kind.  Alternatively, 
landlords could retain control over the coffee plots by simply hiring small farmers for 
their labor on the coffee patches and in exchange granting them access to subsistence 
plots.   
These sharecropping and tenant farmer arrangements provided the basis for 
accumulation through the coffee economy.  Additionally, Indian reserve lands that had 
been communally owned were further divided during this time until being completely 
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transformed into private property.  Roseberry (1983) points out that this division of 
properties and reserves served the purpose of securing and fostering capital investment 
and the establishment of the coffee economy.  In other words, the division of land and 
conversion to private property for large landowners was needed to foster capital 
accumulation, since investors demanded secure land whose ownership was not in 
dispute and would not be subject to conflicting claims.  
In addition to properties and reserves a third component - terrenos baldios - 
contributed to the continuation of this accumulation of capital and to the creation of 
the foundations for small-scale production (Roseberry, 1983).  These relatively 
uncultivated national lands were slowly occupied by squatters who set up family farms 
largely for the cultivation of coffee, but also for the production of their subsistence 
crops.  Family farms therefore constituted an important part of the coffee economy as 
the small coffee farmers that occupied them were forced to enter into credit relations 
with merchants in order to attain better equipment for the production of their coffee 
and to be able to satisfy their own consumption needs.  The decision to grow coffee 
was a sacrifice for these small farmers due to the burdensome initial start-up costs that 
plunged them into endless debt with merchants, and also reduced the amount of time 
and labor that they could dedicate to the production of subsistence crops.   
This direct relationship between small farmers and merchants gave the latter a 
structural claim to a share of the former’s surplus product.  Thus small farmers 
become proprietors with independence from landlords, but under constant debt burden 
to the possessors of money capital, merchants, who were becoming dominant in the 
coffee region.  The combined effect of the growing influence of merchants and the 
creation of this property-holding peasantry was the further decline of the landlord as a 
social category throughout the country (Roseberry 1983).  
What becomes clear from this analysis is that the formation of the peasantry in 
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Venezuela is inseparable from the imposition and development of a particular form of 
capitalist social relations in the country (Roseberry, 1983).  The growing dominance 
of commodity production for export and the ever increasing dependence of peasants 
on merchants for the reproduction of their farms meant the transformation of labor 
power into a commodity.  Moreover, capitalism’s destructive forces such as the 
breakdown of closely nit family and community social relations and networks 
provided the basis by which the peasantry evolved.  The further division and 
alienation of communal forms of landed property like Indian reserve lands eliminated 
the basis for indigenous identity and permitted the establishment of small-scale private 
property, thus precipitating the formation of a peasantry (Roseberry, 1983).    
This new reality presented an interesting contradiction.  On the one hand, 
peasants were now forced to obtain investment of capital for production and 
subsistence needs, thus tying them more closely to the means of production.  At the 
same time, they were further divorced from those same means of production.  Thus, 
Roseberry (1983) argues that while Venezuela’s small farmers were alienated through 
their long-term credit relationships with merchants, they were in fact a sort of peasant-
proletariat hybrid since they retained some control over the means of production but 
had not experienced the “final separation characteristic of industrial capital” (p.109).  
Furthermore, he points out that the ability of peasants to maintain some, albeit minor 
control over the production process allowed them to accumulate a portion of their total 
product; an impossibility according to the rules of industrial capital (Roseberry, 1983). 
Equally important to note is that most of the Venezuelan peasantry had never 
truly been an undifferentiated class (Roseberry, 1983).  Instead, it was comprised of 
heterogeneous elements, including Indians from former reserve lands, migrants that 
had settled on national lands, and people from divided colonial properties.  The 
development of small-scale private property only enhanced the diversity of the 
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peasantry, as some peasants went on to produce coffee for oversees markets and other 
produced minor crops for local and regional consumption.  Peasants who worked in 
the privileged coffee economy tended to be in better positions than those who 
produced minor crops, thus demonstrating the differential access to land and resources 
that existed among the peasantry.  Generally speaking, the Venezuelan peasantry of 
the coffee economy consisted of family farmers in commercial production who were 
either dependent renters or independent landowners or squatters (Roseberry, 1983). 
All this is to demonstrate the historical formation of a politically weak 
Venezuelan peasantry with little structural unity and unable to organize itself as a 
class.  The breakdown of communal lands and networks along with the fragmentation 
of the peasantry paved the way for the development of a rural environment where 
competition and conflict predominated.  The forging of alliances between peasants and 
merchants, creation of local factions, favoring of some peasants over others, and 
disparity between wealthy and poor peasants all added to the heterogeneity and 
division of the peasantry.  These factors along with the strong promotion of forces 
against community ideology and practice, and the demise of agriculture in the early 
twentieth century following the creation of the petroleum industry, to be later 
examined, all help to explain the overall passivity of the Venezuela peasantry.  This 
relative passivity marks a striking feature of the peasant movement in Venezuela that 
greatly distinguishes it from other Latin American nations where violent peasant 
struggles have been the norm.   
As Venezuela entered the twentieth century, its once dynamic coffee economy 
slowly began showing signs of its limits and eventual demise.  The turn of the century 
brought with it several problems for the coffee economy including price fluctuations 
of coffee and decreased availability of high quality land.  While the coffee sector 
remained profitable, it was clear that production had begun to level off and that 
  
 32 
 
 
 
 
transformations were imminent.   
 
The Gomez Era Begins 
The end of the nineteenth century in Venezuela witnessed the rise of the 
liberals from the Andean state of Tachira, and signaled the start of important social, 
economic, and political changes.  In 1899 the strong liberal national army of Cipriano 
Castro succeeded in marching into Caracas and seizing power, in an event referred to 
as the Revolución Liberal Restauradora (Tarver and Frederick, 2005).  This 
acquisition of control over the Venezuela central government by the liberal strongman 
cemented the shift in regional power from conservatives to liberals in the country.   
Shortly thereafter, an event took place in the country that would have profound 
consequences on Venezuelan society for years to come.  On December 19, 1908 a 
prominent coffee hacendado and military general by the name of Juan Gomez would 
seize power from the Cipriano Castro government, continuing a long period of 
military strongman rule.  The installation of the personalistic dictatorship of Juan 
Gomez in 1908 led to greatly enhanced centralization and control of state power, thus 
producing significant transformations throughout the country as the state machinery 
for the first time was able to integrate the Venezuelan social formation and begin 
dismantling the regional bases of political and economic power (Roseberry, 1983).  
Gomez therefore came to represent the ideal Venezuelan caudillo while 
simultaneously dismantling the era of the regional caudillo through his ability to 
consolidate power nationally through a strongman military strategy.   
Gomez was able to take advantage of this to intensify both the process of 
capital accumulation and modernization in Venezuela.  In this he was greatly aided by 
the momentous event that would forever change the entire social, political, and 
economic identity of Venezuela: the drilling of the first commercial oil well in the 
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country in February 1914.  It was during the Gomez era that the country’s 
transformation from an agricultural export economy to a petroleum republic was set 
into motion.  As we will see, the previously noted oligarchic factionalism combined 
with the emergence and subsequent growth of the country’s immense oil wealth 
contributed heavily to the severe marginalization of the role of land as a source of 
capital and investment, which in turn prevented the consolidation existence of a strong 
traditional landowning oligarchy in Venezuela (Anderson, 1986).    
 
The Rise of a Petroleum Republic 
 The discovery of petroleum in 1914 on the eastern shore of Lake Maracaibo by 
the Caribbean Petroleum Corporation (Shell) at Mene Gande coincided with the start 
of the bloody First World War.  Thus it is important to place Venezuela’s 
transformation into a petroleum republic in the context of the international conjuncture 
within which it occurred.  This global war which saw the creation of a series of 
alliances and war declarations between nations engulfed the entire European continent, 
and spread to other areas like Africa and the Middle East.  Its end results were the 
redrawing of much of Europe as empires fell and new nations were created, as well as 
setting the stage for future world conflicts.  Most importantly, however, the four year 
struggle between the global powers took a significant toll on human life (40 million 
casualties) and had extraordinary economic consequences.  In order to sustain their 
war efforts nations looked abroad for the resources they desperately needed.     
In Venezuela, the Gomez dictatorship enjoyed both the prosperity that came to 
Latin American following WWI, as well as the recently found wealth from petroleum.  
That is, while the regime maintained domestic peace by way of force, intimidation, 
and repression, it simultaneously capitalized on the prosperity of the coffee and 
petroleum industries.  The dramatically increasing revenues being pumped into the 
  
 34 
 
 
 
 
government’s coffers through these industries allowed Gomez to advance his plans for 
accumulation of capital and modernization.    
Venezuela had begun to export petroleum in 1917, just three years after its 
discovery in the country.  The transformation of the country that ensued, from a 
largely agriculturally based society to an oil exporting one, was dramatic.  Moreover, 
the historical (and contemporary) significance of the emergence of Venezuela’s oil-
based economy is immeasurable.  At the time coffee production was the only viable 
sector of Venezuela’s economy (cacao and cowhide exports were greatly declining), 
providing more than one million bags of coffee for the rest of the world.  A decade 
later, by 1929, Venezuela had become the world’s second largest oil producer after the 
U.S. and the leader in the export of oil, with over 100 million barrels sold abroad 
yearly (Wilpert, 2007).  Incredibly, the contribution of oil to Venezuela’s economy 
skyrocketed from 1.9% of exports in 1920 to 91.2% in 1935, leading to the near total 
extinction of agricultural production and stagnation of industrialization in comparison 
to the other nations of Latin America (Wilpert, 2007).  In fact, agriculture would later 
go on to play a smaller role in the Venezuelan economy than in virtually any other 
Latin American country, so much so that by the 1980s the sector only contributed 
about 5.9 percent of GDP, employed 13 percent of the labor force, and accounted for a 
dismal 1 percent of total exports (U.S. Library of Congress 2007).  The results of this 
radical change in Venezuela, in which oil became the country’s so-called life-blood, 
included reduced class-based politics, a weakening of the traditional elite, and a 
further over-concentration of state power.        
 Roseberry (1989) distinguishes between two periods of the petroleum industry; 
one of simple growth from 1920-1945 and another of more complex development 
from 1945 onward.  During the first period of simple growth he explains that the 
industry was a sort of enclave within the Venezuelan economy that employed just a 
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small fraction of the country’s population yet produced the majority of its wealth.  
With few regulations and many concessions granted to them, foreign oil companies 
were able to dictate their own terms, build private road networks, and prevent the 
Venezuela state from receiving the benefits of its own patrimony.  Moreover, as a 
result of the petroleum economy complementary industries and services were created 
that enabled the diversification and growth of the nation’s commerce.  This included 
an expanded and more complex bureaucracy and the development of several state 
institutions, as well as the creation of a middle-class made up mostly of public sector 
employees that purchased imported goods from the newly created group of merchants. 
   The commencement of the petroleum era did not necessary produce the 
immediate demise of the coffee economy.  In fact, while coffee prices did fluctuate 
they generally continued to rise throughout the 1920s.  Yet, the settlement of 
petroleum firms in the early period of the petroleum era (1920-1945) in the lowlands 
around Lack Maracaibo and near the Andes created a pull factor that attracted 
migrants from nearby coffee-producing areas like Trujillo, Carache, and Escuque 
(Roseberry 1983).  It was not until the 1930’s that the coffee economy really entered 
into crisis as coffee prices fell considerably, pushing migrants out and causing many 
people to abandon coffee production altogether.  Despite this, agriculture still provided 
22 percent of Venezuela’s GDP and accounted for 60 percent of its labor force as late 
as the 1930’s (U.S. Library of Congress 2007).  While the agricultural sector in the 
country experienced a decline, the tertiary sector saw considerable expansion as public 
institutions were created and commercial activity grew and diversified.    
The inability of the coffee economy to respond to the crisis and to the 
twentieth century national economic transformations in Venezuela that were put into 
motion as a result of the rise of the petroleum industry signified its complete 
disintegration.  Many large landowners were unable to pay back their loans to the 
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state-run Banco y Pacuario (BAP) in the 1930’s, causing them to accept the 
government takeover of their properties (Ellner, 1993).  The extensive public domain 
that resulted from this provided the basis for future government agrarian reform 
efforts, which themselves, lessened the tension that existed between large landowners 
and peasants and prevented the violent peasant struggles of the twentieth century that 
were so characteristic of Mexico, Colombia, Peru, and many other Latin American 
nations (Ellner, 1993).  It is interesting to note, however, that even with the demise of 
the coffee economy and decline in productivity, the number of farms and surface area 
devoted to coffee production nationally actually continued increasing until 1971.  This 
can be explained by the inability of local merchants to collect debts from struggling 
small coffee producers, and their subsequent decision to either attempt to expand 
spatially to squeeze our more coffee, or to sell out to Maracaibo companies (Roseberry 
1983).        
  Again, it is necessary to take into account the global conjuncture within which 
this demise of the coffee economy took place.  The year 1929 marked the beginning of 
the worldwide economic crisis that produced devastating effects for nations around the 
world.  The inability of many European nations to make payments towards the debts 
that they had incurred from the post-WWI rebuilding effort led to several defaults on 
their loans, and accelerated the eventual collapse of banks, financial institutions, and 
overall international monetary system (Makki, 2004).  The stock market crash in the 
U.S. and the overall economic depression in the industrialized countries resulted in a 
great reduction in the demand for raw materials from Latin America and thus a drastic 
drop in the region’s exports.  The effect of this external shock was so pronounced for 
Latin American countries that some even experienced reductions of their exports by as 
much as 70 percent (Weaver, 2000).  Consequently, these nations underwent 
significant economic restructuring that shifted their economies from an external to an 
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internal model to cope with the new realities.        
 
 The Differentiation of the Peasantry and the Venezuelan Proletariat 
 Around this same time another important development had already begun 
taking place throughout Latin America and worldwide: the explosion of labor strife.  
That is, the rapid development of industry in the early twentieth century led to the rise 
of an industrial proletariat that would organize itself into strong and politically-
conscious social forces like militant labor unions.  The revolutionary currents in the 
working class that flourished during these years were greatly influenced by and had 
their roots in Marxist and anarchist theory and literature.  Furthermore, the progression 
of socialist and anarchist movements greatly intensified following the unprecedented 
Russian Revolution of 1917, which provided the world’s working-class with an 
important source of inspiration and hope.   
 For Latin America, the increase of industrial activity and the influence of 
socialist and anarchist thought brought over by European migrants meant the 
development and spread of working-class movements and trade unions.  This was 
especially true in countries that saw a greater influx of European migrants, like Chile, 
Argentina, and Brazil, where massive proletarian movements developed and battled 
militantly to combat the exploitative capitalist establishment.  According to Perez 
Sainz & Zarembka (1979) however, in Venezuela it is not possible to speak of an 
industrialization process, “understood as development of the industrial branch of the 
capitalist mode of production,” prior to the 1940’s.  They regard any earlier process as 
minimal and characterize it as petty-commodity in nature.  Yet, as we will see, this did 
not impede the development of various working-class currents in Venezuela.  The 
period of tyranny, economic growth, and modernization that characterized the Gomez 
regime (1908-1935) did not go unopposed.  In fact, over 20 national armed revolts and 
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numerous student-led protests and popular mobilizations took place during this era in 
protest of the brutal Gomez tyranny (Tarver and Frederick, 2005).   
  This important social force would develop quite differently in Venezuela from 
that of the rest of Latin America, where for the most part it proved to be a strong 
socially-conscious political actor.  In Venezuela on the other hand, the absence of a 
strong landed elite class was also accompanied by a relatively weak and unorganized 
working-class.  This would prove a crucial factor in the maintenance of the country’s 
relative political stability, and as will be examined, in the eventual rise and survival of 
the post-1958 liberal democratic system.  But first, it is important to analyze the 
historical formation of the weak Venezuela proletariat; a key social reality with many 
causes.  Most significant among these is the overwhelming influence that oil has 
played in the political-economic sphere of Venezuela after its discovery in the early 
20th century.  In other words, it is demonstrated that the country’s over-dependency on 
oil wealth has had a severely limiting effect on both agricultural production and 
industrialization, therefore contributing to the prevention of the formation of a strong 
and organized working-class. 
To begin, it is important to note that the dominance of latifundia in the 
Venezuelan economy ever since the colonial period meant that the industrial sector 
failed to really take off until the third decade of the twentieth century.  Prior to this, 
the manufacturing that did exist was restricted to small, family-run artisan shops in the 
countryside that processed the products of certain regions (Carrillo Batalla, 1962).  
That is, manufactured good were generally for consumption at the site of their 
production since transportation and technology was not advanced enough for large-
scale national industrial commerce.  As late as the beginning of the twentieth century, 
there still only existed throughout the rural areas a few industries such as beer, textiles, 
cigarettes, and shoes (Quintero, 1966).  In fact during this time industry represented a 
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small sector of Venezuela’s economy, and industrial employment totaled just 39,000 
or 5 percent of the total labor force in 1937 (Fagan, 1974).           
The transformations of the Venezuelan agricultural sector that had commenced 
in the early twentieth century continued into the 1930’s, further changing the overall 
landscape of the countryside.  Roseberry (1983) points out that although labor power 
had slowly been becoming a commodity in Venezuela since the nineteenth century, a 
new feature emerged with the increasing demand for and dominance of wage labor 
starting in the 1930’s.  This new reality was the development of a type of 
proletarianization process of small and middle-level Venezuelan farmers, in which 
peasants who used to work off the farm to supplement farm income now did so to 
supplement wages instead.  The breakdown of family farms and small-farm 
organization led members of farming families to migrate and seek wage labor in order 
to provide income for the livelihood of their families.  Yet, Roseberry (1983) argues 
against the restrictive and idealized versions of proletarians and peasants, and 
proposes that we not treat the process of proletarianization as progressing along an 
even or linear fashion.  The reason for this is the complex nature of wage labor in the 
context of property-holding small farmers in Venezuela, demonstrated by the fact that 
small farmers persisted despite the establishment of capitalist farms (Roseberry, 
1983).             
Overall, therefore, the 1930’s saw the great transformation of the traditional 
latifundia system as the peasantry was largely converted from sharecroppers and 
tenant farmers to small holders and wage laborers, principally as a result of the crisis 
of pre-capitalist agriculture and the emergence of the oil enclave as the principal axis 
of the accumulation process (Perez Sainz & Zarembka, 1979).  The transformation of 
aparceros and arrendatarios (tenant farmers) into jornaleros (day laborers, i.e. wage 
workers) represented the displacement of pre-capitalist forms of production and 
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meant, “the definitive consolidation of the capitalist mode of production as the 
dominant mode in the Venezuela social formation (Perez Sainz & Zarembka, 1979: 
p.6).  Therefore, these important transformations and new realties in the social 
situation of farmers signified the disintegration and internal differentiation of the 
peasantry in Venezuela, and the establishment of a new form of exploitation and 
capital accumulation on the part of the country’s elites.   
What this discussion suggests is that there is a need to conceive of the 
Venezuela working-class as a much broader and complex social group.  This becomes 
even more important when discussing the growth of the industrial development and 
rise of the oil industry in Venezuela during this era, which relegated agriculture to 
permanent secondary status.  The rural surplus population that had been created as a 
consequence of the displacing-effects of the oil enclave allowed the newly created 
capitalist agrarian sector to integrate with the nascent industrial branch (Perez Sainz & 
Zarembka, 1979).   Consequently, it was this labor power that enabled the growth of 
the industrial branch in the country.  The oil branch, however, was able to absorb only 
a small fraction of the large reserve army of labor, leaving millions to find 
employment elsewhere.  In fact, while the oil industry served as the primary generator 
of revenue for the Venezuelan state, and thus the leading source of accumulation, it 
only provided employment for a tiny subset of the entire working class population.   
The existence of a fragmented proletariat, therefore, is no mystery.  By this I 
mean that ever since the early evolvement of a working class in Venezuela there has 
existed an extremely small and privileged sector of the proletariat that works in the oil 
industry, while at the same time the vast majority of the Venezuelan population has 
remained overwhelmingly un-, under-, or self-employed.  According to Anderson 
(1986), the sociological consequences of this have been both the relative absence of 
any massive concentration of workers in the oil industry and the overall weakness of 
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an organized Venezuelan working-class.  In addition, the historically harsh repression 
and exclusion of all forms of political opposition during the Gomez era, especially of 
labor unions and ideologically progressive and left tendencies in Venezuela has further 
impeded any mass working-class mobilization.  As we will see in more detail in a 
discussion of the labor movement in the next chapter, all of these factors together help 
to explain the relative lack of a strong and politically-conscious working-class 
movement in Venezuela.   
 
Conclusion: A Fragmented Landowning Oligarchy, Passive Peasantry, and Weak 
Working-Class  
This chapter has provided a historical overview of the development of the 
social forces in Venezuela, including the traditional landowning class, peasantry, and 
working-class; all of whose strength was greatly weakened through time.  It was 
demonstrated that the overall formation of a weak traditional landowning class and 
discontinuous ownership of the means of agricultural production was the result of a 
series of historical processes which include the country’s bloody independence 
struggles that significantly reduced the influence of colonial elites, continual 
oligarchic conflict and factionalism, tyrannical rule of Juan Vicente Gomez, and 
displacement of the export economy by petroleum (Anderson, 1986).  Moreover, it 
was shown that the introduction of an export commodity-based capitalist coffee 
economy that dismantled traditional Indian communal forms property and living, in 
addition to the marginalization of land caused by the discovery of petroleum, resulted 
in the formation of an alienated Venezuela peasantry incapable of organizing itself as 
a strong social force.  Finally, the lack of a strong and socially conscious mass 
working-class was found to be a result of the overwhelming dominance of petroleum 
in all spheres of the Venezuelan society and the numerically small privileged 
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proletariat that makes up the industry (Anderson, 1986).  
This analysis of the development and transformation of Venezuela’s overall 
social configuration better allows us to examine the socio-political trajectory of the 
country following the end of the Gomez dictatorship in 1935 and the beginning of an 
important new era in the country.  Furthermore, it is argued that the relationship 
between the three social groups previously analyzed led to a particular socio-political 
formation that provides the basis for an understanding of Venezuela’s current and 
historical social processes and realities.  Most importantly for the purposes of this 
thesis, this overview of Venezuela’s socio-historical context provides the necessary 
foundation by which to then examine the character and significance of the Bolivarian 
Revolution, and its potential construction of an alternative to the neo-liberal model of 
development and capitalism in general. 
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CHAPTER 3  
THE SOCIO-POLITICAL TRAJECTORY (1935 – 1989) 
 
 The fall of the Gomez dictatorship in 1935 signaled the start of important 
socio-political and economic transformations in Venezuela.  This momentous event 
occurred in the context of the historic conjuncture that saw the entire world gripped by 
the most severe economic crisis of modern times.  The Great Depression witnessed the 
breakdown of the entire global financial and trading system.  Moreover, it signaled the 
collapse of the gold standard, which according to Polanyi was the “linchpin of the 
‘self-regulating’ market” (Makki 2004:152).  Among the political-economic 
consequences of this was the rise of new interventionist policies on the part of 
governments worldwide as part of the new development paradigm.  More importantly, 
it was the beginning of yet another phase of the broader, ongoing historical process of 
capitalist accumulation of capital. 
For Latin America, this meant the rise to power of populist coalitions of 
nationalists and industrialists (Makki, 2004), and also the adoption and popularizing of 
import substitution industrialization (ISI) development strategies to deal with the 
region’s problem of exhausted reserves that a collapsed export sector and continued 
imports had produced.  Thus, the post-WWII emergence of the developmentalist 
framework and Venezuela’s own experience with this model will be analyzed 
following an examination of the post-Gomez ‘modernizing’ efforts.  An overview will 
be provided of the treino period and subsequent Perez Jimenez era, both of which 
helped to create the initial foundations for Venezuela’s eventual comprehensive 
developmentalist efforts following the end of the dictatorship.  After an examination 
of the solidification of the rentier state in Venezuela, we look at the Import 
Substitution Industrial (ISI) strategy in Venezuela.  Finally we explain the eventual 
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establishment and consolidation of Venezuela’s long lasting liberal bourgeois system 
of governance following the ousting of the country’s military regime, which signaled 
the definite triumph of a liberal capitalist regime in the country.  Overall, this chapter 
seeks to illuminate the country’s socio-political trajectory with the purpose of 
providing the basis for a more thorough analysis of the origins and ascendance of the 
Bolivarian Revolution as an attempt of social transformation in Venezuela.                               
 
A Political Opening    
The situating of Venezuela’s transition from dictatorial rule to civilian rule in 
the context of the international depression of the 1930’s facilitates the examination of 
the country’s overall socio-political transformations.  This period coincides with the 
growing influence of the Venezuelan bourgeoisie and the further decline of the 
agrarian oligarchy (Ellner, 1984).  Following the economic crisis of the thirties local 
dominant classes had increased their share in the oil surplus.  This surplus was then 
used to finance productive processes such as subsidizing the country’s declining pre-
capitalist agriculture, and promoting capitalist agriculture and the nascent industrial 
sector (Perez Sainz & Zarembka, 1979).  The post-Gomez era included the 
implementation of the state’s first development plans during the Contreras (1936-
1941) regime, and the landmark revision of the petroleum laws by Medina Angarita 
(1941-1945), both of which led to further changes in the country.   
 It is interesting to note that later regimes ironically tried relegating the Gomez 
tyranny to the 'backward' age of Venezuela's past, allowing them to "fashion 
themselves as the deputies of modernity," and thus also permitted the obscuring of 
"their foundations in the Gomez regime, their shared dependence on the oil economy, 
and their extraordinary personalization of state power" (Coronil, 1997: p.3).  This 
attempt by later governments to distance themselves from the past by redefining the 
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Gomez regime as, “a backward dictatorship that stood in opposition to Venezuela’s 
civilizing democracy,” is troublesome since it ignores the fact that the period of the 
'traditional' Gomez regime actually made it possible to, "imagine Venezuela as a 
modern oil nation, to identify the ruler with the state, and to construe the state as the 
agent of modernization" (Coronil, 1997: p.3). 
 While Gomez’s death left a leadership vacuum in the country that was quickly 
filled by other military leaders, it did however also begin a slow process of 
transferring power from the military to civilians.  Besides initiating the beginnings of a 
process of modernization and industrialization in the country, this transition also led to 
the emergence of a political opening that saw new political institutions and parties 
develop.  During his 27 year rule Gomez had been able to effectively and ruthlessly 
control and almost entirely eliminate his opposition.  The two governments that ruled 
Venezuela for the decade following Gomez’s death were led by General Lopez 
Contreras (1935-1941) and General Isaias Medina Angarita (1941-1945), both 
personal friends of Gomez and loyal followers of his traditional attitudes and values 
(Ellner, 1993).  Although they both promoted the idea of democratic liberties and 
modernization, they failed to “open regular channels of participation for organized 
labor,” and consequently “forced many labor leaders to conceal their political 
commitments and pretend to be apolitical in accordance with the legal requirement” 
(Ellner 1993: p. 1).   
 Yet despite this, they did allow for the first time in Venezuela the opening up 
of space for, and legalization of political organizations and socially indoctrinated and 
structured political parties, many of which had already been organizing clandestinely.  
Many of the prominent leaders of these organizations had belonged to the Generacion 
de 28 in Venezuela, which had carried out street protests against the Gomez regime 
(Ellner, 1984).  A variety of new social forces began to emerge, one of the most 
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importantly of which was the PDN Partido Democratico Nacional, itself the result of 
a fusion of various leftist groups.  This new social force would later evolve into the 
Accion Democratica (AD), a party that viewed itself as leftist, nationalist, populist, 
multiclass, and anti-imperialist, and that sought to carry out the dictates of social 
democracy (Elner, 1984).   
AD, however, would from its inception distance itself from the emerging 
Venezuelan Communist movement and subsequent Partido Comunista de Venezuela  
(PCV).  The entering of the PCV into the country’s political scene during this time 
was significant.  The PCV had its organizational foundations in the Partido 
Revolucionario Venezolano (PRV), which had been founded in Mexico in 1926 
(Tarver and Frederick, 2005).  In fact, among the leaders of this nascent communist 
movement were the revolutionary Salvador de la Plaza (1896-1970) and Gustavo 
Machado (1898-1983).  Although already active in the international communist 
movement for some years, the PCV had been banned in Venezuela since its inception.  
Taking advantage of the narrow political opening that emerged following Gomez’s 
death, the leaders of the communist movement decided to return to Venezuela and 
proceeded to clandestinely build up their organization under the name Partido 
Republicano Progresista, until finally being legalized by the Medina Angarita 
presidency in 1941 (Tarver and Frederick, 2005).  
Another key new development that occurred as a consequence of the political 
opening in Venezuela was the rise of the labor movement.  Just one year after 
Gomez’s death the Labor Law of 1936 was instituted, thereby legalizing unions for the 
first time in the country (Ellner, 1993).  The period in between the Gomez tyranny and 
the installation of Perez Jimenez dictatorship served as the formative years for the 
Venezuela labor movement.  From early on it was clear that the oil workers played the 
major role in the development of the country’s labor movement, despite their 
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numerical weakness.  The influence that it exerted on organized labor stemmed largely 
from its famous strike of 1936 in which it galvanized anti-imperialist, nationalist 
sentiment and caused the isolation of oil companies (Ellner, 1993).  Yet, despite the 
opening of the political arena during this era, labor leaders were targeted and 
persecuted in the years immediately after 1936, and even more so during the military 
dictatorship of Perez Jimenez (1948-1958) where many of them were imprisoned and 
exiled. 
One of the important distinguishing features of the Venezuelan labor 
movement that greatly determined its future trajectory was the close tie that existed 
between unions and political parties in the country.  Initially, the radical PCV had 
been the leading force within the newly emerging labor movement.  However, AD was 
able to slowly grow its presence in the movement over the years to the point of 
gaining control of it by 1944-45 (Ellner, 1993).  This shift away from the more leftist 
and militant ideology of the PCV and towards a liberal reformist outlook led to the 
splintering of the labor movement and would have serious implications for the future 
path of the working-class movement in Venezuela.   
As Ellner (1993) observes, AD represented the ideal typical Latin American 
populist party, “in that it defended a radical program of income redistribution, its long-
term goals were not clearly defined, and it based its popular appeal to a considerable 
degree on the charismatic qualities of its jefe maximo, Romulo Betancourt” (p.1).  This 
well-funded political machine known as AD, inspired by democratic centralism and 
seeking to “carry out the dictates of social democracy,” finally achieved its self-
professed goal of leading the masses with its successful golpe de estado in 1945 that 
ushered in the three year treino, as this period came to be called (Tarver and Frederick 
2005: p.88).   
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The Treino (1945-1948) 
 The civilian-military coup of 1945 that placed AD as the main political force in 
Venezuela was largely the result of a high level of impatience on the part of AD at the 
relative slowness of the liberalization and modernization processes in the country 
(Ellner, 1993).  However, it also stemmed from the fact that AD had suffered a 
crushing defeat in the recent Caracas municipal elections of 1944 in which an alliance 
between opposition groups (that included the Venezuelan communists) had 
successfully won (Tarver and Frederick, 2005). This huge setback for AD made its 
leadership come to the realization that it would not be able to gain state power through 
the electoral process, and instead would have to rely on extrajudicial methods to attain 
their objective.   
In a historic move, a clandestine group of discontented junior officers created 
an organization known as the Union Patriotica Militar (UPM), or Patriotic Military 
Union.  These officers, frustrated at the sluggish pace of modernization and 
advancement within the military service, and at the lack of professionalism on the part 
of military officers in the senior ranks, decided to join forces with AD in the golpe de 
estado (Tarver and Frederick, 2005).  The result was the taking of power and the 
setting up of the Junta Revolucionaria de Gobierno, or Revolutionary Government 
Junta, that was presided over by AD’s leader, Romulo Betancourt.  This was a 
civilian-military alliance in the strict sense of the term, since the new governing body 
included both a civilian-led government and an armed forces controlled by the UPM.   
Significant political changes occurred from the start of the coup until its 
collapse in November of 1948.  Most importantly, democracy in Venezuelan political 
life was said to have been institutionalized for the first time as universal, direct, and 
secret voting was finally implemented (Tarver and Frederick, 2005).  During this time 
period, AD was able to further consolidate its power by its increased support among 
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the popular sectors, and obtainment of complete control over working-class, peasant, 
and student movements in the country (Ellner, 1993).  The immense size of its 
following led to intense interparty conflicts as AD’s exceedingly high self-confidence 
allowed it to isolate opposition parties to its left, like the PCV, and to the right, such as 
the Comite de Organizacion Politica Electoral Independiente, or COPEI (Ellner, 
1993). 
COPEI was in fact a newly created right-of-center Christian democratic 
political party that was formed during this reform period of the treino.  This party, 
which would come to represent one of the nation’s largest political forces, was 
founded in 1946 by the future president, Rafael Caldera.  Another political party that 
emerged during this era and that would come to play a significant role in the nation’s 
political arena was the left-of-center Union Republicana Democratica (URD).  Along 
with the creation of these new political parties also came the organization of labor into 
the Confederacion de Trabajadores de Venezuela CTV (Confederation of Venezuelan 
Workers), which as will later be shown, was historically dominated by AD.  The 
promotion of unionization and creation of new labor unions was another strategy on 
the part of AD to build its base of support, especially due to its acknowledgement of 
labor as an important source of its power and legitimization (Tarver and Frederick, 
2005).   
Other developments that occurred during AD rule included increased 
industrialization plans, implementation of laws that reinforced the modernization 
process, agrarian reform, organization of political parties, and changes to the military 
forces.  As will be demonstrated in the next section, the agreement reached by the 
government and the petroleum companies to give the state a larger share of the oil 
revenues provided the necessary capital for an early industrialization process to begin.  
The government began a program of land redistribution to reduce the high levels of 
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insecurity that peasants faced, but also to co-opt the campesino movement, which 
organized itself into the Federacion Campesina de Venezuela FCV (Peasant 
Federation of Venezuela) in 1947.  By giving members of the FCV some limited roles 
in the nation’s decision-making and granting them 10 percent representation within the 
CTV labor federation, AD was able to further pacify the country’s peasant forces and 
reduce tension between peasants and large landowners (Ellner, 1993).  The rhetoric 
and program of the FCV, however, differed from that of AD, and its leadership even 
threatened civil disobedience and violence should agrarian reform be blocked.    
Of the new developments in the country it was the changes to the military 
structure that would cause the most serious difficulties for AD.  The reform of the 
armed forces would prove to be a roadblock in AD’s quest to gain absolute control of 
the country.  There still remained hostility and resentment among sectors of the 
military at the 1945 coup d’etat.  There also existed significant differences among 
various elements in the military, particularly between “the generation of military 
academy-trained officials (with solid technical and professional backgrounds) and the 
old guard officers, especially the tachirenses [from the state of Tachira], who had risen 
through the ranks under Gomez” (Tarver and Frederick 2005: p. 92).  Despite carrying 
out and winning the nation’s first universal democratic presidential elections in 
December 1947, AD was unable to avoid the military coup against its government on 
November 24, 1948.  This momentous event would signal the start of a decade-long 
military rule that would reverse several democratic advancements and reforms made 
during the treino period, while simultaneously continuing to promote Venezuela’s 
early efforts at modernization and national development, albeit haphazardly.     
 
Perez Jimenez Dictatorship (1948-1958) 
Before the start of Venezuela’s so-called exceptionalism era, in which the 
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country remained relatively free of severe political and military conflict, Venezuelans 
first had to endure a repressive military dictatorship that ruled with an iron fist from 
1948 to 1958.  In the fraudulent elections of 1952, General Marcos Perez Jimenez was 
elected president.  The first couple of years of military rule were particularly turbulent.  
According to most analysts of Venezuelan history, the Perez Jimenez era saw the 
banning on trade unions and disbandment of the labor federation (CTV) following its 
call for a strike, repression and torture of all opposition groups, censorship of the 
press, shutting down of universities, selling out to foreign interests, and lack of 
economic progress (Ellner, 1995).   
However, revisionists who have focused on the state-run industrial policy 
during this era have argued that in fact there were a series of ambitious development 
projects in steel and hydroelectric power.  Moreover, they point to the success of the 
Perez Jimenez regime in the building of infrastructure, and development of plans for a 
national railroad system and aluminum and atomic energy (Ellner, 1995).  These 
arguments refute the common simplistic view of an infamous Perez Jimenez 
dictatorship.  The overall assessment of the dictatorship therefore needs to take into 
account both its ruthlessness with regard to its treatment of political opposition, but 
also the impressive mass public works projects that it carried out.  One fact that is not 
generally disputed is that Venezuela’s industrial sector stagnated from 1948 to 1958 
due to Perez Jimenez’s favoring of “commerce and construction over manufacturing 
activity, financial and commercial capital over industrial capital, and luxury goods 
over the traditional industrial sector (Ellner 1995: p. 105).  Yet, as will later be 
explained, Venezuela’s first phase of ‘easy’ industrialization (1950-1957) did in fact 
take place during the Perez Jimenez period in which interventionist state policies were 
implemented.  
Interestingly, despite ruthlessly suppressing all of the political opposition while 
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in power, Perez Jimenez was awarded the U.S. Legion of Merit by the United States 
(Ewell, 1977).  Intensely active and politically inspired civilian-military protests and 
mobilizations, organized by the popular Patriotic Front of 1958, helped to pave the 
road towards the eventual overthrow of the dictatorship on January 23, 1958 (Gott, 
2006).  To many, the end of the Perez Jimenez regime signified the start of a long 
period of democracy in Venezuela.  Yet this popular claim downplays the 
exclusiveness of the two-party political system known as puntofijismo that was 
subsequently created and that would help to maintain four decades of liberal bourgeois 
democracy in Venezuela.    
Prior to analyzing the puntofijismo period, during which the interventionist 
Venezuela state was consolidated for the implementation of a national development 
strategy, we first turn to an examination of the developmentalist framework. The 
analysis of the Venezuela’s political trajectory, therefore, must take into account the 
broader historical conjuncture that saw the end of WWII and the ushering in of a new 
phase of capitalist accumulation that was based on the school of thought known as 
developmentalism, whose principal focus was the notion of national development and 
economic growth by way of an interventionist welfare state.   
 
The Developmentalist Paradigm and Modernization Theory 
The Second World War is appropriately referred to as a watershed that sharply 
shifted global power in favor of the United States.  While the U.S. had long been the 
leading power in the Western Hemisphere and had maintained the strongest economy 
in the world prior to WWII, it had also remained a distant third behind England and 
France as a global player in world affairs (Chomsky, 1997).  Following WWII, 
however, the United States’ main European industrial rivals were either severely 
weakened or decimated by the war.  Profiting enormously from the post-war 
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rebuilding efforts in Europe, the U.S. was able to gain overwhelming control over the 
new world order. As Chomsky (1997) poignantly notes, “The people who determine 
American policy were well aware that the U.S. would emerge from WWII as the first 
global power in history, and during and after the war they were carefully planning how 
to shape the postwar world” (p.7).  This intentional plan for global domination on the 
part of American planners resulted in the possession of over half of the world’s 
wealth, incomparable military might, quadrupling of industrial production, and brutal 
intolerance toward any efforts by other countries to exercise sovereignty (Chomsky, 
1997).              
Furthermore, the post WWII period, which witnessed the birth of the Cold 
War, the process of decolonization, and the emergence of a challenge to the dominant 
laissez-faire capitalist economic order, produced a conceptual shift in the relationship 
between the state and economy.  Since the global depression of the 1930’s politicians 
and economists alike had begun acknowledging that “the pure logic of the market 
could no longer be relied on to ensure stability and growth,” (Makki 2004: p.153).  
There was also a growing shift towards the notion of the economy as “a self-contained 
and internally dynamic totality, separate from other economies and subject to state 
intervention” (Makki 2004: p.153).  Influential thinkers like John Maynard Keynes 
began calling for intervention on the part of states through macroeconomic policy 
instruments to deal with the inability of the market to correct itself.  The result of this 
was the replacement of the logic of the market and its abstraction with the notion of an 
integrated global economic system comprised of nation-states and requiring state 
intervention for the promotion of economic stability and growth.  This new state-
economy framework would take on several different manifestations including 
Leninist, Keynesian, and fascist forms (Makki, 2004).    
The proliferation of these new ideas, especially those of influential economists 
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like Keynes, constituted the first formulations of what in the 1950’s came to be known 
as ‘development theory’ (Leys, 1996).  The basic motive behind this nascent 
theoretical work was to find ways to transform and increase the productivity of the 
colonial economies (Leys, 1996).  In other words, faced with the decolonization of 
their former colonies, European powers sought to restructure their economies in such 
ways as to create new strategies for their continued accumulation of capital.  It is 
surprising, as Leys (1996) notes, how little this new theoretical paradigm drew from 
the body of theory about development that already existed since the advent of 
capitalism, particularly in the work of Hegel and Marx (Leys 1996).      
In fact, modernization theory, which was based on the assumption that 
countries develop from traditional to modern in a unilinear fashion, grew out of socio-
cultural evolutionist theories.  Later, sociologists and political scientists working for 
U.S. government research and teaching programs that sought to advance the role of the 
U.S. as a superpower would go on to construct the discourse of the theory (Leys, 
1996).  It basically maintained that Third World countries were simply behind, or in 
the earlier stages of development, and that they would eventually progress and reach 
the levels of development of the Western world.  
As elsewhere, modernization theory was popularized during the 1950’s and 
60’s in Latin America, where poverty ran rampant and demands for change flourished.  
The next sections demonstrate the growing impact of development and modernization 
theory on Venezuela in the post-Gomez ‘modernizing’ period, which witnessed the 
beginnings of the crystallization of a bureaucratic state apparatus and its increased 
intervention in the economy, as well as the start of an industrialization process and the 
eventual embrace of protectionist policies.  Appropriately, we first provide an 
examination of the solidification of the Venezuelan rentier state, the basis of the 
developmentalist project in Venezuela.  It will be demonstrated that while initial 
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efforts at national development and modernization were made in Venezuela by both 
the revolutionary junta that took control of Venezuela from 1945-1948, and the Perez 
Jimenez regime (1948-1958), it was the Venezuelan governments that succeeded the 
dictatorship which actually put into gear a comprehensive and sustained process of 
interventionist-led national development and modernization.  
     
Venezuela as a Rentier State 
The previous discussion on the period from the end of the Gomez tyranny 
(1935) to the ousting of the Perez Jimenez (1958) dictatorship is fundamentally crucial 
to understanding the rest of Venezuela’s historical trajectory.  Yet, this analysis would 
be incomplete without further incorporating the significance and impact of petroleum 
on the social reality of Venezuela.  In order to comprehend the particular form of 
realization of the development project in Venezuela, we now continue the examination 
commenced in an earlier section on the formation and solidification of the Venezuelan 
rentier state, a quintessential reality that would forever change the socio-political 
trajectory of the country.   
As we previously noted, the radical transformation of the country’s economic 
structure from one that was based on agriculture to one dominated by the export of oil 
greatly altered the social structure and political dynamics of Venezuela.  The 
weakening of the traditional landowning class that had begun with the independence 
struggles of the colonial elites, progressed with the civil wars and caudillo battles of 
the 19th century and intensified during to the Gomez regime, was complete by the 
early twentieth century due to the drastic marginalization of agriculture following the 
discovery of oil.  The dominance of oil also impeded the growth of a strong domestic 
industry.  The effect of this was that it prevented the development of a strong 
entrepreneurial class to replace the landed elite, therefore concentrating the reigns of 
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political power in the state and into the hands of whoever controlled it (Wilpert, 2007).  
We’ve also seen that the exclusivity of the oil industry and slow industrialization 
process created both a weak peasantry and working-class as the majority of 
Venezuelans were forced into various forms of precarious wage labor employment.  It 
is important to also include in this analysis the contribution of the incredibly rapid 
urbanization process in Venezuela following the oil bonanza, which provided yet 
another impediment to the creation of a strong landed elite and organized peasant 
movement.   
Up to now, however, we have only analyzed the first period (1920-1945) of 
simple growth of the oil industry.  We saw that despite producing the majority of the 
country’s wealth, the oil industry was able to only absorb a tiny fraction of the entire 
working-class.  Moreover, it was demonstrated that the Venezuelan state was 
prevented from receiving the benefits of its own patrimony due to the dominance of 
the foreign oil companies.  These companies not only had few regulations to abide by, 
but were also granted many concessions that allowed them to dictate their own terms.  
For example, they demanded and received the paying of lower taxes and the ability to 
build private road networks for their use only (Rosberry 1993).       
Now we delve into the second period in the growth of the petroleum industry, 
which Roseberry (1983) characterizes as one of diversification and development.  This 
post-1945 period saw great changes take place in Venezuela, most importantly of 
which was the increased complexity of the state bureaucracy and the swelling of the 
public treasury.  This process had been initiated with the momentous passing of the 
1943 Hydrocarbons Act in Venezuela that increased the state’s share of the total oil 
profits to 16.66 percent and eventually to 50 percent by 1948, thus tying the state’s 
revenues tightly to the extraction of oil.  In fact, the state’s revenues from and 
intervention of the petroleum industry, had both been relatively low prior to the 
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enactment of this legislation.  As late as 1940 the share of surplus profits (ground rent) 
that the Venezuelan state retained was lower than 20 percent (Ellner, 1984).  
Afterwards, the state’s increasing share would allow it to sembrar petroleo, or sow the 
oil.   
The tremendous expansion and bureaucratization of the state and its capital led 
to huge public expenditures on public works, direct financing of investment, and the 
enlargement of the internal market (Perez Sainz & Zarembka, 1979).  Moreover, it 
allowed the expansion of government intervention in the economy through the 
creation of institutions that increased the state’s control over economic decisions.  This 
allowed it to embark on an economic growth strategy that helped to diversify the 
agricultural sector and set up the infrastructure that was needed for the intensification 
of the industrialization process (Llambi, 1989).  New government institutions like the 
Corporacion Venezolana de Fomento CVF (Venezuelan Development Corporation) 
allowed the state to invest heavily in industry and agriculture, while the Instituto 
Agrario Nacional, IAN (National Agrarian Institute) was put in charge of 
administering the agrarian reform that had been approved during the treino years.    
  Additionally, the expanding government payroll led to increased employment 
in the public sector, and thus the creation of a new middle class.  Out of this complex 
state bureaucracy also emerged a new group of merchants that imported consumer 
goods for the nascent middle-class (Roseberry, 1983).  Equally important, the 
abundance of state funds permitted the construction of highways and the expansion of 
transportation.  These new developments combined attracted many more Venezuelans 
to the country’s urban areas, accelerating the already massive shift of the country’s 
population distribution from rural to urban.  Following the post-WWII oil boom the 
movement of people into the cities accelerated tremendously, so that the once 
urbanization rate of 7 percent in 1920 skyrocketed to 32 percent by 1950, and to 60 
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percent two decades later (Gall, 1973).   
The increased demand for agricultural foodstuffs and raw materials that this 
new phenomenon created, however, was not easily satisfied by the country’s 
agricultural sector.  As Wilpert (2007) notes, this was caused by a sort of ‘Dutch 
Disease’ in which one sector of the economy grows extremely fast in comparison with 
others, leading to various complications in these other sectors.  In Venezuela, this 
meant the rapid rise of the oil industry and the inability of both domestic industry and 
the agricultural sector to meet the increasing demand for consumer goods.  This 
resulted in the necessity of the country to import industrial and agricultural goods, and 
in fact, become the second most urbanized country in Latin America and its only net 
food importer (Wilpert, 2007).  The increasing dominance of the extractive oil 
industry and the government’s appropriation of its profits for national revenue thus 
solidified the rentier state in Venezuela, provided the basis for the developmentalist 
strategy in Venezuela, and led to the implementation of the interventionist ISI policies 
that had become so popular throughout Latin America.   
 
The Adoption of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI)  
The global economic crisis of the 1930’s had devastated most economies of 
Latin American due to the inability of these nations to export their goods to the 
world’s shrinking markets.  The drastic cut in export earnings further weakened the 
traditionally powerful exporting elites, therefore creating a political vacuum in which 
the ability of a social class to exercise political hegemony was absent.  This in turn 
supported the political viability of strong state power, and enabled the government to 
become the principal actor in maintaining social order (Weaver, 2000).  Despite 
reduced export revenues and shortage of credit Latin American countries continued to 
import heavily, causing further economic imbalances including the exhaustion of these 
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countries’ reserves and the devaluation of their currencies.  In response, the external 
export-dependent model of growth that had dominated for the past decades was put 
into question.  
In its place was established an internal model of import substitution 
industrialization that allowed Latin American countries to substitute imported finished 
goods with locally produced substitute in order to develop the domestic manufacturing 
industry.  That is, due to the increased cost of imported goods and various other 
economic difficulties, Latin American nations set off on a strong national program and 
ISI process that set up protective barriers to trade and was initially limited to the 
implementation of import tariffs to protect local industry. This led to the ‘Golden Era’ 
in Latin America from the 1930s to the 1960s, which was identified with nationalist 
and populist governments that carried out strong state interventionist policies with 
mass popular support.  The next sections analyze the specific nature, importance, and 
outcome of ISI strategies in Venezuela and Latin America in general.  
While the initiation of ISI in other Latin American countries was a direct result 
of the crisis of the balance of payments and the “subsequent relative disarticulation [of 
these economies] from the process of accumulation at the world scale,” this was not 
the case in Venezuela thanks to its oil enclave (Perez Sainz and Zarembka, 1979: 
p.24).  As we have seen, the consolidation of the oil enclave as the basis of the 
accumulation process in Venezuela conditioned the emergence of the country’s 
industrial branch through the crisis in pre-capitalist agriculture, increase in state 
expenditures on public works from growing oil revenues, and enlargement of the 
internal market (Perez Sainz and Zarembka, 1979).  Thus the increased local share of 
the oil surplus in the 1930’s had neutralized the effects of the economic crisis that 
gripped the world, and “avoided the necessity of a process of import substitution” in 
Venezuela (Perez Sainz & Zarembka, 1979: p.24).  Prior to the 1940’s the country’s 
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industrialization processes were nearly nonexistent, or very minimal.  On the whole, 
they were characterized as petty commodity in nature and consisted of a low level of 
productivity.  The most important sector was the food branch, which represented 54% 
of the total absorbed labor, followed by textiles and leather (Perez Sainz and 
Zarembka, 1979).   
It was not until Venezuela suffered a brief interruption of its imports during 
WWII that an initial and brief attempt at ISI based on consumption commodities 
began in the country.  The decreased flow of imported capital and intermediate goods 
led to an increase in production and a shift towards labor-intensive techniques, 
resulting in the expansion of the absorbed labor (Carrillo Batalla, 1962; in Perez Sainz 
and Zarembka, 1979).  This transition period, however, was short-lived since through 
its oil revenues Venezuela was able to resume its pre-bellum import flow following 
the end of the war, thereby also signaling the end of this early attempt at the formation 
of a national capital in the country.  In Venezuela, the ISI process would truly 
commence only after the completion of WWII.  This contrasted with most other Latin 
American nations that had begun long-term processes of ISI during the interwar period 
as a result of the weakening of ties between them, as peripheral social formations, and 
the center.  These processes had subsequently allowed for the creation of (peripheral) 
national bourgeoisies in other Latin American countries.     
 Yet unlike in these other Latin American nations, a national bourgeoisie would 
not emerge in Venezuela in the 1940’s (Perez Sainz & Zarembka, 1979).  Thus, as 
Perez Sainz & Zarembka (1979) point out, “the dominant contradiction between the 
national bourgeoisie and its possible allies against foreign capital” (p.23) failed to 
materialize in Venezuela during the first phase of ISI, as it had throughout most of the 
region.  In fact, the Venezuelan bourgeoisie had shared a cordial existence with 
foreign capital from the start of the country’s industrialization.  This prevented the 
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need that was found in other Latin American nations of a ‘denationalization’ process, 
whereby center-periphery relationships are redefined to break the domination of 
foreign capital and to allow (peripheral) national bourgeoisies to become associated 
bourgeoisies with those of the center (Perez Sainz & Zarembka, 1979).   
 The construction of an industrial branch of the capitalist mode of production in 
Venezuela finally took off, albeit haphazardly, in the years following the completion 
of the Second World War.  That is, the post-war period allowed for the establishment 
of a sufficiently broad internal market in Venezuela that enabled the commencement 
of the industrialization process and adoption of a long-term ISI economic strategy in 
the country.  Perez Sainz & Zarembka (1979) argue that during this first phase of 
‘easy’ industrialization from 1950-1957 the expansion of import substitution of 
consumer goods was greatly restricted due to the limitations of the 1939 Treaty of 
Commercial Reciprocity between Venezuela and the United States that placed tariff 
limits on roughly 200 products.  While pressure from local capital in the industrial 
branch forced amendments to this treaty in 1952 the revisions still only allowed only a 
precarious ISI process based on quantitative restrictions (Maza Zavala, 1969; in Perez 
Sainz & Zarembka 1979).   
The volume and orientation of public investment changed drastically during 
this first industrialization stage as public investment gradually increased, particularly 
in the industries linked to construction.  In contrast to the usual first stage of ISI 
processes that focused on light consumer goods the accumulation process in 
Venezuela shifted more rapidly towards intermediate goods branches (Araujo, 1964: 
13; Carroll Batalla, 1962; Perez Sainz & Zarembka 1979).  The need for skilled labor 
to meet the capital-intensive techniques of these industries, and its absence locally, 
meant a sharp increase in migration to Venezuela during the 1950’s.  Overall only a 
few industries were able to complete import substitution, including biscuits by 1955 
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and beer in 1956.  These protectionist policies under the Perez Jimenez regime also 
greatly increased the production of wood, rubber tires, assembled vehicles, and 
especially cement, which experienced a dramatic fall in imports from 82 percent in 
1938 to just 1 percent in 1956 (Perez Sainz & Zarembka 1979).  While the rubber tire 
and assembled vehicle industries were owned by foreign capital, the beer and cement 
industries remained under the control of the rising local monopoly capitalist class.           
The second more advanced phase of industrialization in Venezuela (1958-
1973) coincided with the fall of the Perez Jimenez dictatorship and the establishment 
of the  country’s liberal bourgeois state, and was geared towards intermediate branches 
(food processing, textiles, pharmaceuticals, tires, glass, and cement, iron, steel, 
ceramics, and transportation equipment).  During this period the Venezuelan state 
created a framework for a consistent ISI strategy that consisted of both an unusual 
tariff structure and licensing.  While tariffs did help to protect against external 
commodities the average tariff surcharge of 21.6 percent was rather low, with high 
tariffs only being applied to products that accounted for less than 5 percent of total 
imports (CORDIPLAN, 1968: 164; in Perez Sainz & Zarembka 1979).  Overall, tariffs 
tended to most affect non-durable consumer goods, while minimally affecting durable 
consumer goods, capital goods, and raw materials.      
As Perez Sainz & Zarembka (1979) note, the main instrument of Venezuela’s 
own ISI strategy was the granting of licensing protection to firms whose investment 
exceeded 100,000 bolivares.  These firms applied to the Ministry of Development and 
were then chosen according to three criteria: “potential absorption by the internal 
market;” “use of domestic inputs;” and “the impact on employment, price level, and 
value added” (Perez Sainz & Zarembka 1979: p.10).  These criteria were also applied 
to the two other principal mechanisms of state intervention in industrial development, 
duty exemptions for imported machinery and raw materials, and access to public 
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financing.  This licensing framework was applied to numerous commodities, including 
“food products, manufactured goods classified according to materials, machinery and 
transportation equipment, and various manufactured goods” (Perez Sainz & Zarembka 
1979: p. 11).   
The goal of this ISI process was to change the composition of imports, so that 
instead of importing finished goods Venezuela would now import the technology to 
make these goods itself, thus also creating backward linkages in the form of state 
subsidies for local producers and suppliers.  By the 1960’s this ISI process had shown 
clear signs of success such as the displacement of food and other consumer good 
imports by raw material imports, and the increase to nearly half of total imports of 
“machinery, tools, construction materials, and transportation equipment,” thus 
“showing the external reproduction of the process” (Banco Central de Venezuela, 
1969, 1970; in Perez Sainz & Zarembka 1979: p. 11).  Additionally, there were 
significant changes to the internal market of the country, as the state’s importance in 
the internal circulation process diminished.  That is, the discrimination that existed 
against local capital during the Perez Jimenez dictatorship was replaced by a form of 
state intervention that fostered and promoted the industrialization process and capital 
as a whole (Perez Sainz & Zarembka 1979).  Moreover, the incorporation of 
previously excluded groups in the industrial process and subsequent expansion of the 
internal market allowed for the emergence of a certain redistribution process that 
included among other things, wage increases, an emergency program to increase labor 
power absorption, and agrarian reform.           
The development of Venezuela’s ISI process continued so that by 1970, as 
Perez Sainz & Zarembka (1979) explain, several industries had completed import 
substitution, including “food processing, tobacco, textiles, pharmaceuticals, tires, glass 
and cement; some possibilities remained in beverages, ceramics, iron and steel, metal 
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products and parts for transportation equipment; and substantial import-substitution 
possibilities remained in paper and pulp, chemicals (including artificial fibers), 
aluminum and equipment (p.12).  Stemming from the country’s industrialization 
process were other important developments such as the already mentioned wage 
increases, and the expansion of employment, particularly in the food, textiles, and 
clothing industries.  Whereas local capital was dominant in the smaller competitive 
branches of leather, footwear, wood, furniture, printing and publishing, and metallic 
products, the larger-scale production was in the hands of foreign capital.  That is, 
foreign capital’s influence (especially that of the United States) continually increased, 
so much so that it became dominant in various large-scale industries like food, textiles, 
rubber, transportation equipment, food processing, and aluminum.  By the 1970’s 
foreign capital had come to dominate Venezuelan industrialization as it did in most 
other Latin American countries, thereby establishing new forms of exploitation and 
imperialism that will later be discussed.    
Overall, it can be said that the uniqueness of Venezuela’s ISI strategy was the 
rapid speed at which it developed from initial to later stages, and its relatively short 
duration in comparison to the other Latin American experiences.  To its great 
advantage, the availability of capital from the oil export revenues meant that 
Venezuela did not suffer the constraints on raw materials and capital good imports 
faced by other Latin American countries.  Thus the ISI process in Venezuela was able 
to proceed rapidly first through a precarious period from 1950-1957, and then through 
a more advanced second stage from 1958-1973, allowing the completion of import 
substitution in several industries.  However, though many branches were able to 
complete import substitution, only the exporting of sophisticated foods and cement 
was successful (Perez Sainz & Zarembka 1979).  This, combined with ever present oil 
revenues, meant that the accumulation process would continue to depend heavily on 
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the country’s extraction and export of petroleum.      
Among the difficulties that the social formations of the periphery experienced 
was their technological dependency on the industrialized core countries in the world-
system that controlled the knowledge of the production processes (Perez Sainz & 
Zarembka 1979).  The dependency and vulnerability of ISI production on imported 
inputs such as intermediate goods, technology, capital equipment, and raw materials 
was especially troubling for Latin American nations. Thus, for example, Venezuela’s 
high level (48.8 percent) of imports in electrical and non-electrical machinery and 
transportation equipment (Perez Sainz & Zarembka 1979 p.16).  
Another problem that existed with Latin America’s ISI strategy was the tension 
that it created between the urban and rural populations.  The new urban constituencies 
were able to receive concessions from the government in the form of increased rights 
and benefits, while excluding rural workers.  For example, the urban areas were able 
to enjoy depressed food prices causing much resentment and anger among the rural 
populations.  Additionally, the rural sector was taxed and squeezed for export earnings 
that were then transferred in the form of government expenditures into the cities.  This 
undoubtedly favored the urban constituencies and signified a power shift from rural 
export interests to urban constituencies which allied themselves with the discontented 
working-class and its labor unions, thus also intensifying the friction between rural 
and urban. A consequence of this urban bias was increased migration of people to the 
cities from the countryside, resulting in increased levels of poverty and informality 
around cities in Latin America.    
An additional shortcoming of ISI in Latin America was the failure of 
governments to make land reform and modernization of the agricultural sector a 
priority.  Instead, emphasis was placed on the development of cities, while rural areas 
stagnated.  Failure to properly deal with the land question and enact real agrarian 
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reform would contribute heavily to the social discontent and popular uprisings in the 
region, which will be examined in an upcoming section.               
Many of the above mentioned contradictions and difficulties of the ISI process 
in Latin America emerged in the 1960’s and intensified in the 1970’s.  For Latin 
America, the uncompetitiveness of its industries in the world market, inability of its 
nations to integrate regionally, lack of structural reforms to redistribute land and 
wealth, increasing inflationary pressures, and growing dominance of foreign capital, 
all contributed to the dismantling and abandonment of the ISI strategy and to the rise 
of political unrest and military dictatorships in the region.  The oil shock of 1973 
signaled a devastating blow to the import-dependent ISI strategy of Latin America 
countries, since the increased fuel costs greatly limited the capacity of these nations to 
import.  This external shock led to hyperinflation and increased foreign debt for Latin 
American economies, as governments desperately printed and borrowed money to 
sustain their economies.  
Globally, economic stagnation began taking grip as the postwar expansionary 
growth period came to a screeching halt in the early 1970’s.  These new set of events 
unleashed important political and social changes throughout the Third World.  The 
economic deterioration of Third World nations had its greatest impact on the most 
vulnerable sectors of the population, sending millions more into poverty.  The unequal 
societies of the Third World began to experience increasing levels of working-class 
and peasant unrest, as structural reforms to an unjust system remained just a false 
promise.  As we will see in a later section, the demise of the developmentalist 
framework meant the emergence of popular and guerrilla movements throughout the 
world, and especially in Latin America, to combat the injustices produced by the 
ruling elites and their exploitative capitalist economic system.  In response 
government repression became the norm throughout much of the Third World, as 
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military dictatorships came to power in several countries.        
Before proceeding with the discussion of the crisis of the developmentalist 
program, we must first examine the establishment of a liberal bourgeois system of 
governance in Venezuela.  Earlier we saw how the unity of Venezuelan civilians and 
the military created a powerful Patriotic Front that through mass popular mobilization 
was able to bring down the Perez Jimenez dictatorship in 1958.  This upcoming 
discussion on puntofijismo will allow us to understand the importance of the analysis 
of Venezuela’s historical socio-political dynamics that has been carried out up to now 
in this study.  The combined absence of a landowning oligarchy, and strong working-
class and peasant movements, as well as the overwhelming dominance of the oil 
industry and prosperity of the Venezuelan rentier state had effectively paved the way 
for the establishment and stability of a liberal bourgeois democracy that would rule 
Venezuela for the next four decades.   
 
Puntofijismo and the Establishment of the Liberal Bourgeois State 
The most popularly accepted notion of post-WWII Venezuela has been its 
supposed ‘exceptionalism’ with respect to the rest of Latin America, where numerous 
military dictatorships reigned from the 1960s through the 1980s.  Venezuela is thus 
credited with avoiding the extreme nationalism present throughout the continent that 
had nations on the “verge of choosing between military dictatorship and Cuban-style 
communism” (Ellner and Salas 2005: p.6).  The exceptionalism thesis glorifies 
Venezuela as privileged and not only praises it for remaining, “free of the acute 
conflict and cleavages that threatened political stability elsewhere,” but also for its 
“healthy and solid” democratic system and political culture (Ellner and Salas (2005): 
p.7).  However, as Ellner and Salas (2005) demonstrate, this view fails to accurately 
interpret Venezuela’s complex history since it ignores the political exclusion of the 
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left, widespread human rights violations, electoral manipulation, clientalism, and 
corruption that accompanied the country’s pacted democracy after the end of the 
decade-long Perez Jimenez dictatorship.  
Following the popular overthrow of the repressive military dictatorship of 
Perez Jimenez representatives from the center-right Comite de Organizacion Politica 
Electoral Independiente (COPEI - Social Christian Party of Venezuela), center-left 
Accion-Democratica (AD - Democratic Action Party), and small leftist Union 
Republicana Democratica (URD - Democratic Republican Union) united to sign the 
undemocratic Pacto Punto Fijo (Pact of Punto Fijo) in 1958.  The overall goal of the 
arrangement was to create political stability that could advance the process of capital 
accumulation through the sharing of power and resources among the signatories of the 
pact, and the intentional exclusion of all challengers especially of radical leftist groups 
(Wilpert, 2007).  The need to share power with other political parties was something 
that AD, which was almost sure to be victorious in the upcoming 1959 presidential 
elections, had painfully been taught to understand and accept.  Just ten years earlier a 
military coup had put an end to AD’s overwhelming dominance of all branches of 
government by deposing its democratically elected president, Romulo Gallegos.   
Thus the 1959 election of Romulo Betancourt to the presidency is commonly 
referred to as the ‘return to democracy’ in Venezuela.  The Betancourt government 
(1959-1964) was able to implement the policies and achieve the ideal typical form of 
democracy that was promoted by the United States for Latin America (Alexander 
1964: p.319; in Ellner and Salas 2005).  This ‘father of Venezuelan democracy’ who 
had been the country’s president during the treino years of 1945-1948, now returned 
from exile to set up and lead the coalition-style government created by the pre-
electoral agreements of the Punto Fijo pact (Ellner and Salas, 2005).  The significance 
of this new exclusionary political system was that it essentially limited political 
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competition to the two dominant political parties, AD and COPEI, while also 
solidifying a liberal bourgeois form of governance, and ensuring the continuation of 
the process of capital accumulation.  In effect, these two parties would end up sharing 
and alternating the Venezuelan presidency for the next forty years, in much the same 
way as the Liberal and Conservative parties in Colombia did from 1958 to 1974 with 
their two-party National Front accord.   
Upon entering office, it quickly became apparent to the Betancourt 
administration that it had inherited an economy with severe problems caused by the 
spendthrift regime of Perez Jimenez, including a depleted treasury and an extremely 
high foreign debt.  Despite this, Betancourt was determined to work diligently to fulfill 
many of his government’s promises of modernization and to ensure the continued 
process of capital accumulation.  Like the vast majority of nations around the world at 
the time Venezuela had been operating under the ‘development project’ that 
McMichael (1996) says dominated the globe from the time of its formation in the late 
1940s until its demise in the early 1970s.  McMichael (1996) characterizes it as a 
transnational project of national economic growth that through state-managed 
economic and social policies and an international system of alliances could integrate 
the entire world.   
As was previously discussed, the success of Venezuela’s own development 
strategy was heavily dependent on the oil sector.  Betancourt’s administration 
therefore, proceeded with a plan that was based on the concept of rentism whereby a 
strong interventionist Venezuelan state could use the national income from oil 
revenues to invest in various social and economic projects, and to support the 
industrialization and accumulation processes.  Since its discovery in Venezuela in the 
early 20th century, oil had become the most important “product, export, and source of 
private and public wealth” (Wilpert 2007: p.10).  Fortunately for Venezuela’s liberal 
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bourgeois two-party system, oil prices remained relatively stable during the first two 
decades of puntofijismo, thus solidifying the country’s oil-based economy and 
contributing to political stability.  In fact, the boom years from 1960-1979 in 
Venezuela, after the fall of the Marcos Perez Jimenez dictatorship, propelled the 
country to the top spot among Latin American nations in terms of per-capita GDP 
(Karl, 1997).  However, the source of this economic expansion was principally the 
global rise in oil prices and not part of a strategic development plan. 
As demonstrated earlier, Venezuela was actively pursuing an ISI strategy that 
substituted previoulsy imported finished goods with locally produced substitutes and 
promoted industrialization, as was the rest of Latin America during this era.  The 
implementation of this ISI model throughout the continent was largely regarded as the 
source of the rapid economic growth experienced by Latin American nations.  While 
economists and historians still debate which Venezuelan government deserves credit 
for the success of ISI in the country, it makes more sense to acknowledge the 
contribution of all regimes since the early 1940’s to this gradual process.  What is 
clear is that in Venezuela support for the ISI model and government intervention in the 
economy ensured a high level of state legitimacy and popularity of “pro-establishment 
political leaders” (Ellner and Salas 2005: p.6) 
Among the successes typically attributed to the Betancourt government is the 
crafting of the new 1961 constitution that established the foundations of the new state 
and respect for modern political, economic, and social principles and rights (Frederick 
and Tarver, 2005).  The administration tackled poverty by inititiating a rural land 
reform program that through the Agrarian Reform Law of 1960 saw the redistributed 
of land to 150,000 peasant families throughout the countryside (Wilpert, 2007).  Yet, 
most of the land that was distributed came from public land that the state had obtained 
following the end of the Gomez tyranny in 1935, and not from the expropriation of 
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large landholdings (Tarver and Frederick, 2005).  The new regime also sought to 
expand decentralized public administration, create new state-run enterprises, and 
invest in public education, sanitation, and health care.   
However, the establishment of this nascent liberal brourgeois democracy that 
the Betancourt presidency effectively gave birth to did not go unchallenged.  Although 
the coalition government formed by Betancourt in 1959 had successfully united the 
main political parties of Venezuela, distributing cabinet and gubernatorial positions 
among the members of the alliance, it was not enough to quell the opposition.  Several 
acute challenges put in doubt the survival of the Betancourt government.  First of all, 
the puntofijismo coalition that had been established had purposely excluded the 
Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV), despite the fact that its members had been a 
leading force in the briging down of the Perez Jimenez dictatorship.  Not only had 
Communist party members helped to organize street demonstrations and worker 
strikes, they had also tirelessly broadcast propaganda against the dictatorship through 
their press and radio stations (Frederick and Traver, 2005).  It is thus no wonder why 
the PCV felt betrayed by Betancourt and subsquently decided to lead the opposition 
against it.  In fact, the early optimism of many on the left, both nationally and 
regionally, quickly dissipated as the AD-led government consolidated the bourgeoise 
liberal state and isolated all left political forces.    
In fact, the Betancourt government faced all kinds of problems.  On the 
economic front, Venezuela experienced a downturn in its economy due to the lowering 
of oil prices that the increased production of oil by the Middle East had created.  This 
in turn led to the Betancourt government adopting a series of austerity measures that 
particularly hurt the popular classes and created much discontent.  These included a 
devaluation of the bolivar of 35.5 percent, decrease in public expenditures, 10 percent 
cut in the salaries of public employees, and the elimination of the Emergency Plan that 
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had provided the unemployed with assistance in finding jobs (Ellner, 1993).  The 
growing unemployment rate in the country’s major cities, and the government’s 
inability or unwillingness to deal with the problem fueled social tensions even further.  
The majority of the unemployed were people from the rural areas that had migrated to 
the cities in search of construction jobs that had become available with the large public 
works projects of the Perez Jimenez regime.  This rural migration and increased 
industralization had transformed the working-class in Venezuela, which with the 
exception the oil industry, had been overwhelmingly artisan just three decades earlier 
(Ellner, 1993).   
On the political front, things were not much better.  There was worry and 
unrest among elements of the military that saw AD’s rise to power as threatening 
because of the possibility of its “penetration of their institution and decision-making 
authority” (Ellner, 1993).  Moreover, the rising discontent of the popular classes was 
channelled in the form of increasingly belligerent street protests and stepped up efforts 
by the labor movement to criticize the Betancourt administration.  Organized labor had 
been able to renew its operations in 1959, after having been banned by the dictatorship 
seven years earlier.  The labor confederation, CTV, was once again re-established with 
AD representing 52 percent of its delegates, 23 percent beloging to the Communist 
party (PCV), 15 percent to COPEI, and 10 percent to URD (Ellner, 1993).  
During the Betancourt years few CTV unions criticized the government for its 
failure to offer viable solutions to deal with the country’s high unemploymnent rate, 
and for its passing of a very unpopular series of austerity measures.  The more radical 
elements of the labor federation, the PCV and URD, though supportive of the national 
unity policy that had allowed for immediate presidential elections, came out in defense 
of the struggle of the poor and unemployed urban poor against the Betancourt 
government, causing tensions to flare with the other factions that had close ties to the 
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nation’s oligarchy.  It will later be shown that this confrontation within the labor 
movement between constituencies of the Left and those representing the country’s 
oligarchy would only intensify throughout the years creating further fragmentations 
and impeding the advancement of the struggle of workers in Venezuela.      
Additionally, there was the inspiration of the Cuban Revoluton on the 
country’s popular movements, particularly inside the youth wings of the PCV, URD, 
and AD.  In fact, shortly after the successful taking of state power in Cuba, the Cuban 
leader Fidel Castro, visited Venezuela and guaranteed support for its revolutionary 
process (not recognizing or anticipating its non-‘revolutionary’ nature).  Yet, 
Betancourt’s hostility towards Cuba and the growing unrest on the part of the Left in 
Venezuela, caused the URD to abadon the ruling AD coalition.  Tension within the 
AD also led to the creation of other parties, such as the left-leaning Movimiento 
Electoral del Pueblo (MEP)  and the self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist Castroite 
Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario or MIR, a “breakway from AD of its youth 
contigent” (Ellner, 1986: p.83).  Accroding to Ellner (1993) these continuing and 
intensifying conflicts throughout the nation and within the labor movement, “set the 
stage for the initiation of the armed struggle in 1962,” as the Left escalated its protests 
in the form of guerrilla warfare (p.16).  Thus, the establishment of the Western liberal 
democratic model in Venezuela would not only be questioned, but would be put in 
doubt by the forces of the Left.       
 
Armed Struggle and Guerrilla Opposition   
The first sign of an insurgent movement in the country surfaced on October 19, 
1960, after police arrested the editors of the MIR’s newspaper, Izquierda, for having 
put out an editorial promoting ‘popular revolution’ against the Betancourt government 
(Tarver and Frederick 2005).  Various incidents of civil unrest ensued, including riots 
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and demonstrations by students and members of the parties of the Left.  Eventually, 
however, these protests were pacified by government forces, forcing the opposition to 
regroup and formulate a new strategy of resistance.  As a result, the membership of the 
PCV (Communist Party) and MIR united and set forth on a path to overthrow the 
Betancourt regime.  Interestingly, many young activists during these chaotic years had 
joined the ranks of the PCV, but had failed to fully adopt the party’s doctrinal 
positions (Ellner, 1986).  It was precisely this youth wing of the PCV that was most 
adamant in pushing the party’s senior membership to take up the strategy of guerrilla 
warfare (Ellner, 1986).  Yet, although some elements of the alliance favored the 
strategy of protracted guerrilla warfare, the insurgency instead proceeded with a plan 
to achieve a rapid victory exclusively through urban insurgency tactics.  Only later in 
1962 did the revolutionaries alter their position and incorporated a rural guerrilla 
strategy into their struggle.           
According to Douglas Bravo, a Communist Party member and leading guerrilla 
figure in Venezuela, a principal cause of the uprising was the government’s decision 
to dissolve the Patriotic Front: “the most important organization for the unity and 
mobilization of the masses” (Pena, 1978: p.46).  This civilian-military front that 
through organized and intense popular street actions had successfully rid Venezuela of 
the Perez Jimenez dictatorship was effectively destroyed with the signing of the Punto 
Fijo pact and the intentional exclusion and isolation of the PCV and other leftist 
parties from the political system.  The fundamental motive behind these decisions, as 
Bravo himself points out, was the desire on the part of oil companies and the 
Betancourt administration to guarantee both the economic interests of the large 
monopoly corporations and the continuation of the larger accumulation process (Pena, 
1978).   
Thus, fearing the threat against the traditional parliamentary democratic system 
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posed by the growing magnitude and radicalism of the popular movement with its 
active and direct presence in the street, the ruling privileged sectors of Venezuelan 
society decided to act.  By attacking the Left they sought to prevent the communist 
influence in the state’s decision-making apparatuses and to ensure the continuation of 
the liberal bourgeois form of governance.  This strategy of political repression and 
liquidation of the Left, done in the spirit of U.S. containment of communism, was also 
responsible for the purging of hundreds of thousands of leftists throughout Latin 
America through kidnapping, torture, and massacre.   
The rise of guerrilla forces in Venezuela in the 1960’s, and the creation of the 
leftist Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) and Partido Revolucionario Venezolano 
(PRV) years later by former guerrilla leaders like Bravo, were a response to the 
continued corruption and poverty that the liberal bourgeois governments failed to deal 
with and in many ways helped to cause.  Furthermore, the continued disproportionate 
access to the country’s wealth, the lack of structural socioeconomic reforms 
challenging this form of wealth accumulation, and the increasing isolation of leftist 
actors in the country were all influences in the decision to take up arms (Pena, 1978).  
The insurgency sought to fight the inequalities that the intensified process of 
accumulation produced, whereby a small dominant group of Venezuelans and 
foreigners profited at the expense of the larger majority of the population.  The goal 
was to take state power and advance towards the creation of a socialist and truly 
democratic government that would implement and respect policies that corresponded 
with the needs and interests of the popular masses.   
The insurgency, therefore, concentrated its efforts to try to reactivate and 
strengthen the popular forces and parallel organs of power that had existed in the 
country when the Popular Front was still active.  These had included student, women, 
civilian-military, and labor union committees and associations that through popular 
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initiative had flourished throughout the country.  Bravo argues that these organs of 
popular power had been dissolved due to the failure of the popular movements to 
actively defend them and to push the government to promote popular participation.  
Moreover, Bravo regards as a mistake and premature the calling of elections in 1958 
immediately following the overthrow of Perez Jimenez since it did not give the 
revolutionary movement the time it needed to strengthen itself and to effectively 
overcome the remaining right-wing forces (Pena, 1978).   
 The fragile democracy being constructed by the Betancourt government 
experienced its most serious challenges in late 1962 as urban insurgency attacks 
increased.  These included the robbing of banks, kidnappings, killing of policemen, 
bombing of bus stations, setting on fire of oil pipelines, and attack on private property 
like the Coca-Cola plant in the capital city (Tarver and Frederick, 2005).  Uprisings 
among leftist Venezuelan marines, soldiers, national guardsmen, and civilians also 
broke out in Carupano and Puerto Cabello.  On the rural guerrilla front, the leftist 
parties of the PCV and MIR joined with elements of the left-of-center URD to form 
the main two guerrilla organizations, Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional 
(FALN) and Frente de Liberacion Nacional (FLN) and to promote a socialist agenda 
that favored the working-class, peasantry, and popular masses in general.  
Additionally, the Venezuelan revolutionary forces received military aid and weapons 
from Cuba, and even traveled to the nation to acquire training in insurgency tactics.   
Rebel activity increased even more ahead of the 1963 presidential election with 
the insurgency engaging in various acts of sabotage against the government forces and 
guerrilla armies stepping up their attacks against military targets.  In response, the 
Betancourt government drastically intensified its counter-insurgency efforts, ordering 
military operations, censoring the press, suspending constitutional guarantees, and 
arresting hundreds of civilians including MIR and PCV party leaders and even 
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members of Congress.  The Venezuelan government was able to deal the revolutionary 
forces a serious blow on election day as 92 percent of Venezuelans went to the polls 
and voted in another AD candidate, Raul Leoni, to the presidency, thereby signifying 
both the survival of the coalition-style bourgeois liberal government and the over 
inability of the guerrilla opposition to win over the support of the population.         
While this was a major setback for the insurgency it did not eliminate the rebel 
cause or effort.  In fact, though its level of activity diminished, the insurgency 
remained well alive throughout the remainder of the 1960’s and into the 1970’s, 
causing some troubles for the next administrations.  At one point in 1965, it was 
estimated that the FALN still had approximately 1,500 militants among its ranks.  
Eventually, however, a ceasefire was signed during the Caldera presidency (1969-
1974) granting the guerrilleros a governmental amnesty, and thus allowing their slow 
reincorporation into the country’s mainstream political system.   
Overall, however, it can be said that the guerrilla forces had failed to 
accurately assess the historical conjunture in Venezuela, in which conditions made 
armed insurrection extremely difficult.  The thought of attempting to overthrow the 
democratically elected government of Betancourt was simply not something that 
resonated with majority of Venezuelans at the time.  The country had just emerged 
from a decade of repressive dictatorial rule and was for the first time seeing the 
possibility of achieving peace; peace that is, with continued hunger, poverty, and 
injustice, but peace nonetheless.  While the working-class had many reasons to be 
disappointed with the Betancourt administration, it overwhelmingly had decided to 
support the new regime and not join the insurgency (Hellinger, 1996).  This contrasted 
with other Latin American nations, where around this same period guerrilla and 
insurgent movements received mass support and thus greatly threatened the ruling 
political establishments of their countries (i.e Cuba, Bolivia, Nicaragua, El Salvador).  
  
 78 
 
 
 
 
However, many of the ideas and lessons of this guerrilla uprising would remain alive 
in the hearts and minds of Venezuelans, and as we will see, would reemerge in the 
country’s contemporary revolutionary period.       
  
Further Consolidation of the Venezuelan Liberal Bourgeois Democracy (1964-
1988) 
 With the threat of the guerrilla movement diminished and the government’s 
success in securing the acquiescence of the majority of Venezuelans, the further 
consolidation of the country’s liberal bourgeois democracy was able to proceed.  This 
process included the setting up of mechanisms and institutions such as the parliament 
and municipalities or legislative assemblies, and the implementation of a wide range 
of laws, decrees, and regulations that were said to ensure the constitutional protection 
of individual duties and rights that had been established by the 1961 constitution 
(Bravo and Melet 1991).  The new constitution also expanded and redefined the 
government’s role in national economic development and on behalf of the people of 
Venezuela, thereby continuing the tradition of a strong central state and executive 
branch.   
Most importantly, however, was the predominance of the party regime that was 
created by this deepening of the liberal bourgeois model.  According to Bravo this 
caused the spaces permitted for political and social debate to become out of reach to 
the common Venezuelan citizen, and to be accessible solely through political parties 
(Bravo and Melet 1991).  Thus a growing process was initiated whereby political 
parties were granted the right to represent the Venezuelan people in parliament, 
legislative assemblies, unions, and student, peasant, and cultural organizations.  
Through this process Venezuelan citizens delegated their sovereignty to the country’s 
political parties and these in turn to the central government.  This sealed the 
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establishment of “political-ideological absolutism” and of a subtle totalitarianism 
disguised in the ideology of democracy, which meant that all of the organs of 
institutional power were “democratically centralized in the governing super-elite” 
(Bravo & Melet 1991: p.26).  
Furthermore, universal suffrage became the “legitimating element par 
excellence” of this hegemonic party regime (Bravo & Melet 1991: p.27).  Political 
parties were thus transformed into reinforcing agents of the electoral system, and into 
the main tools of power.  In this sense, not only does the act of voting appear as the 
all-encompassing symbol of “individual sovereignty and the equality of all before the 
Law,” but also as “the act of delegating that sovereignty into the hands of the all 
powerful party structures” (Bravo and Melet, 1991: p.27).  As we will see, the 
adoption of this representative democratic system in Venezuela, whereby the dominant 
bourgeois political parties act as the sole representatives of the people, would remain 
in place for nearly four decades until the ushering in of a new participatory democratic 
model by the Bolivarian Revolution that ensured the broad participation of all 
Venezuelans in the direction of the country’s political and governance system.  
Thus the accomplishments of the Betancourt government’s five year term were 
quite ambivalent.  The unpopular economic austerity policies and isolation of the Left 
were obvious attacks against the poor and working-class majority, which resulted its 
further impoverishment. Moreover, the intentional dissolvement of the mass coalition 
movement known as the Patriotic Front by the governmnent prevented the deepening 
of the democratic spaces that had been conquered by the Venezuelan people in their 
struggle against the Perez Jimenez dictatorship (Bravo & Melet, 1991).  Yet, still 
many credit the Betancourt government for helping to achieve the country’s first ever 
successful transfer of power from one constitutionally elected president to another, 
and thus institutionalizing democracy (Tarver and Frederick, 2005).   
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The successive presidencies of Raul Leoni (1964-1968) from AD and Rafael 
Caldera (1969-1974), founding member of COPEI and signatory of the Punto Fijo 
Pact, initiated a series of changes to the oil sector that granted the Venezuelan state 
more participation and decision-making in the regulation of the oil industry.  They 
also advanced the efforts begun by the Betancourt administration to expand social 
development in the areas of education, sanitation, and housing, and to further develop 
the steel, hydroelectric, and mining industries.  In these efforts both administrations 
were aided by the country’s slow but gradual economic development that was 
occurring as a consequence of the deepening of the ISI process and of the adoption of 
interventionist Keynesian-type state policies.    
As aforementioned the state successfully increased its intervention in the 
industrialization process during the second phase of ISI (1958-1973) through its use of 
licensing and duty exemptions on raw materials and capital goods (Perez Sainz & 
Zarembka 1979).  The Venezuelan state also fostered accumulation in the industrial 
branch through its various state apparatuses, most prominently of which was the 
Corporacion Venezolana de Fomento (CVF).  It greatly assisted the financing of 
industrial development with capital, technological assistance, and project elaboration 
and evaluation.  Most of its financial intervention was made through the CVF, which 
granted long-term credit and medium-term loans to handicrafts and small industry, and 
to medium industry.   
The state extended its activities to several branches through the Corporacion 
Venezolana de Guayana (CVG), including the basic metallics branches like iron, steel, 
and aluminum.  State intervention in iron and steel had commenced in 1964 with the 
founding of the firm CVG-Siderurgica del Orinoco (SIDOR), whose production was 
intended for internal and external markets (mainly to Argentina, Colombia, and 
Mexico).  Additionally, the state owned aluminum plant of Aluminio del Caroni S.A. 
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(ALCASA) was inaugurated in 1967 and began exporting in 1970 principally to 
Colombia, but also to Peru.  Through the CVG the state also expanded its influence in 
other industries namely, cement, paper, and pulp, creating various new state-owned 
firms.  Moreover, it was able to establish the sugar producing company Centrales 
Azucareras, which eventually led to the accomplishment of the country’s self-
sufficiency in sugar (Perez Sainz & Zarembka, 1979).  Successful state projects were 
also carried out by the Instituto Venezolano de Petroquímicas (IVP), under the 
Ministry of Mining and Hydrocarbons, including the construction of the two important 
petrochemical complexes. 
Among the goals of this interventionist policy of the state was the desire to 
limit the growing influence of foreign capital, which as was argued earlier, was 
creating a new form dependency of peripheral countries on those of the center through 
the rise of TNC’s.  The country’s expanding industrialization process increased the 
attractiveness of Venezuelan to foreign capital.  In fact, compared to the rest of Latin 
America, where the rate of profit in the industrial sector stood around 7 percent, 
Venezuela was doing exceptionally well with profits at 14 percent (Mayobre 1970: 
p.34; in Perez Sainz & Zarembka 1979).  To counter the threat of growing foreign 
control over Venezuelan industry, the government increased nationalizations and 
pushed for greater state ownership of industries.  Additionally, the Caldera 
government was able to raise the tax on the rent to the oil companies up to 60 percent.  
The implementation of these strong nationalist policies was made easier in 1974 with 
the incorporation of the Venezuelan economy to the Andean Pact, which allowed for 
increased trade with other South American countries and placed restrictions against 
foreign investment (Perez Sainz & Zarembka 1979).   
Like most Latin American nations, Venezuela experienced significant 
industrialization and economic growth in the post WWII era until the early 1970’s.  In 
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fact, the combined relative peace, and economic and military dominance of the U.S. 
commonly referred to as the Pax Americana, allowed for “an historically 
unprecedented expansion of the world economy” (Makki 2004: p.160). However, the 
development that did take place worldwide was largely uneven, and as Makki (2004) 
points out “prosperity remained a remote dream” for most Third World nations 
(p.161).  The worldwide economic decline of the early 1970’s thus placed the entire 
developmentalist framwork into question, and as we will later see, led to its eventual 
demise.    
In Venezuela, an oil-dominated state paternalism characterized much of the 
second half of the twentieth century in Venezuela.  As will be shown, this problem 
would be most pronounced during the country’s oil boom from the mid 1970’s to the 
mid 1980’s.  But first we turn our attention to the Venezuelan Left and how it 
responded to the new realities in the country following its overall cessation of armed 
struggle and weary acceptance of the electoral political system. 
 
A Change of Tactic for the Venezuelan Left   
While the Venezuelan elite was busy solidifying its liberal bourgeois 
democratic system in the 1960’s and 1970’s, the rest of Latin America was gripped by 
a wave of military dictatorships.  Nicaragua, for example, continued to be ruled by the 
brutal Somoza dynasty that U.S. imperialism had helped to put into place and 
maintain, and that was known to brutally crush all of its opposition through 
imprisonment, censorship, assassination, and torture.  Other Central American 
countries, including Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Panama were under the 
control of military regimes through most of that era as well.  In Brazil, with U.S. 
imperialism’s military and intelligence assistance, a 1964 coup d’etat overthrew the 
democratically elected government João Goulart, installing a right-wing military 
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dictatorship that suspended the civil rights and liberties of Brazilians.  Military 
regimes also came into power during this period throughout other Latin American 
nations, such as Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Dominican Republic, Haiti, 
Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay.  But the prevalence of social unrest and military 
dictatorships was not limited to Latin America.  In fact, the Asian and African 
continents were rocked by numerous wars and military juntas that rose to power.   
 Despite the continued consolidation of the Venezuelan oligarchy’s political 
system, organizing efforts among the country’s opposition forces still existed.  In 
addition to increased public spending of petrodollars to avoid discontent, AD and 
COPEI governments and their party machines had further consolidated their power by 
continuing to find ways to exclude or repress Left opposition throughout the country.  
Yet, the Left would not remain passive in the face of these undemocratic attacks.  In 
fact, after its re-legalization, the Communist party (PCV) worked fervently to organize 
a more progressive Left-leaning labor federation - the Central Unitaria de 
Trabajadores de Venezuela (CUTV), or Unitary Center of Venezuelan Workers.  
Several leftist labor unionists and a substantial portion of the CTV unions broke away 
from the major labor federation to help form the new federation.  Despite this, most of 
the country’s leftist parties (MAS, MIR, MEP) decided to stay within the dominant 
CTV labor federation and battle AD over its hegemony of labor, thus continuing the 
acute partisan rivalry that historically characterized Venezuela’s labor movement 
(Hellinger, 2003).  
 Most importantly, this new development marked the Left’s definitive 
abandonment of armed struggle and its replacement with a strategy of accumulating 
power in civil society through the labor movement, thereby supporting its view of 
labor as “one more arena in the struggle to capture control of the state” (Ellner, 1986, 
1988; Garcia et al., 1982; in Hellinger 2003: p.111).  The virtual end of subversive 
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activity in Venezuela created an important new setting that saw the crystallization of 
internal tensions within many of the country’s political parties and agglomerations.  
The dominant political party, AD, suffered from previously mentioned divisions that 
led, among other things, to the emergence of the socialist political party, MIR.  
Moreover, in addition to the leftist tendency of the CTV abandoning the labor 
federation and creating the rival Communist-dominated CUTV, the Communist Party 
(PCV) witnessed generational and ideological differences that produced its eventual 
split in 1971, and led to the setting up of the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS).  
This new breakaway faction of the PCV that sought to “redefine the socialist 
ideal” by distancing itself form both orthodox Communism and Soviet influence 
would go on to become the largest political party of the Venezuela Left (Ellner, 1986: 
p.86) (see Table 1).  Yet, it’s over-preoccupation with projecting itself as a socialist 
alternative caused it to lose sight of the more materially important work of 
socioeconomic reforms and struggle.   
 
TABLE 1 
Outcome of Elections Since 1973 (in percentages) 
 
Candidate Presidential Elections of 1973 
Presidential 
Elections of 1978 
Presidential 
Elections of 1983 
AD'S candidate 48.7 43.3 56.8 
Copei's candidate 36.7 46.6 34.9 
MAS' candidate 4.2a 5.1 4.1a 
MEP's candidate - 1.1 - 
PCV's candidate - 0.5 - 
MEP-PCV alliance 5.1 - 3.3 
MIR's candidate - 0.9 - 
 
Political 
Party 
Congressional 
Elections of 
1973 
Congressional 
Elections of 
1978 
Municipal 
Elections 
of 1979 
Congressional 
Elections of 
1983 
Municipal 
Elections 
of 1984 
AD 44.3 40.0 30.2 49.9 52.6 
Copei 30.2 40.0 49.1 28.7 21.7 
MAS 5.2 6.1 9.7 5.7 7.2 
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TABLE 1 (Continued) 
 
MEP 5.0 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.7 
MIR 1.0 2.3 2.3 1.6 1.4 
PCV 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.8 2.1 
Others 5.3 8.5 5.4 10.1 12.3 
a. MIR supported MAS presidential candidate in 1973 and 1983. 
Source: Ellner, 1993 
 
Moreover, the challenges faced by the Venezuelan Left inside the country’s 
labor movement were immense, both within the newly formed labor federation, 
CUTV, and the dominant CTV.  This is largely a result of AD’s historical dominance 
of the nation’s labor movement, which was reinforced through labor laws and 
institutions that both enhanced union dependence on the state and political parties, and 
limited the autonomy of labor leaders (Hellinger, 2003).  Clientelism and patronage 
thus abounded due to the overwhelming presence and influence of the state in every 
aspect of labor, including the granting of employment, regulating of dismissals, 
contract negotiation, and settling of labor disputes (Arrieta, 1982; in Hellinger 2003).  
It is no surprise then that the power of non-AD trade unionists within the CTV was 
extremely limited.  AD held overwhelming control of the federation’s executive 
committee and regularly practiced the granting of concessions to trade unionists from 
other parties in return for the unconditional defense of CTV policies (Ellner, 1993).  
Additionally, the CTV had been able to make an economic empire from its large share 
of oil revenues.  In fact, it was able to not only buy off the support of workers, but to 
also acquire ownership of the Venezuelan Workers’ Bank, as well as of tourist, 
finance, recreational, and other enterprises totaling over US$1 billion (Lopez Maya, 
1989 in Hellinger 2003: p. 113).   
The difficulty of the Left’s struggle within the labor movement to promote and 
fight for true worker democracy therefore becomes clear, in the face of such a wealthy 
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and powerful political machine that permeated all branches and institutions of 
government.  The Left, however, was able to attack the façade that the CTV created of 
itself as a labor federation with ample democracy and electoral competition.  The truth 
is that the CTV failed to eliminate corruption within its ranks, and did very little to 
promote internal democracy.  Ironically, in its early years AD’s ‘labor thesis,’ which 
historically prevailed in the CTV, had labeled the working class as, “a revolutionary 
force moving the country toward development and socialism” (Hellinger 2003: p.113).  
Despite this militant sounding rhetoric in favor of Venezuela’s exploited classes, the 
reality is that these ideas were never put into practice by the CTV leadership.  In fact, 
the CTV has historically, since 1958, been guided by a reformist attitude and 
maintained the belief that forceful action on the part of organized labor is not 
necessary in order to achieve the goals of the working-class (Ellner, 1993).     
Unsurprisingly, strike activity among the unions of the CTV has for the most 
part been historically low (see Table 2).  The CTV leadership has done everything 
possible to avoid strikes, and has instead preferred to rely on dialogue, persuasion, and 
other mechanisms that do not threaten the nation’s economy (Ellner, 1993).  These 
mild reformist tactics, however, have never been able to achieve significant structural 
improvements for the working-class in Venezuela.  In other words, the intentional and 
unfortunate decision by CTV leaders to not employ a strategy based on class conflict 
has translated into a failure of organized labor in Venezuela to properly address the 
interests and needs of the working-class and to improve its working and living 
conditions.   
By 1981 the CTV had completely abandoned many of its previously stated and 
unstated more radical goals, and adopted that of congestion, or shared control between 
workers and management, which it viewed as "a project realizable within the mold of 
classical capitalism" (Lestienne, 1981: p.25 in Hellinger 2003: p.113).  It would also 
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fail to properly respond to the changing composition of the workforce in later years.  
Thus, despite the growing number of women in the labor force, women labor leaders 
remained scarce (Ellner, 1993).  And as we will later see, despite the growth of 
Venezuela’s informal economy, it would remain outside the confines of the labor 
movement.  That is, the unwillingness and inability of organized labor to defend the 
all-important informal workforce would further hinder the advancement of organized 
labor in Venezuela.  This all goes to show that the CTV was little more than an 
appendage of the traditional reformist party of AD and that it therefore never became a 
strong force for change.  It also helps to explain the CTV’s absence from Venezuela’s 
most important labor struggles.   
 
TABLE 2 
Strike Activity in Venezuela (1958-1990) 
 
Year Petitions 
to go on 
Strike 
Legal 
Strikes 
Illegal 
Strikes 
Workers 
Involved 
(Legal 
Strikes) 
Workers 
Involved 
(Illegal 
Strikes) 
Man 
Hours 
Lost 
(Legal 
Strikes) 
Man 
Hours 
Lost 
(Illegal 
Strikes) 
1958 78 15 7 - - - - 
1959 63 10 5 - - - - 
1960 91 8 28 - - 34,332 293,412 
1961 40 5 9 2,953 11,551 178,332 214,640 
1962 40 8 11 3,492 4,762 340,380 40,153 
1963 24 5 4 483 2,018 105,928 117,602 
1964 45 7 20 1,049 3,544 85,440 18,436 
1965 52 4 20 2,225 4,680 73,912 68,493 
1966 28 1 11 194 3,180 40,200 23,488 
1967 59 5 29 1,154 4,227 54,638 41,327 
1968 78 4 9 3,054 4,473 35,038 10,757 
1969 113 3 83 341 21,356 10,700 1,580,980 
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TABLE 2 (Continued) 
Source: Labor Ministry, Memoria y Cuenta, 1958-1990. Compiled by Leonardo Rodriguez. 
in Ellner (1993).  
  
The alternative Communist-controlled CUTV, on the other hand, was able to 
attract members from a broad spectrum of leftist, progressive, and independent 
1970 173 2 64 902 24,836 265,502 1,874,282 
1971 187 5 228 806 39,307 314,676 3,850,074 
1972 257 7 172 2,069 27,263 328,068 1,169,456 
1973 274 4 250 525 46,033 902,000 1,157,358 
1974 236 3 116 135 17,598 19,376 1,039,824 
1975 207 3 110 164 25,916 62,928 804,336 
1976 210 1 178 3,000 36,932 36,000 730,123 
1977 183 0 214 0 63,923 0 687,976 
1978 112 0 114 0 25,337 0 318,732 
1979 182 2 145 237 23,031 3,304 394,822 
1980 192 4 185 494 63,844 52,592 2,431,754 
1981 199 3 126 270 29,292 160,640 2,074,347 
1982 158 2 102 253 14,859 31,264 329,603 
1983 274 0 200 0 59,749 0 2,886,273 
1984 15 0 39 0 3,767 0 50,956 
1985 82 6 11 873 12,076 40,888 54,920 
1986 88 2 20 1,137 - - - 
1987 84 1 38 - - - - 
1988 69 2 - - - - - 
1989 95 6 - - - - - 
1990 134 7 - - - - - 
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political tendencies due to its classist foundations based on class struggle.  However, 
while ideologically strong, it was never able to get the amount of backing enjoyed by 
the CTV.  Membership statistics show the continued dominance of the CTV and 
marginal role of the country’s three smaller labor federations:  CTV (1million – 2.5 
million); CUTV 80,000-320,000; Codesa 60,000-200,000; and CGT 300,000-180,000 
(Ellner, 1993).  So although the CUTV emerged as a potent force in its early years, its 
influence in the nation’s political system slowly declined because of its historical 
exclusion from the public sector (which AD and COPEI largely controlled).  It’s loss 
of influence in future years would force a rethinking among the Left over whether it 
was more beneficial to split with the CTV or try working for change within it (Ellner, 
1993).  Fortunately for the CUTV, it would later effectively merge with the class-
conscious National Workers' Union (UNT), founded by the Bolivarian Revolution in 
2003 to rival the older CTV, and continue to work towards advancing the unity of the 
workers’ movement in Venezuela.   
In an explicit rejection of the larger leftist Venezuelan political parties, several 
smaller parties of the Left independently organized several sectors of the working-
class.  These smaller parties therefore protested not only AD and COPEI, but also the 
main leftist parties (MAS, MEP, and PCV) for their abandonment of commonly held 
long-term objectives like the right to strike, the forty-hour week, and job security, 
which had yet to be realized.  In general, therefore, their struggle was against the 
traditional and dominant form of unionism known as reinvidicalismo, which was 
oriented exclusively towards immediate material or ‘bread and butter’ gains.  Their 
role in labor, instead, would be more responsive to the needs of workers and 
aggressively oriented towards fighting for their interests (Hellinger, 1996). 
Among these militant small parties that emerged was the worker-led party of 
Causa R, which resembled Brazil’s Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), or Workers’ 
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Party.  The Causa R would gain national prominence through its efforts in organizing 
workers in one of Venezuela’s most heavily industrialized and poor regions known as 
Guayana, home to one the nations’ largest steel making company Sidenirgica de 
Orinoco's (Orinoco Steel-SIDOR).  In fact, the Matanceros (a worker contingent of 
the Causa R) was able to win control of the very important and militant steel workers 
union in Guayana known as SUTISS, propelling it to the country’s most important 
militant worker movement in the 1970s and 1980’s (Ellner and Salas, 2005).  The 
Causa R’s support and fight for the working-class is most telling by its coining of the 
slogan, “In SUTISS the political parties have always governed; now it's time for the 
workers" (Matancero, 1979: 16; in Ellner, 1986: p.99).  The steel workers of SUTISS, 
who in 1969 elected a communist to head their union, are among the country’s most 
militant groups and wield substantial power given the importance of the export of steel 
for Venezuela.  Unlike other unions, SUTISS was able to make significant gains in its 
demands for the forty-hour work week, and occupational and safety and health 
provisions, thanks to its strategy of engaging in militant political struggle.   
The new unionism represented by the Causa R, based on advancing the interest 
of workers  and union democracy, would help to launch the party to the top spot of 
Venezuela’s leftist parties by the early 1990’s.  Its radical stance in comparison to 
other parties and boasting of its leadership as truly working-class in origin 
distinguished it from other parties.  This new unionism of the 1970’s and 1980’s 
directly rejected and challenged the traditional model of political parties.  However, in 
the case of the Causa R, an overemphasis on union politics and concrete demands, 
relative failure to define itself ideologically and to engage in the country’s broader 
arena of national politics, and its intense hostility towards other political parties caused 
it to suffer several defeats and lose electoral ground in subsequent years (Hellinger, 
1996).  One of such defeats was the 1981 takeover by the AD-controlled CTV of the 
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Causa R-led union (SUTISS) that represented workers in the steel company, SIDOR 
(Ellner and Salas, 2005).  The Causa R would also be actively excluded from national 
and regional governmental structures, despite being the leading revolutionary workers’ 
movement in the 1970s and 1980s (Ellner and Salas 2005).  
Another example that demonstrates the Left’s new strategy of accumulating 
power in civil society and its successful inroads in organized labor with its new style 
of unionism occurred within the country’s all-important textile industry.  That is, in 
addition to the Causa R’s movement in the steel industry, the textile workers 
movement also created new spaces of hope for the Venezuelan proletariat.  In 1980, 
the country witnessed what is considered one of Latin America’s most significant 
labor struggles when the textile workers union, UTIT (United Textile Workers 
Industry Union), went on strike to protest the abrogation of a previous contract with 
the employers' syndicate, ATV (Venezuelan Textile Association).   
The ATV had discharged thousands of textile workers in the three previous 
years and was now actively engaged in helping the CTV to wrestle control of the 
UTIT away from a smaller rival leftist labor federation that led it (Hellinger, 1996).  
At the same time textile workers found themselves in the middle of a battle to improve 
the health and safety conditions in their factories.  Worker discontent intensified and 
led to the launching of strike by the UTIT that would eventually result in an industry-
wide labor struggle.  UTIT’s militant actions, such as the occupation of the main 
cathedral in Caracas helped to gain the support of archbishop and the repudiation of 
the CTV leadership that labeled the workers actions as armed subversion (Hellinger, 
1996).  In what appeared to be a signal of victory by the textile workers, the employers 
agreed to a wage increase and a new contract.  However, demands made by more 
intransigent leader of the UTIT to nationalize the ATV’s largest enterprise resulted in 
a series of complications for the union and led to its eventual defeat (Helliner, 1996).  
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Despite the loss, the textile union movement had shown the entire Venezuelan 
proletariat the potential available for advancement of its interests through worker-led 
mobilization and militant struggle.      
At this point, it is important to also take into consideration the situation faced 
by two of Venezuela’s other major social forces; the peasantry and oil workers.  In 
terms of the Venezuelan peasantry, it remained relatively passive during this time as it 
had throughout most of Venezuela’s history.  Besides the already mentioned 
subordination of the land in Venezuela, we need to remember that AD had substantial 
influence in the peasant federation (FCV).  In fact, among the FCV’s main national 
leaders were AD trade unionists who organized widely throughout the countryside.  
To help explain the relative tranquility, therefore, one needs to also acknowledge the 
strong tie that existed between Venezuela’s peasant movement and the rest of the 
organized labor (Ellner, 1993).  Since early on, Venezuelan governments had been 
willing to accept the FCV’s participation in the major labor federation (CTV), thus 
giving the peasantry a sense of empowerment, albeit a false one since its members 
actually had very little influence within the CTV (Ellner, 1993).    
Venezuela’s oil workers, on the other hand, had been at the forefront of the 
country’s labor movement prior to the 1960’s.  In fact, they had constituted somewhat 
of a vanguard and served as an inspiration for the rest of the country’s proletariat 
(Eller, 1993).  In support of this argument Ellner (1993) notes, “their militant struggles 
in favor of union recognition, establidad absoluta (absolute job security clause), and 
the overthrow of the Perez Jimenez dictatorship” (p.225).  Oil workers had militantly 
pushed for their social, political, and economic demands, especially through their 1936 
and 1950 monumental strikes.  Their willingness to engage in industrial strife and 
overall militant tradition, however, was abandoned in the 1960’s as non-leftists leaders 
came to dominate the oil workers movement.  Thus, for example, they were largely 
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unwilling in subsequent years to put up much of a fight for estabilidad absoluta, or 
absolute job security (Ellner, 1993).   
Typically, it is assumed that oil workers are and have always been the 
privileged sector of Venezuela’s working-class, or its so-called labor aristocracy 
(Ellner, 1993).  While there is much truth to this argument, it is not completely 
accurate.  It is true that oil workers have seen important gains and far-reaching 
improvements that have largely been beyond the reach of the rest of the working-class, 
but this applies specifically only to the period from 1960 to 1980.  A clear example of 
their privileged status during these years is their success at pushing for the reduction 
of their work week, eventually achieving the forty-hour a week clause in their contract 
(Eller, 1993).  Not even the most militant steel and textile worker movements were 
able to accomplish this feat after decades of struggle.   
Throughout the 1960’s and in the years after, oil workers enjoyed benefits that 
workers in no other industry did.  Oil companies, for example, set up camps that 
provided oil workers with houses, and also granted workers who did not want to live 
in the camps special bonuses to pay for their housing.  Additionally, oil workers 
enjoyed significantly reduced prices on food through the commissaries that were 
established for them.  So the image of oil workers as constituting an elite segment of 
the working-class with better living conditions than the rest of workers was true at one 
point.  The relative passivity of the oil workers movement and the close association of 
most of its leader with the traditional and dominant non-leftist parties of AD and 
COPEI further support this argument (Ellner, 1993). 
Additionally, no other sector of the working-class besides oil workers has been 
able to succeed in getting estabilidad numerica (numerical stability) and estabilidad 
absoluta (absolute job security).  As we will see, the nationalization of the oil industry 
in 1976 looked quite promising for the entire working-class because of the windfall in 
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government revenue.  Yet, it was the oil workers in particular, that benefited most 
from the nationalization.  The Perez government astutely decided to grant the oil 
workers the much sought-after estabilidad absoluta (absolute job security) in return 
for their support of the nationalization, thus using them as a counterbalance of sorts 
against the critics of the nationalization. 
Yet, when the worldwide price of oil took a turn downward in 1982, the 
overall standard of living of oil workers greatly declined (Ellner, 1993).  Oil workers, 
who had previously enjoyed company-managed health facilities, were now forced to 
use the inadequate Social Security health centers like the rest of the working-class.  
Soon enough, new workers who entered the industry were denied the houses in the oil 
camps and subsidized food of the commissaries.  Oil workers from the state-owned oil 
firm PDVSA saw elimination of fringe benefits and great reductions in their 
purchasing power.  Moreover, the majority of the growing white-collar segment of 
PDVSA’s oil workers (43.7% in 1963 to 66.6% in 1989: see Table 3) were 
systematically converted to so-called confidential (thus upper-payroll) employees by 
management, thereby effectively eliminating them from the collective bargaining 
agreement and its benefits (Ellner, 1993).   
The subsequent inequalities that arose in terms of benefits and working 
conditions among the oil workers (and total labor force in general) put the elite status 
of oil workers into question.  Ellner (1993) argues that the labor aristocracy thesis thus 
becomes dubious in the modern democratic period, due to the drastic decrease in the 
standard of living of oil workers.  What is clear is that since the 1960’s the oil workers 
movement has exhibited the same unfortunate characteristic as most of Venezuela’s 
labor movement - general passivity; thus impeding the advancement of the overall 
working-class movement.  We now turn our attention to the boom years in 
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Venezuela’s history, which drastically accelerated the country’s accumulation process 
and created all kinds of changes.    
 
TABLE 3 
 Makeup of Venezuelan Oil Work Force, 1963-1989 
 
Year 
White-collar 
Workers 
Blue-collar 
Workers 
Percentage of 
White-collar 
Workers 
Foreign 
Workers 
Total Work 
Force 
1963 14,732 19,010 43.7% 2,155 33,742 
1966 13,560 18,614 46.0 % 1,481 29,448 
1969 12,178 12,343 49.7 % 1,183 24,521 
1972 12,500 10,828 53.6% 856 23,328 
1975 12,428 10,660 53.8% 504 23,088 
Nationalization 
1976 13,307 10,517 55.9% 202 23,824 
1977 13,874 11,228 55.3% 121 25,102 
1978 14,382 11,738 55.1% 176 26,120 
1979 17,063 13,430 56.0% 250 30,493 
1980 18,671 14,753 55.9% 264 33,424 
1981 20,643 15,963 56.4% 307 36,606 
1982 22,782 16,407 58.1% 326 39,189 
1983 23,648 15,947 59.7% 233 39,595 
1984 23,655 16,450 59.0% 163 40,105 
1985 23,558 14,846 61.3% 135 38,404 
1986 24,320 14,604 62.5% 112 38,924 
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TABLE 3 (Continued) 
 
1987 24,693 14,445 62.5% 116 39,138 
1988 24,362 17,597 63.1% 129 41,959 
1989 25,936 13,018 66.6% 89 38,954 
Sources: Ministerio de Energia y Minas, Petroleo y otros datos estadísticos (1989); Labor Ministry, 
Memoria y Cuenta (various years). In Ellner (1993).  
 
  
The Boom Years, Nationalization, and the State as the Center of Power 
It has already been established that oil was the main axis of Venezuela’s 
accumulation process ever since it first began to be exported from the country in the 
early 20th century.  Yet, the boost that the accumulation process in Venezuela received 
in 1973 with the Middle East oil embargo and subsequent increase in the worldwide 
price of oil was like none other the country had experienced since its discovery of oil.  
The sudden windfall in oil profits created euphoria among Venezuelans and immediate 
prosperity for the government which saw its revenues skyrocket from 12,545 million 
bolivares in 1972 to 40,179 million bolivares just three year later in 1975 (Perez Sainz 
& Zarembka, 1979).  With these new realities the already growing influence of the 
Venezuelan state multiplied, thereby transforming the state into the primary engine of 
accumulation.          
 Prior to the rise of Carlos Andres Perez to the presidency in 1974 the 
Venezuelan state already had a significant share in and overall regulation of the oil 
industry, even though foreign oil companies largely controlled the country’s oil 
production.  Thus since most of Venezuela’s economic activity flowed in one way or 
another through the oil industry, the state was the center of power.  The early 20th 
century dismantlement of the country’s landed elite and the absence of an 
entrepreneurial class to replace it, combined with the lack of a strong working-class 
and peasant movement only solidified the state’s position of power. The sudden oil 
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boom of 1973, therefore, had the effect of creating the possibility for the further 
strengthening of the state.        
Wishing to gain further control of oil surplus and thus expanding the influence 
of the state, the Carlos Andres Perez government made the bold move to fully 
nationalize Venezuela’s oil industry in 1976, thereby creating the state oil company, 
Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA).  These historic set of events led Carlos Andres 
Perez to announce that Venezuela would be converted into a developed nation within a 
couple of years through his La Gran Venezuela project that would ‘sow the oil’ 
(Wilpet, 2007).  To accomplish this he proposed price controls and income increases 
to fight poverty, and import substitution to diversify the Venezuelan economy 
(Wilpert, 2007).  This initiated an extravagant government spending spree and 
expansion of the bureaucracy. 
It should be pointed out that the nationalization of the oil industry in Venezuela 
was not unique, but as Douglas Bravo notes, quite common at the time among the oil 
producing nations of the world (Pena, 1978).  Moreover, Bravo stresses the need to 
acknowledge the favorable international conjuncture that allowed the nationalization 
to take place.  He notes the defeats of the United States in Asia, and argues that the 
correlation of forces had aligned themselves at the time in such a way that favored the 
socialist world over capitalism.  Consequently, oil producing nations took advantage 
of this after the Arab-Israeli War to set their own prices for oil and ensure that they 
continued rising.  Therefore, instead of relying on large transnational corporations for 
the management of their oil industries, these oil producing nations reached a common 
agreement to nationalize their oil sectors (Pena, 1978).     
The expansion of Venezuela’s state capitalist and developmentalist program 
that had commenced in the mid 1970’s thus entailed the further intervention of the 
government in the country’s accumulation process.  Besides oil, the government 
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increased its investment in mining, petrochemicals, and hydroelectricity.  Moreover, it 
initiated a drive to purchase several privately owned businesses while also establishing 
hundreds of new state-owned enterprises throughout the country.  Equally important 
was the government’s decision to nationalize steel, the country’s second most import 
export industry, further increasing its revenues and spending ability.   
The huge mass of money capital being generated by the oil industry was used 
in several ways.  First, the government created a central hub for the management of 
this money known as the Fondo de Inversiones Venezuela (FIV) or Venezuelan 
Investment Fund.  Among its purposes was the lending of money capital to various 
international institutions like the IMF, World Bank, and Inter-American Bank, and the 
establishment of the necessary foundations for potential export markets for Venezuela 
(Perez Sainz & Zarembka 1979).  The reason these funds were kept outside of the 
Venezuelan economy was the government’s belief that there was insufficient internal 
accumulation capacity for creating productive capital out of this money.   
The other main areas of investment were the already mentioned allocation of 
revenues to the numerous large state-led projects, which were also managed by the 
FIV, and the financing of credit, agrarian, and urban housing and development 
institutions (Perez Sainz & Zarembka 1979).  The government also stepped up its 
efforts to stimulate the export sector of the country by initiating an export promotion 
policy that sought to take advantage of Venezuela’s recent incorporation to the 
regional trade and integration agreement, or Andrean Pact.  While some branches were 
hurt by this integration, such as sugar, alcoholic beverages, tobacco and textiles, others 
branches that had already been exporting prior to 1973 or that had the potential for it, 
like petrochemicals, iron, steel, and aluminum, benefited greatly (Perez Sainz & 
Zarembka 1979).   
However, the oil blessing was not all positive for Venezuela.  In fact, the oil 
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boom brought with it negative consequences, such as chronic inflation and an increase 
in the nation’s debt due to the excessive government spending (Wilpert, 2003).  More 
importantly is the need to examine how the nation’s so-called prosperity and national 
development affected the poor and working-class.  Logically, many may think that the 
situation of these sectors of the population was drastically improved due to the 
potential for investment in infrastructure, education, health care, and social projects 
that the huge influx of government oil revenues created.  However, the government’s 
partial use of its newly inherited oil wealth to help combat poverty and improve the 
lives of ordinary Venezuelans proved only a temporary band aid to treat the symptoms 
of societal ills and injustices instead of their root causes.   
That is not to say that poverty reduction strategies did not exist.  In fact, they 
were abundant throughout the boom years and did help to reduce poverty in Venezuela 
during this time.  Some of these included free and universal health care and education, 
a raising of the minimum wage, and large public works projects (Wilpert, 2007).  
Unfortunately, there was an almost complete abandonment of any attempts at land 
reform during this time.  Yet, the main problem with these government policies were 
that they were directly dependent on the high oil revenues of the time, and did not 
form part of a comprehensive structural reform package.  The government’s main 
preoccupation was to move Venezuela completely away from agriculture and 
transform it into a modern industrialized country.  Furthermore, of the many social 
services assistance programs that existed most were tainted by clientelism and 
paternalism that many times obligated beneficiaries to become members of the one of 
the two ruling parties, AD or COPEI, before actually receiving benefits (Wilpert, 
2007).  This clientelistic and paternalistic behavior deepened throughout the boom 
year administrations of Carlos Andres Perez (1974-1979) and Luis Herrera Campins 
(1979-1984).   
  
 100 
 
 
 
 
A principle factor in the lack of structural change to the country’s inequalities 
and injustices during the oil boom had to do with the oil industry itself.  Despite the 
so-called nationalization of the oil industry, the government still exhibited a 
significant lack of control over the state-run oil company, PDVSA.  This can be 
explained by the fact that the oil industry’s old management, which exhibited an “anti-
statist and transnational corporatist culture,” remained in power even after 
nationalization (Wilpert 2007: p 89).  Thus while there was a transfer of ownership of 
the industry, there was not a change in management itself or in management culture 
and policies.  The industry kept being run under the same principles and goals as 
before, which largely benefited capital over the interests of Venezuelans.  The 
compensation and association agreements with the international oil interests thus made 
the nationalization of the massive petroleum industry both moderate and non-radical.    
Moreover, the nationalized Venezuelan companies retained strong ties to the 
former owners who were thus able to continue benefiting from the oil industry.  In 
fact, several multinational oil companies were able to retain their seats on the oil 
company’s board.  Consequently, Wilpert (2007) argues that the oil industry “never 
actually pursued Venezuelan interests,” because its management only felt loyalty 
towards the oil company and not to Venezuela, therefore concentrating solely on 
“maximizing oil production and sales, but not profits, which would have to be turned 
over to a, from their perspective, wasteful state” (p.89).  Thus, big capital was 
rewarded with generous subsidies, while the government showed excessive 
complacency towards the transnational corporations (Bravo and Melet, 1991).  
Additionally, the overdependence on oil was accompanied by widespread corruption, 
clientelism, and patronage on the part of the Venezuelan state and its many public 
institutions.  As a result of all this, the country’s oligarchy was able to further 
centralize its capital, and the dominant political parties, AD and COPEI, extend their 
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power.   
The oil dependency thus shaped the social structure of the country, and as 
previously noted, helped to maintain both a weak working class and landowning elite 
(Wilpert, 2007).  Moreover, the role of capital accumulation had become exclusively 
occupied by the Venezuelan state, producing a weak civic society and a paternalistic 
national political culture whereby citizens looked towards the state for the satisfaction 
of their every need.  In other words, the abundance of petrodollars allowed the 
interventionist Venezuelan state to maintain both its large public sector and political 
system of buying political loyalty with oil revenues.  Unsurprisingly, this greatly 
helped to contain class tensions and popular unrest, and to ensure an overall high level 
of political stability unseen in the rest of Latin America, up until the collapse of the oil 
sector in the mid 1980’s.  As we will see shortly, the economic troubles faced by 
Venezuela were only one part of a larger regional (and worldwide) economic 
meltdown that brought to an end the so-called Golden Age in Latin America.     
  
The Oil Bust and its Threat to Venezuela’s Puntofijismo Political System  
Already prior to the upcoming presidential elections of Venezuela in 1978, it 
was commonly acknowledged that the country was suffering from an excessive rate of 
both public and private spending and expansion.  Yet, the continued high price of oil 
allowed the excessive government spending to continue well into the Luis Herrera 
Campins era (1979-1984).  Soon enough, however, the wave of optimism and 
prosperity for the Venezuelan state, oligarchy, and growing middle-class would come 
to a crashing halt with the drastic drop in oil prices in the early 1980’s.  Starting in 
1981, OPEC members had begun cutting the price of oil due to the decision by Saudis 
to flood the market with inexpensive oil.  The continued excessive supply of oil 
worldwide finally caused the thirteen OPEC members to virtually lose control over 
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world oil prices and break their production quotas, causing prices to plummet in 1982.   
This oil bust of 1982 would have devastating implications for Venezuela, 
putting the entire puntofijismo system into question.  According to Wilpert (2007), the 
unraveling of this liberal bourgeois system had begun earlier in 1979 when Venezuela 
commenced its 20 year economic decline.  It was not until the global overproduction 
of oil and dramatic price drop that the system entered into crisis.  Negative economic 
growth and stagnation led to a multiplying of Venezuela’s debt.  The country’s 
overdependence on oil revenues had made the country particularly susceptible to the 
fluctuations in oil prices.  Therefore, in the early 1980’s oil revenues could no longer 
support the array of government subsidies, price controls, exchange-rate losses, and 
the operations of more than 400 public institutions.      
 An aggressive attempt to reverse the 1983 economic crisis was made by the 
government of Jaime Lusinchi (1984-89) that included several devaluations of the 
currency, increased import protection, a multi-tier exchange-rate system, and subsidies 
to both producers and consumers (Tarver a& Frederick, 2005).  The effect of these 
reforms was a moderate recovery and growth between 1985 and 1988.  Despite this, 
the drop in the price of oil by almost half 1986 only worsened the economic situation 
and indebtedness of Venezuela, so that by 1989 Venezuela’s system based on the high 
rate of government spending of oil revenue finally collapsed.   A decade later, in 1998, 
the price of oil would reach a historical low of $3.19 per barrel, in 1973 prices (OPEC 
Annual Statistical Bulletin, 2001).  As will be analyzed in a later section, the impact of 
the incredible loss of oil revenue for Venezuela that began in the early 1980’s 
translated into a nearly two-decade long economic deterioration of Venezuela’s 
economy and a drastic decline in the per capita income for most Venezuelans.  
Moreover, it would also lead to the imposition of a new phase of capital accumulation 
known as neo-liberalism, which we will see, enhanced poverty and further eroded the 
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standard of living of most Venezuelans.     
All this goes to show that the view of Venezuela as having a healthy and 
vibrant political culture and active population, social peace, and a democratic system 
is not only very misleading, but untrue.  Therefore, while Venezuela was able to avoid 
military rule from the 1960s through the 1980s unlike other Latin American nations, it 
did so by maintaining a repressive, corrupt, and elitist two-party regime that denied 
political participation to others and used petrodollars to buy political loyalty, thus 
reinforcing the long-standing paternalistic political culture and the servility of the 
acquiescent Venezuelan citizenry.  Overall, it has been demonstrated that while 
ensuring a certain level of stability in Venezuela, the unsustainable and repressive 
liberal democratic system began its decline as oil profits diminished in the early 
1980’s.   
An understanding of the economic collapse in Venezuela would be incomplete 
without also examining the broader spatial and temporal situation.  That is, in order to 
understand the oil bust and decline of the political system in Venezuela, we must 
situate events in Venezuela with the larger global historic picture that witnessed the 
demise of the developmental framework.  To say the least, the situation in Venezuela 
had been unique in the region.  Most Latin American countries had suffered through 
the economic turmoil of the 1970’s that resulted in the end of the so-called Golden 
Era.  Venezuela, like most oil-producing countries, experienced significant growth 
throughout the 1970’s thanks to the ever-increasing availability of petrodollars, while 
other Latin American nations and the world in general, were already engulfed in 
severe economic distress.  Thus, although the end of the ‘Golden Age’ in Venezuela 
was delayed by some years in comparison to the rest of the region, it eventually came 
with a vengeance in the 1980’s.    
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CHAPTER 4   
NEO-LIBERALISM: VENEZUELA AND THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS  
 
 Up to now we have explained the collapse of the development framework, and 
the nature of the economic stagnation and debt crisis that gripped Latin America.  Our 
attention now turns to the implications of this economic catastrophe on the region, and 
especially to Venezuela, and the popular response to neo-liberalism that manifested 
itself in the form of Chavismo and the rise of the Bolivarian Revolution more 
generally. 
While it can generally be regarded as an expression of the class conflict 
between the poor and working-class majority and the wealthy elite minority, the 
Bolivarian Revolution is also seeking to abolish other forms of social distinction and 
oppression (ie. racial, gender, sexual, ecological).  Essentially, it is a movement 
against the negative effects of the capitalist system, including exploitation of all kinds, 
overconcentration of wealth and access to it, alienation, commodity fetishism, and 
ecological destruction.  In this next section we will see the how the 1989 imposition of 
neo-liberalism and its logic of shifting accountability from the state towards the 
individual ensured the continued capitalist accumulation of wealth, but more 
importantly, resulted in devastating effects for the majority of Venezuelan citizens.  
An examination into the nature of neo-liberalism, the form it took in its imposition on 
Venezuela, its effects on society, and the creation of a counter-movement against it 
will now be carried out. 
 
Neo-liberalism’s Early Developments   
 The end of the post-1945 regulatory era that resulted from the crisis of the 
1970’s signaled a watershed for the capitalist world-system.  Not only was the Fordist 
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mass production form of organization, “based on systems of specialized machines, 
operating within the organizational domains of vertically integrated, bureaucratically 
managed, giant corporations” eliminated, but so were, “the governmental policies and 
actions, social institutions, norms and habits of behavior” that maintained the Fordist 
regime (Arrighi 1994: p.2).  The breakdown of this so-called Fordist-Keynesian 
“regime of accumulation” in which investments in fixed capital enabled increases in 
both productivity and mass consumption, indicated the end of yet another particular 
phase of capitalist development (Boyer 1990; Jessop 1990; Tickell and Peck 1992 in 
Arrighi 1994: p.2).  Yet, despite serving as a decisive turning point in its history, by no 
means was the situation as “unprecedented as it may appear at first sight” (Arrighi 
1994: p.1).  In fact, as Arrighi (1994) goes on to explain,  
 
Long periods of crisis, restructuring and reorganization, in short, of 
discontinuous change, have been far more typical of this history of the 
capitalist world-economy than those brief moments of generalized expansion 
along a definite developmental path like the one that occurred in the 1950s and 
1960s.  In the past, these long periods of discontinuous change ended in a 
reconstitution of the capitalist world-economy on new and enlarged 
foundations (p.1) 
 
This collapse of the post-war economic model coincided with the increased 
geographical mobility of capital and changes in the spatial configuration of the 
processes of capital accumulation that recentralized capital in the higher income 
countries of the world (Arrighi, 1994).  More importantly, the combination of low 
growth rates with high levels of inflation created a historically unique situation that 
was taken advantage of by a group of neo-liberal theorists (Anderson, 1999; in Houtart 
2001).  In other words, “Over the debris of the ‘development framework’, neo-liberal 
globalization emerged as the reigning orthodoxy” (Makki, 2004: p.162).  
Consequently, the Keynesian period’s emphasis on long-term social and economic 
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national development was effectively abandoned.  Of importance here, therefore, is 
illuminating the theoretical roots of this political-economic school of thought and set 
of policy prescriptions known as neo-liberalism.   
This neo-liberal model promoting higher economic freedom, would take some 
time to become dominant.  In fact, at first OECD countries were inclined to use 
Keynesian policies to try to correct the problems associated with the global economic 
crisis (Anderson, 1999; in Houtart 2001).  Later, however, neo-liberalism would 
become the reigning ideology throughout the majority of the industrialized capitalist 
countries of Western Europe and of the United States.  While the first implementation 
of a neo-liberal program by an advanced capitalist country occurred in Great Britain in 
1979, it was in Latin America where the first true testing of neo-liberalism took place.  
As we witnessed earlier, the economic crisis had particularly devastating effects on 
Latin American nations, which had amassed extremely high foreign debts as part of 
their ISI strategies.  The decision by governments in Latin American to abandon the 
ISI model because of its perceived inability to remedy the region’s worst recession 
since the 1930’s led to the imposition of a pattern of neo-liberal development based on 
export production, market liberalization, free trade, and a reduced state role.   
In Venezuela, the liberal democratic puntofijismo system, which had already 
commenced its unraveling, now faced ever greater difficulties.  The response to the 
economic deterioration and growing political instability in Venezuela by then-
President Carlos Andres Perez was similar to that of most other Latin American 
nations, where governments began imposing neo-liberal policies in a top-down fashion 
onto their populations.  President Andres Perez decided to accept an International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) loan shortly following his election in February 1989, therefore 
marking the beginning of the imposition on Venezuela of the neo-liberal structural 
adjustment reforms advocated by the IMF.  
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The downsizing of the state and liberalization of the economy according to the 
tenets of neo-liberalism, therefore transformed the notion of governance from one that 
saw individuals as objects of policy to practitioners of policy (Hyatt 1997, p.218).  In 
other words, neo-liberalism became a device that allowed for the shifting of 
accountability from the state to the individual.  It encouraged citizens to become active 
participants in the management of their own welfare.  The concept of poverty for 
example, was largely replaced by that of ‘social exclusion’ or ‘disempowerment.’  
This reformulation of citizenship bears testimony to the values and goals of neo-
liberalism: efficiency and the institutionalization of the primacy of the market in 
mediating needs and resources (Hyatt, 1997).      
Latin America was chosen by the international development establishment as 
the ideal testing ground for these neo-liberal policies, commonly known as the 
Washington Consensus, due to the high number of countries in the region with large 
foreign debts (most of which were amassed in the 1970s and 1980s by corrupt 
governments and military regimes with the insistence of international banks) (Gott, 
2005).  Ironically, the capitalist developed nations of the world denounced the same 
tools and policies of protectionism and state interventionism that had helped to build 
up the economies of Europe and North America, actively discouraging and preventing 
Latin American countries from following their example (Chang, 2002).  Venezuela in 
particular, had accumulated an enormous level of debt due to the foolhardy manner in 
which its “corrupt and incompetent” governments borrowed high interest money from 
abroad (Gott 2005: p.51).  Thus Venezuela became an excellent target for the 
implementation of the Washington Consensus, whose purpose it was to fundamentally 
alter the internal economic structures and mechanisms of debtor countries in order for 
these in turn to be able to repay their debts, many of which were owed to American 
banks (Gott, 2005).   
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The Imposition of Neo-liberalism on Venezuela and Its Effects 
It is now necessary to examine in detail the aforementioned policy reforms of 
1989 in Venezuela.  Ironically, President Andres Perez spearheaded the IMF-
promoted structural reforms, despite also having been the one to preside over the 
interventionist state period and government expansion in his first term as president in 
the 1970’s.  The goals of these new policies were to reduce the role played by 
government in the economy, orient all of the country’s economic activities toward the 
free market, and to attract foreign investment.  According to Lander and Fierro (1996) 
the set of economic policies characteristic of neo-liberalism that were imposed on 
Venezuela included the removal of trade barriers, fiscal policy discipline, abolishment 
of price controls, the cutting of social services by reducing or ending subsidies of basic 
goods and services, the privatization of state industries and utilities, removal of 
employment rights and protection, and the deregulation of the state for the free 
operation of the market.  They summarize the new policies as consisting of three 
aspects:  
 
(1)adjustment as a mechanism for establishing short-term equilibria in the 
main macroeconomic indicators and repaying the external debt; (2) structural 
reform of the economy – the shift from state-directed and oil-dependant 
economy to market-economy based on private, nontraditional exports; and (3) 
the transformation of the “populist” political systems typical of Latin America 
to a “modern” system that would not interfere with the free operation of the 
market and would conform to the “objective” demands of the new 
international economic order (Lander and Fierro 1996: p.51) 
 
Among the new reforms the most fundamental was the attempt to stimulate 
exports through the great devaluation of Venezuela’s currency, the bolívar, from its 
highly overvalued rate to its market rate.  Other similar adjustments included the 
selling off of state-owned enterprises, restructuring of the financial sector, and 
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restoration of positive real interest rates, all with the purpose of eliminated the 
country’s budget deficits.  Moreover, the desire to lower the debilitating high foreign 
debt repayments forced the Venezuelan government to pursue aggressive debt 
reduction schemes with its commercial creditors.    
The effects of the policies were felt almost immediately and very intensely 
throughout the country, thus giving new meaning to the term ‘shock treatment.’  
Among these the doubling of the price of gas was perhaps the single most outrage-
producing and devastating one.  Although there was supposed to be a controlled price 
increase of 30% on public transportation, most transportation federations ignored the 
controls and dramatically raised their fares, creating great dissatisfaction among 
Venezuelans who depend on public transportation (Tarver and Frederick 2005).  
Another significant result of the structural adjustments policies was the erosion of 
formal employment, which directly contributed to the deterioration of living 
conditions within metropolitan centers as real wages dropped and unemployment and 
informality increased (Villa and Rodriguez, 1996).   
Since 1979 decreasing oil prices and revenues caused Venezuela to undergo 
significant economic decline and to experience a lowering of per capita GDP by 27% 
from 1979 to 1999 (Wilpert, 2007).  This drastic economic deterioration also saw the 
erosion of the middle-class’ standard of living that had been improving throughout the 
previous decades, and the increase in poverty from 17% in 1980 to 65% in 1996 
(Wilpert 2007).  In effect, during these two decades Venezuela had experienced both 
the largest decline in per capita income and the greatest rise in poverty in all of Latin 
America.  Moreover, the rate of inflation that had historically remained in the single 
digits grew to 29% in 1988, in addition to the expansion of the country’s trade deficit 
(Lander and Fierro 1996).  The decline in social spending added to the already 
declining standard of living for Venezuelans.  In the face of all these difficulties the 
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clientalistic puntofijismo system, which depended on the increasing influx of oil 
revenues to attain political loyalty and that was largely regarded as highly corrupt, 
entered into crisis, thereby finally opening up the space for outside political 
competition.  
Another drastic and noticeable change that occurred as a result of the neo-
liberal model was the new pattern of spatial growth that took place within Venezuela, 
and all other Latin American countries.  The increasing level of job insecurity and 
misery faced by the poor and working-class as a result of labor flexibilization, 
contributed to the increased income inequality and deepening of social polarization.  
As a result the growth in irregular settlements was drastic throughout the outskirts of 
Venezuela.  These low-income enclaves lacked essential services such as water and 
electrical systems, hospitals, schools, and police stations.   
In Caracas, for example, the growth of these shantytowns was so dramatic that 
by 1991 approximately 42%, or 1.2 million out of a total population of 3 million, 
inhabited such areas (Gilbert 1996).  On the other side of the equation, Latin American 
cities like Caracas witnessed the rapid construction of what Teresa Calderia (1996) 
labels fortified enclaves, or luxury high-rise buildings enclosed within fences and 
protected by security guards.  While some have noted the close proximity between 
shantytowns and these elite settlements as a possible sign of decreased social 
polarization (Portes et al, 1997), the overall patterns insist a further residential 
segregation and thus polarization between classes as elites seek to hide and protect 
themselves from the perceived violence of the ‘subalterns’ of society.  
While metropolitan centers throughout Latin America saw decreased levels of 
investment and population growth, rural areas and secondary cities began growing and 
benefiting from investors that attempted to exploit agriculture, mining, and tourism.  
In Mexico for example, the border city of Tijuana, agricultural city of Sinaloa, and 
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tourist center of Acapulco, all began expanding more rapidly than the major urban 
center (Portes et al., 1997).   Moreover, while the new outward looking export model 
led to both deindustrialization and a decline in manufacturing, it also allowed for the 
rapid growth of export processing zones (EPZs) in both metropolitan centers and 
secondary cities.  In some countries urban primacy was greatly reduced, as in the case 
of Kingston, Jamaica, which now faced competition from the site of a second EPZ, 
Montego Bay, and its fast growth in tourism (Portes et al., 1997).  Port-au-Prince, 
Haiti on the other hand, maintained its reign in primacy, as it remained the sole host of 
an EPZ in the entire country and thus the center of goods assembly for export (Portes 
et al. 1997).  While EPZs did offer a form of employment for some (mainly women), 
the exploitation of these workers and the lack of both backward and forward linkages 
translated into minimal overall development of countries.           
 One of the main effects of the economic restructuring and labor flexibilization 
of the neo-liberal policies was the increased polarization of the occupational structure, 
so that the relatively low availability of high-skilled jobs and technical training existed 
alongside an excess of precarious low-skilled and poor-paying jobs (Canales, 2007).  
The grim situation faced by the majority of the ‘redundant’ working-class population 
of Venezuela, in particular the social exclusion of large sectors of the population as a 
result of the distortions caused by the imposition of the neo-liberal model, contributed 
greatly to the increased outflow of migrants to selected global cities in the U.S. during 
the 1980’s. Ultimately, this new pattern of outflow migration is a product of global 
capitalism, in which the North serves as a magnet for the South’s redundant labor 
(Perez Sainz 2005).  Migration from Latin America to the U.S. was so great during 
this time that the contribution of immigrants from Latin America to the total U.S. 
population nearly doubled from 3.9 million in 1980 to 7.7 million in 1990, and then 
more than doubled to 17.4 million in 2002 (Canales, 2007).  This international 
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migration, therefore, entailed not only a territorial uprooting, but a globalizing of the 
labor force and the creation of transnational immigrant networks between receiving 
and sending nations.       
 The resultant ‘redundancy’ of a large portion of the working-class created by 
neo-liberalism led to the massive expansion of the informal economies of Latin 
American nations, that tried to absorb this labor force supply.  In fact, according to the 
International Labor Organization of all the new jobs created in Latin American from 
1990 to 1993 an amazing 83% were in the informal sector (Orlando, 2001).  As table 4 
shows, poverty rates in the informal economy are much higher than in the formal 
economy in Latin American countries.   
  In Venezuela the informal economy, which accounts for more than half of the 
active working Venezuela population, is a main contributor to the overall income of 
the country.  In fact, the informal sector has increased its participation in Venezuela’s 
overall employment, from 32% of total employment in 1978 to 52% in 1999 (Orlando, 
2001).  This unorganized Venezuelan mass has had to depend on all sorts of informal 
and irregular employment - street selling of petty commodities, temporary service-
sector activities, and sub-subsistence entrepreneurship – in order to survive.   
 
TABLE 4 
 Poverty and Informality in Latin America during the 1990’s 
 
% Poor 
 Formal Informal 
Argentina 13 38 
Bolivia 20 43 
Chile 18 32 
Costa Rica 4 30 
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TABLE 4 (Continued) 
 
Ecuador 13 45 
El Salvador 43 72 
Honduras 47 82 
Mexico 4 40 
Panama 5 51 
Paraguay 3 24 
Uruguay 4 27 
Venezuela 10 41 
Average 15 43 
Source: Orlando y Pollack (2000) in Orlando, 2001. 
Note: the line of poverty used is of $60 monthly per person according to the Purchasing Power Parity 
theory.  
 
 While we have seen neo-liberalism’s implications for Latin America, it is 
necessary to also examine the reaction of those excluded from the benefits of neo-
liberal policies and most affected by their negative consequences.  We will now see 
how the limits of neo-liberalism would eventually cause it to enter into crisis in the 
late 1980’s and how its contradictions would help give rise to a series of popular 
counter-movements throughout the globe, and Latin America in particular.   
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CHAPTER 5 
CRISIS OF NEO-LIBERALISM: SITUATING CHAVISMO WITHIN THE LATIN 
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE OF RESISTANCE  
 
 The ‘creative destruction’ that neo-liberalism caused in Venezuela, and in 
countries globally, includes that of “institutional frameworks and powers, divisions of 
labor, social relations, welfare provisions, ways of life and thought, and attachments to 
the land and habits of the heart” (Harvey, 2005: p.3).  Additionally, as has been 
shown, the neo-liberal project is responsible for the dramatic spread and 
intensification of poverty, inequality, and social polarization, along with a 
deterioration of the environment and access to health care and educational services.  
As Polanyi (2001) succinctly puts it, the self-regulating market promoted by neo-
liberal ideology transforms both human beings and the natural environment into 
commodities, thereby leading to the destruction of society and the natural 
environment.  Moreover, the individualistic market rationality promoted by neo-liberal 
ideology, and capitalism in general, has placed the greatest responsibility of poverty 
mitigation on the poor themselves, since as Leys points out, “governments have had it 
within their power to try to resist these changes, or to try to change their direction; but 
they rarely tried” (Leys, p.11).  Unfortunately, all of the solutions that have been 
proposed to help the poor such as technological innovation, micro credit, and ‘green’ 
agriculture, are ineffectual and instead of challenging the pillars of capitalism, help to 
maintain them. 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2006) argues that the political power of the 
transnational mobilization of social movements and of the masses of people excluded 
from the benefits of social citizenship becomes the only source capable of replacing 
neo-liberal institutions with democratic egalitarian ones.  Here it is appropriate to use 
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Karl Polanyi’s exposition of what he called capitalism’s ‘double movement’ as a guide 
to helping explain the popular backlash against neo-liberalism.  According to Polanyi 
(2001),  
 
the unleashing of markets for labor, land, and money wreaks profound havoc  
and generates counter-tendencies and demands for intervention and social 
protection. Far from the counter-movement representing some kind of external 
intervention in an inexorably unfolding teleology, these opposing tendencies 
are contained within capitalism.  By the same taken, the conditions for global 
capital accumulation must be actively created and constantly reworked (Hart, 
year p. 304)   
 
In Venezuela, neo-liberal reforms that impacted most severely on the poor and 
working class provoked popular outrage that would intensify over the course of the 
next decade and culminate in the crystallization of a powerful resistance movement.  
We now move on to see how one of the most spectacular contemporary manifestations 
of the double movement, Venezuelan’s Bolivarian Revolution, sprang to life, 
developed through a series of historical events, and triumphed in taking power in 1998 
at the same time that the neo-liberal model of development lost its last traces of 
legitimacy.  
 
The Birth of the Bolivarian Revolution: El Caracazo 
On the morning of February 27, 1989 thousands of Venezuelans took to the 
streets in protest of the unexpected economic reforms introduced by then-president 
Carlos Andres Perez, in what would later be called the Caracazo - the first massive 
action of the popular classes since 1935 when the killing of the military strongman, 
Juan Vincente Gomez, provoked intense unrest and conflict, especially between 
classes (Hellinger, 2003).  This mass popular uprising that lasted five days and took 
the lives of several hundred people was therefore largely a result of the government’s 
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imposition of the structural adjustment program, or el paquete (“the package”) on 
Venezuela (Coronil 1997; Gott 2006; Lebowitz 2006; Wilpert 2007).  The Caracazo 
proved to be the spark that would ignite the fire of the resistance movement in 
Venezuela that came to be known as the Revolucion Bolivariana.  Interestingly, 
despite articulating the interests of the non-privileged and marginalized classes, the 
country’s major labor federation, CTV, reacted to the Caracazo by denying that 
organized workers were involved, and being conspicuously absent from the street 
protests involving students and poor people that became prevalent throughout the 
entire country (Ellner, 1993).   
This intense backlash and uprising against neo-liberalism’s hegemony and 
imposition, however, was not limited to Latin America but could be seen worldwide.  
In fact, around the globe, powerful transnational political and social mobilization 
began to spring up. Yet, clearly the leading and most forceful of these movements 
emerged in Venezuela, posing a real and serious challenge to the tenets of neo-
liberalism and capitalism.  Before delving into the complexities of this contemporary 
attempt at social transformation it is imperative to contextualize it by briefly reviewing 
the heavily influential focoist strategy of social change in Latin America that 
dominated in the 1960s and 1970s.  
  The Cold War era, which saw a long global ideological and geo-political 
struggle between the United States (liberal capitalist ideology) and Soviet Union (state 
socialist ideology), was a time of great political fervor in Latin America.  An intense 
offensive by the United States and its allies was underway in order to contain what 
they regarded as the spread of communism throughout the world.  In Latin American 
in particular, the 1960s and 1970s saw great social upheavals that intensified into 
revolutionary movements.  The 1959 Cuban Revolution is generally projected as the 
beginning of this cycle of Latin American revolutions.   
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The Cuban revolutionaries that carried out the armed struggle for national 
liberation  became known as the founders of the new practice of ‘focoismo’ or 
‘revolution within a revolution’, in which an intellectually capable military cadre 
without mass support can successfully lead and direct a revolutionary movement to 
quick military victory.  This Castroist form of revolutionary struggle would be 
promoted throughout Latin America and would serve as an inspiration to social 
movements in the region fighting for national liberation.  The basic tenets of ‘foco 
theory’ were first introduced by Che Guevara in his manual on guerrilla warfare. 
Guevara (1961) maintained that it was not necessary for revolutionary conditions to 
develop, but that instead they could be created through the establishment and 
development of a dedicated and armed vanguard, or guerrilla foco.  His philosophy of 
social change, therefore, placed the emphasis on armed resistance and revolution and 
not on political parties.  Moreover, Guevara (1961) believed that in the 
underdeveloped Latin American countries the appropriate site of battle would be the 
rural areas and not the cities.   
The focoist strategy would subsequently be elaborated by the French 
intellectual and ex-revolutionary Regis Debray in his 1967 book Revolution in the 
Revolution.  The basic principles laid out by Debray (1967) were that, just as in Cuba, 
the conditions for revolution were already ripe throughout the rest of Latin America.  
According to him, all that was needed was a committed revolutionary armed force to 
begin the armed insurrection.  He did not think it necessary to first organize on a party 
basis, but that instead the revolutionary foco could serve as the embryo of the 
vanguard party that would later be developed.  He used the successful takeover by 
Cuban revolutionaries without a party as an example to support this thesis, which 
subordinated political tasks of revolution to military action.  Debray’s believed that his 
thesis on focoismo was applicable throughout the region and hoped that the rules and 
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principles of the Cuban experience would be equally applied to other Latin American 
revolutions.  
The focoist strategy represented a clear break from the sterile and unilinear 
stagist vision of revolutionary change proposed by orthodox Marxism.  The stagist 
theory maintained that revolutionary forces must hold off until capitalist production 
achieves a high level of development and economic conditions mature enough to 
permit revolution.  Moreover, stagist strategy argues that before socialism can be 
achieved there needs to be a large and organized proletariat, and both a high level of 
industrialization and concentration of capital.  This implies that social change is a 
gradual process, whereby rigid preconditions for socialism slowly develop as the 
working-class gains a firmer hold in the social and political spheres and acquires a 
higher level of class-consciousness.  This call for postponement of revolutionary 
action by stagist theory stands in stark contrast to the focoist strategy that calls for 
immediate revolutionary armed insurrection.  Rather than wait for the necessary 
conditions to arise, specifically the existence of a conscious and organized working-
class, ‘foco theory’ expressed the idea that rural peasants could be elicited by the 
guerrilla foco for support and thus together launch a sudden armed revolution for 
radical social change.     
In sum, the 1959 installation of the new revolutionary power in Cuba would 
become the symbol of the march towards national liberation and socialism.  In 
Nicaragua, another group of armed revolutionaries would found the guerrilla 
organization, Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional (FSLN) or National 
Sandinista Liberation Front in 1961.  These revolutionaries appealed to Nicaragua’s 
large peasant population in order to attract people to its ranks and carry out intense 
guerrilla warfare against the Somoza dictatorship.  In this sense the FSLN followed 
some of the focoist strategies, although it also actively organized urban workers and 
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made alliances with diverse sectors of the country.  Like in Cuba, after taking state 
power the FSLN developed poder popular (popular power), implemented an 
aggressive land redistribution program for the dispossessed that broke the 
overconcentration of land ownership, nationalized a number of key industries, and 
created a democratic popular army and militia.  
In contrast to the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions, the ‘Chilean path to 
socialism’ program of the 1970’s initiated by the Allende government did not 
originate by way of an armed popular insurgency.  While this brief socialist attempt 
had its roots in Chile’s historically politicized and socially conscious working-class, it 
was also greatly inspired by the revolutionary events of Cuba, which helped to 
develop a stronger political culture among Chilean students and intellectuals 
throughout the 1960’s.  The Chilean case, like the contemporary Venezuelan one, 
represents a peaceful attempt at socialist transformation through the traditional 
representative democratic electoral system.  According to Lowy (1986) it is not 
possible to begin the transition towards socialism without having as a starting point, 
“an armed popular rebellion that breaks with the oligarchic/capitalist state’s police-
military system” (Lowy, p. 266; in Fagen et al. 1986).  What this meant for Chile was 
that since the structural transformation program occurred, “within the framework of 
the bourgeois state itself, with its repressive structures intact,” the obstacles faced by 
the working-class movement were too overbearing and thus lead to an eventual 
“defeat of the workers” (Lowy, p. 266; in Fagen et al. 1986).    
While the struggles of the 1960s and 1970s in Latin America achieved 
important social and political changes, the poor and working-class majorities 
continued suffering the consequences of an unjust and exploitative political-economic 
capitalist system and simultaneously, persisted in their struggle for a better society.  
The current emergence of new progressive and left movements and governments 
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throughout Latin America signals both the end of the cycle of the social struggles that 
were initiated in the decade of the 60’s and the maturation of a new cycle of struggles 
(Zibechi, 2008: www.aporrea.org/ideologia/a62930.html).  That is, these new popular-
national struggles that combine political forces of the left and popular movements are 
the result of a longer process of development that began in the revolutionary period of 
the 1960’s.  Incredibly, these movements survived in the face of the dictatorships of 
the 1970’s, and were able to finally flourish following the neo-liberal decade of the 
90’s (Zibechi, 2008: www.aporrea.org/ideologia/a62930.html).  The Bolivarian 
Revolution in Venezuela represents the culmination of just one of these long struggles 
in the region.  Our goal is to examine the specific nature and development of 
Venezuela’s contemporary socialist attempt and see how it compares relative to the 
other experiences of the region.   
  
The Growth of a Resistance Movement: The Bolivarian Revolution’s Long Road 
to Victory 
While the Venezuelan people’s discontent for the government had already 
been growing for some years it was the 1989 Caracazo and its brutal suppression by 
the military that signaled the tipping point for Venezuelans.  The mobilized sectors of 
civil society along with the discontented progressive elements within the military 
began to coalesce into a strong resistance movement (Wilpert, 2007).  While the 
Caracazo had been civilian-led, the progressive elements of the military also 
coordinated an uprising of their own soon thereafter in the attempted coup d’etat led 
by Hugo Chavez.  The stimulus for this unsuccessful military-civilian revolt had been 
the Caracazo and the anger at the unnecessary overuse of force to quell the rioting.  
Instead of attempting to overthrow the government immediately following the 
Caracazo, Chavez and his military conspirators decided to hold off and use the 
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momentum of the uprising to strengthen the organizing and recruitment of members 
for its cause (Wilpert, 2007).   
Perhaps the most important aspect of this new resistance movement was the 
coming together of civilian and military forces, which had been loosely in contact with 
each other since the economic and political turmoil started in the 1980’s (Gott, 2006).  
The subversive elements of the military were largely welcomed by the growing 
number of discontented civilian organizations throughout Venezuela, and vice-versa.  
The common thread that united these two dissatisfied groups was the lack of any 
significant positive developments to the corrupt and incompetent political system.  
The importance of this civilian-military unity was something that Chavez and his 
Movimiento Revolucionario Bolivariano (Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement - 
MBR) had understood since its beginnings as a serious subversive political 
organization within the army in 1982.  Venezuelan history had proven the usefulness 
of the participation of citizens in coup d’etats, particularly in, “1944 (against Medina 
Angarita), in 1958 (against Perez Jimenez), and in 1962 (against Romulo Betancourt)” 
(Gott 2006: p.76).   Thus Chavez now actively worked to recruit civilian political 
groups, especially those related to the old guerrilla leadership of the 1960s, in order to 
incorporate citizen participation into his political-military cell. 
One of the important politically active groups that Chavez felt he needed to 
reach out to was Douglas Bravo’s Partido Revolucionario Venezolano (PRV), one of 
two splinter organizations that emerged out of the Venezuelan guerrilla movements of 
the 1960s (the other being the Movimiento al Socialismo – MAS).  Douglas Bravo, the 
ex- guerrilla leader in Falcon in the 1960s and ex-Communist Party member, was now 
a well-known and respected leftist in Venezuela.  His legal political organization, 
PRV, had among his supporters, Adan Chavez, the elder brother of Hugo Chavez who 
lived and taught at the Universidad de los Andes in Merida (Gott 2006).  This 
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connection helped to set up a meeting between Bravo and Hugo Chavez in which both 
agreed on the need to build, “a civilian-military movement, with the long-term aim of 
preparing a revolutionary insurgency” (Gott 2006: p. 58).  However, the year before 
the attempted coup, Bravo and Chavez broke off relations.  Bravo, who favored 
militant civil action and protest on the streets, accused Chavez of detaching himself 
from the support that he had gained from civil society by emphasizing the superiority 
and importance of military action over civilian participation in the upcoming uprising.             
Another group of revolutionary civilians that Chavez felt he must coordinate 
with was La Causa R.  This leftist radical workers’ organization was led at the time by 
another former guerrillero of the 1960s, Alfredo Maneiro, whom had founded the 
organization in the 1970’s.  The hope of Chavez was to train and arm the supporters of 
the organization and thus create citizen militias, capable of performing acts of civil 
disobedience and providing backup to the military (Gott, 2006).  A sense of distrust on 
the part of both sides caused these plans to never develop.  On the one hand there was 
Chavez who distrusted people on the left whom he suspected might be opportunistic 
and simply supporting a military alliance for the sole hope of acquiring a position of 
power.  On the other side you had a distrustful citizenry which had already been 
betrayed in the 1958 civilian-military uprising that had disappointedly only resulted in 
the creation of a ‘pacted democracy’ and not in a more participatory form of 
governance.           
At the same time that Chavez’s own military political organization, MBR, was 
actively planning its eventual rebellion, other politicized elements within the military 
also coordinated their own conspiracies.  Among these were groups led by Admiral 
Hernan Gruber from the navy, and Lieutenant William Izarra, a “revolutionary officer 
with Trotskyist leanings” from the air force (Gott 2006: p.59).  The organizing and 
planning continued over the next couple of years so that by February 4, 1992 Chavez’s 
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group of revolutionaries were ready to carry out their plan.  The goal of reaching 
Caracas, arresting the president, taking control of important military posts, capturing 
the high military command, and eventually overtaking the Miraflowers presidential 
palace, however, did not succeed as planned.   
The military rebellion had been betrayed a day earlier, allowing the military to 
make preparations for the assault.  The almost immediate counterattack by the military 
and failure of the conspirators to seize the presidential palace, television and radio 
stations led to the eventual surrender of Chavez and his forces.  In addition to the 
difficulties faced by the military conspirators, there was also an unexpected and 
insufficient level of civilian support during the actual operation.  Weapons and 
vehicles had been made available to civilian groups, but the lack of control of the 
media made it impossible to reach out for popular support during the attack.  This is 
not to say that civilians did not play a critical role in the rebellion.  On the contrary, 
civilians contributed greatly to the uprising, in one case even helping to seize the city 
of Valencia (Gott, 2005).  In his concessionary speech on television, Chavez admitted 
defeat “for the moment,” but assured Venezuelans that, “new possibilities will arise 
again and the country will be able to move definitively towards a better future” (Gott 
2005: p.67).  
It was therefore clear from the Caracazo and 1992 failed coup d’etat that the 
struggle in Venezuela was far from over, and would continue despite the disappointing 
setbacks.  Two of the most significant outcomes of these rebellions were the further 
mobilization of social movements within the country, and the rise of the young soldier, 
Hugo Chavez, as a key leader in the resistance movement.  In addition to his 
acceptance of responsibility for the courageous rebellion of 1992, his explicit rejection 
of neo-liberalism and promise to work for the creation of real democracy in Venezuela 
earned Chavez great respect and admiration throughout Venezuela.  Wilpert (2007) 
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notes that the popular support that Chavez had gained from Venezuela’s poor and the 
left could be linked directly to the Caracazo, economic deterioration of the past two 
decades years, and quarter-century political exclusion of the left.  Moreover, Chavez 
enthusiastically encouraged Venezuelans to break free from their fear and passiveness, 
and to instead organize and mobilize themselves, because as he himself wrote from 
prison, “the sovereign people must transform itself into the object and the subject of 
power.  This option is not negotiable for revolutionaries” (Lebowitz 2006: p. 89).  The 
call for change could not have been louder, nor the appeal to the ‘popular imagination’ 
greater (Gott, 2005).   
Just nine months after the failed February 1992 coup d’etat a second attempt 
was made to remove President Perez and take power.  This time the rebellion was 
orchestrated by Admiral Hernan Gruber and General Francisco Visconti, the latter of 
which was a conspirator in the previous rebellion.  The new group of conspirators thus 
included a top officer from the navy and a general from the air force, civilians from La 
Causa R, and members of Chavez’s Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement who were 
directed from Chavez’s prison cell.  The high level of discontent within the military 
proved a useful tool in garnering support for the operation.  Among the grievances that 
most troubled military officials was the promotion of low-ranking officers to senior 
ranks “at the whim of civilian politicians,” completely disregarding standard 
procedures (Gott, 2006: p. 72).  The political plans of the group following its expected 
successful coup were to set up a civilian-military Council of State, led by a civilian 
president (Gott, 2006).  However, similar mistakes to the previous attempted coup 
were repeated.  The failure to establish communication with conspiring officers in 
other parts of the country and with civilians to request popular support, led to a quick 
surrender on the part of Admiral Gruber.       
These series of events also contributed to a relatively drastic change in 
  
 125 
 
 
 
 
Venezuela’s political landscape.  Possibly the most significant change of all occurred 
during the presidential elections of 1993, when for the first time ever outside political 
parties attained the majority of votes (Wilpert, 2007).  Though an original signer of the 
Puto Fijo Pact and founder of COPEI, Rafael Caldera’s victory signified change to the 
political system since he was not formally a member of either AD or COPEI, but an 
independent candidate with the group he helped form- Convergencia.  While in the 
end the Caldera government proved incapable of, or unwilling, to initiate economic 
and political reforms favorable to all Venezuelans, the end of the forty year AD-
COPEI political hegemony represented at least a glimmer of hope for change in the 
country.  
There were clear signs that new forces within Venezuela’s political sphere 
were growing and becoming important players.  The 22% of the vote that the leftist 
party La Causa R received was just short of that attained by the AD and COPEI 
candidates, 23.6% and 22.7% respectively.  Moreover, this meant that the majority of 
votes (52%) were received by the political left-leaning outsiders, Convergencia and La 
Causa R, in comparison to the 45% of AD and COPEI; the first time this had occurred 
in Venezuelan history since the start of the country’s ‘pacted democracy’ nearly four 
decades earlier.   
In 1994, following two years of imprisonment, Chavez and his conspirators as 
well as all others involved in the 1992 attempted coup were released from prison and 
granted amnesty by the recently elected President Rafael Caldera, whom felt he had a 
political debt to Chavez.  The reason for this is that Caldera had nearly legitimized 
Chavez’s attempted coup in a speech given in 1993 in which he attacked and blamed 
the neo-liberal program of the Perez administration for the turmoil in the country (Gott 
2006).  While imprisoned, Chavez dedicated a great deal of his time to reading a wide 
array of historical, economic, theoretical, and political literature.  Moreover, he met 
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with many figures from the Venezuelan left including former guerrilleros, trade 
unionists, and politicians, who would go visit him in jail.  The time he spent in prison, 
therefore, helped him to organize his ideas and future plans.  Upon being released 
from prison he responded to a reporter’s question about what his next move was by 
saying, “I am going to get into power” (Gott 2005: p. 134).  Afterwards, all of his 
actions seemed to be directed strictly for the purpose of achieving this goal.  He began 
touring Venezuela, and visiting and meeting with communities throughout the 
country, voicing the need to change the existing corrupt political system and thus 
signaling his intention to take power through electoral politics instead of by force.       
One of Chavez’s main concerns became the need to forge closer political 
relationships with civilians and solidify a strong and broad movement of supporters 
that could then crystallize into a powerful alliance of political groups.  Therefore, 
Chavez sought the support of the political organization, Movement Towards Socialism 
(MAS), that while small, was quite intellectually significant.  Even though its leader at 
the time, former Communist Party member Teodoro Petkoff, played a key role in the 
Caldera administration as the planning minister and was vehemently opposed to an 
alliance with Chavez, the rank-and –file of MAS disobeyed and decided to throw its 
backing behind Chavez anyway (Gott, 2005).  More importantly, however, was the 
need to convince the union-based La Causa R, whose importance had grown 
tremendously with its impressive second place finish in the recent presidential 
elections, to also become an ally of Chavez.  After intense meetings and conversations 
among the members of the party, it was decided in February of 1997 that a split would 
occur.  Ultimately, a small group of members remained with the name La Causa R, 
while a much larger organization was born out of the split, calling itself Patria Para 
Todos (PPT), or Fatherland for Everyone.  Chavez’s ability to gain the support of this 
very influential political organization, the PPT, was a huge motivating success that 
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would prove to be a critical factor in the upcoming 1998 presidential elections.  
With less than two years before the 1998 presidential election, the outlook for 
Chavez’s Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement taking power seemed positive.  His 
determination to bring about a drastic change to the policies of the previous 
administrations and to the entire traditional elitist political system that had ruled 
Venezuela for centuries had given him mass popular support throughout the country.  
His growing political organization was renamed the Movimiento Quinta Republica 
(MVR) or Fifth Republic Movement, to signify a break with the past, especially with 
that of the Fourth Republic that had existed since its founding in 1830 by Simon 
Bolivar’s general, Jose Antonio Paez (Gott 2005).  The appeal of this ‘national and 
popular’ movement was particularly strong among Venezuela’s poor and working-
class majority population, which were on the frontlines of the push towards social and 
political change.   
 
The Taking of State Power in 1999 and Beginning of a New Revolutionary Era in 
Venezuela 
The second administrations of President Carlos Andres Perez (1989-1993) and 
Rafael Caldera (1994-1999) had both proven incapable of curbing the increasing 
levels of social inequality and popular discontent in Venezuela.  By embracing neo-
liberal economic policies these governments only contributed to their demise and to 
the subsequent strengthening of a resistance movement that would end up taking 
power.  Both AD and COPEI had largely been discredited as corrupt accomplices of 
neo-liberalism.  One of the only positive outcomes of the all-encompassing 
penetration of neo-liberalism on Venezuelan society was the outrage and commitment 
to struggle for change that it aroused in the Venezuelan people.  While the Caracazo 
signified the demise of puntofijismo, the system’s death eventually came with the 
election of Hugo Chavez to the presidency.  On December 6, 1998 Chavez and his 
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MVR (Movement for the Fifth Republican) received 56.2% of the votes in the 
presidential election.   
This decisive victory for Chavez and his movement was largely due to his 
ability to reach out for and successfully receive the support of the largest and most 
influential leftist political parties in the country, including the Communist Party of 
Venezuela (PCV) or Partido Communista de Venezuela, Fatherland for All (PPT), and 
Movement Towards Socialism (MAS).  In the run-up to the 1998 presidential 
elections, social movements around Venezuela had been aggressively organizing and 
reaching out to communities, realizing that the neo-liberal policies of the past two 
administrations were largely to blame for the country’s worsening social ills and 
inequalities.  Venezuela, the entire continent, and the world anxiously awaited the 
beginning of this new era, in much the same way as they had done several times 
before with the commencement of other similar attempts at social transformations in 
Latin America.  As we will see, the beginning of Venezuela’s socialist experiment is 
just one of many growing and diverse struggles for alternative social and political-
economic visions throughout the world. 
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CHAPTER 6  
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY SOCIALISM IN VENEZUELA: THE BOLIVARIAN 
REVOLUTION – DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVE OR ALTERNATIVE TO 
DEVELOPMENT?  
 
 The fall of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe combined with the general 
disorganization of the Left and worldwide triumph of capitalism in its hegemonic neo-
liberal form has been regarded by many as the complete discrediting and end of 
socialism.  However, what it really signals is the need for the Left to organize and 
rethink the meaning of socialism, by critically analyzing its historic and multifaceted 
experiences globally.  This will necessarily entail a rejection of Soviet-style state 
bureaucratic socialism and the creation of an alternative democratic socialist vision.  
Despite achieving important pro- working-class transformations, imperialist 
intervention and internal contradictions doomed the Soviet socialist experiments to 
failure.  The prevalence of repressive state apparatuses and the implementation of 
undemocratically centralized decision-making in the Soviet bloc greatly contributed to 
the eventual demise of these socialist projects.    
For these reasons, the recent revival of socialism in the Third World 
(particularly in Latin America) must tread cautiously and take seriously both the 
successes and limitations of previous socialist experiments throughout the world in 
order to create a new democratic socialist model.  As the most serious and 
comprehensive historically-based socio-political movement against capitalism, 
socialism stands at the forefront in the struggle for revolutionary change.  It is thus no 
wonder why as Claudio Katz (2007) notes, “the Latin American left is once again 
discussing the paths to socialism” (p.25).  This is occurring within the present 
historical conjuncture that is witnessing the rise of strong popular movements across 
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the globe, the crisis of neo-liberalism, and the declining offensive capacity of U.S. 
imperialism (Katz, 2007).  Through the strategic combination of electoral participation 
and direct mass popular action, a number of left-leaning leaders have risen to heads of 
state throughout Latin America, and have initiated several bold and progressive 
processes that directly confront the hegemonic neo-liberal ideology and practice and 
that have created the possibilities for alternative social, political, and economic 
visions.  In fact, as Naomi Klein recently commented in an October 1, 2008 speech at 
the University of Chicago (the site of the construction of the economic research center 
known as the Milton Friedman Institute), Latin America constitutes the “most left-
wing place on the planet at the moment,” and it is “interestingly enough the first place 
where the Chicago School ideology made that leap from the textbook into the real 
world” (Democracy Now, October 6, 2008: 
www.democracynow.org/2008/10/6/naomi_klein). 
While anti-neoliberal and anti-imperialist proposals have emerged from social 
movements worldwide, explicit anti-capitalist approaches still remain few and far 
between.  To many, the power, flexibility, and adaptable nature of capital and 
capitalism makes the search for non-capitalist alternatives futile (Quijano, 2007).  
Moreover, the relative weakness of the industrial working-classes around the globe 
suggests to many the impossibility of organizing strong opposition movements to the 
capitalist system.  It will be demonstrated, however, that through the construction of 
alliances between movements with similar leftist programs of social transformation, 
that include among its ranks the working-class and the exploited and oppressed 
majorities, alternatives to the dominant economic system do have the capacity to 
create new, equitable, and sustainable societies.  Currently, the replacement of 
capitalism with socialism constitutes a central preoccupation in the Latin American 
region.  
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Nowhere is this more evident than in Venezuela, where since taking state 
power the forces of the Bolivarian Revolution have been carrying out a multitude of 
new projects as part of its transition towards a ‘21st century socialism’.  This section 
seeks to adjudicate the successes and limitations of Venezuela’s Bolivarian 
Revolution, and its attempt to both articulate a clear counter-narrative and implement 
an alternative political-economic model and form of social organization.  It will 
accomplish these tasks by focusing on and analyzing the specific societal structural 
changes and socio-political transformations that the Bolivarian Revolution has 
achieved in Venezuela through its construction of the new form of socialism known as  
Socialismo del Siglo XXI, or ‘21st century socialism’.  The ultimate goal is to evaluate 
this new socialist model that is being built, and to determine whether the 
transformations that have occurred during the Bolivarian process constitute a 
development alternative or an alternative to development.  In other words, does the 
Bolivarian Revolution represent an anti-capitalist alternative production model, and if 
it does, is it capable of sustaining and reproducing itself within the confines of the 
capitalist system while simultaneously combating it and attempting to displace it with 
a socialist system?   
I conclude by placing the transformative processes underway in Venezuela 
within their larger context, to understand how cooperation and solidarity between the 
Bolivarian Revolution and other Latin American social movements can strengthen and 
advance the overall alternative socialist project of the region.  In order to understand 
the nature and complexity of the Bolivarian Revolution we first begin with an 
examination of the political and ideological nature of Chavismo, and of the Bolivarian 
Revolution in general.   
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Populism & Hugo Chavez’s Ideological Influences  
The Bolivarian Revolution’s socialist, nationalist, and anti-imperialist 
orientation is best characterized as a united broadly based popular movement that 
includes the working-class and poor majority.  Most importantly, its broadly based 
support is grounded in the particular configurations of Venezuela’s material and 
cultural conditions, and in its specific history.  In order to comprehend the nature of 
this Bolivarian process in Venezuela, however, it is necessary to examine its leader’s 
ideological influences.  Having been born into impoverished conditions and being of 
mixed ancestry (Amerindian, Afro-Venezuelan, and Spanish), Hugo Chavez 
developed left-wing nationalist sentiments early on.  He is regarded as an organic 
intellectual and avid reader who frequently quotes Latin American poets and authors 
(Gott, 2007).  Moreover, Chavez has been described by those close to him as a person 
with deep humanistic perspectives, who is concerned with helping the world’s most 
marginalized people (Gott, 2007).  He has consistently argued for the need to create an 
active citizenry capable of working alongside the state in order to develop the 
potentialities of human beings (Gott, 2007).    
Among Chavez’s main ideological influences are the nationalistic ideas from 
Venezuelan revolutionary leaders like Simon Bolivar, Ezequiel Zamora, and Simon 
Rodriguez.  In fact, Chavez has often mentioned that Simon Rodriguez is one of his 
most important ideological influences, and that Rodriguez was actually an early 
socialist or “utopian socialist in the tradition of Robert Owen and Charles Fourier” 
(Wilpert, 2007: p.239).  A close personal friend and first teacher of Simon Bolivar, 
Rodriguez expressed a radical nationalist philosophy that now lies at the heart of 
Chavismo and its attempt to revive nationalist discourse in the age of neo-liberal 
globalization (Gott, 2006).  The political ideology known as Chavismo is also 
fundamentally and explicitly guided by Gramscian notions of hegemony and of 
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establishing a broad system of alliances that unite diverse social forces. 
 The ideas of the Marxist theorist, Antonio Gramsci, therefore, are central to 
understanding Chavismo.  Chavez himself has said that making sense of Venezuela’s 
current socio-political reality requires analyzing Gramscian theories.  He has 
emphasized Gramsci’s concept of ‘historical blocs’ in which “a particular class 
manages to acquire hegemony that is expressed in structures and super-structures” 
(Wilpert 2007, www.venezuelanalysis.com/news/2426).  According to Chavez, the 
super-structure consists of both the institutions of the state and of civil society, the 
latter of which is made up of economic and private institutions that are used by the 
dominant class to disseminate its ideology (Wilpert 2007, 
www.venezuelanalysis.com/news/2426).   Among the ideas spread by the dominant 
class through the mass media are respect for bourgeois democracy, free-markets, and 
capitalism, all of which help to manipulate and control the masses.  Therefore, the 
Venezuelan situation is characterized as a struggle between the institutions of the state 
previously controlled by civil society, and the old civil society that consists of “the 
Catholic Church hierarchy, the mass media, and the education system as the principal 
institutions” (Wilpert 2007, www.venezuelanalysis.com/news/2426).   The necessity 
of the Bolivarian Revolution becomes the dismantling of bourgeois civil society 
through the ‘liberation’ of the state, including the judiciary, legislature, and state-
owned enterprises (Wilpert 2007, www.venezuelanalysis.com/news/2426).   
In addition to the Gramscian influence, Chavismo also exhibits certain notions 
of populism (a significant force in Latin America’s political history).  Since the 20th 
century one finds many examples of populist leaders, or ‘men of the people’, that have 
come to power in the region, including Getulio Vargas in Brazil (1930-1945), Lazaro 
Cardenas in Mexico (1934-1940), Juan Peron in Argentina (1946-1955; 1973), and 
Juan Velasco Alvarado in Peru (1968-1975).  The timing of these populist 
  
 134 
 
 
 
 
governments coincides with the Golden Era in Latin America from the 1930s to 
1960s, in which strong state ISI policies helped to produce economic growth and a 
relative raising of the region’s standard of living.  While not exhibiting a clear and 
consistent political ideology, most of the populist attempts appealed to the broad 
popular masses, carried out large-scale industrialization programs, and governed 
through strong nationalist and redistributive policies that produced advancements in 
education, health care, infrastructure, social security, and land reform.  It is clear that 
these populist and many times military influences would help to shape Chavismo’s 
own vision of sovereignty, nationalism, and social justice.  
  During its rule, the Vargas government ran a centralized and interventionist 
state in Brazil that sought to stimulate and expand domestic industry by employing a 
nationalist discourse and program of social welfare, in addition to suppressing the 
political left as part of its fascist tendency.  In Mexico, Cardenas implemented a 
nationalist set of economic policies that saw the expropriation of the oil industry from 
foreign companies and nationalization of the country’s petroleum reserves.  Cardenas 
also expropriated millions of idle and unused land from haciendas and handed it out to 
poor peasants throughout the country.  Moreover, the industrial working-class saw a 
significant advancement of its labor movement, with increased protection of 
unionization rights and steady wage increases.    
Perhaps the most prominent of the populist leaders during this time was Juan 
Peron, an Argentine military colonel and politician.   With massive popular support, 
Peron was able to enact a far-reaching packet of reforms in Argentina that sought to 
attain social justice and economic independence.  His strong nationalist appeal 
permitted him to nationalize several key industries in the country, including the 
Central Bank, railways, and public utilities and transport.  His support came 
principally from the large working-class population that was encouraged by the 
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government to engage in labor strife and that with the government’s support and labor 
reforms made significant inroads in terms of increasing wages, employment, and 
industrial growth.  
Another populist military influence on Chavismo is that of General Juan 
Velasco Alvarado in Peru. Velasco took control of Peru in a successful military coup 
in 1968, and quickly implemented a progressive nationalization drive that included 
mining, transportation, communications, electrical power, and other sectors (Sustar 
2007, www.isreview.org/issues/54/venezuela.shtml).  He was also responsible for 
carrying out an aggressive agrarian reform project that distributed land to millions of 
poor peasants from the expropriated land of latifundia landholdings.  In a similar 
fashion to the social missions in Venezuela today, Velasco created state-initiated 
social programs and organizations for the advancement of the rights of peasants and 
workers and for improvements in their standards of living.  The ideology and practice 
of Velasco and other populist leaders in the region serve as historical lessons for 
Chavismo and have contributed to the resurgence and formulation of this new populist 
movement.  
To see more specifically how populism relates to Chavismo it is useful to 
examine the ideas of Ernesto Laclau.  In his book, On Populist Reason, Laclau (2005) 
argues that populism is “ascribed not to delimitable phenomenon but to a social logic 
whose effects cut across many phenomenon” (p.xi).  Populism, therefore, is quite 
simply a way of ‘constructing the political.’ Laclau (2005) thus understands populism 
not as a type of movement, with a certain social base or particular ideology, but a 
political logic (p.117).  This political logic is related to the institution of the social, 
which emerges out of the articulation and coalescing of a plurality of unfulfilled social 
demands that in turn construct internal frontiers that separate the ‘people’ from power.  
This can clearly be seen in Venezuela with the Bolivarian Revolution where Chavez 
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has been able to collapse the wide-range of social demands into a single camp, thereby 
creating frontiers between el pueblo (‘the people’) and la oligarquia (the oligarchy).  
Laclau (2005) claims that, “whenever we have this combination of structural 
moments, we have populism of one sort or another,” regardless of the political 
movement’s ideological or social contents (p. 118).  
To help us understand this, Laclau selects the category of ‘social demand’ as 
his minimal unit of analysis.  He explains the emergence of an equivalential chain of 
unsatisfied demands (in Venezuela, problems with poverty, housing, health care, and 
state corruption and inaction) as commencing with requests that if left unsatisfied, turn 
into demands.  When the accumulation of unfulfilled demands is combined with “an 
increasing inability of the institutional system to absorb them in a differential way 
(each in isolation from the others), an equivalential relation is established between 
them” (Laclau 2005: p.73).  Therefore, two preconditions of populism arise. The first 
is the formation of an antagonistic frontier that places the ‘people’ in one camp and 
political power or authority in the other (in Venezuela, the popular forces versus the 
puntofijismo political system).  The second is the equivalential articulation of a set of 
heterogeneous popular demands that allows the formation of the ‘people’ as a 
potential historical actor (hence the 1989 Caracazo).  
 Furthermore, Laclau explains that the construction of the ‘people’ is finalized 
with the crystallization of a chain of equivalences that eventually moves beyond 
feelings of solidarity to that of the crystallization of a certain discursive identity – 
popular identity as such.  Thus the disparate and heterogeneous social demands, “are 
brought to some form of unity through equivalential political articulations” by their 
opposition to the status quo (Leclau 2005: p.229).  This development of a populist 
movement, however, also entails the use of floating and empty signifiers through 
political articulation, be it right-wing or left-wing.  The empty signifier on the other 
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hand, can be seen through concepts or names (for example ‘freedom’, ‘Peron’, 
‘Chavista’) that lose their own specificity when they stand in for the whole chain of 
other demands in opposition to power.  Chavez, for example, frequently makes use of 
the terms ’el imperio’ (‘the empire’) and ‘escualidos’ (the squalid ones) to categorize 
any and all opposition forces, be they members of the U.S. government, national elite, 
Venezuelan political parties, and even of his own governing coalition.       
Laclau’s (2005) most useful insights are those that point out globalized 
capitalism’s role in creating an increasing heterogeneity of social demands and 
antagonisms.  He observes how globalized capitalism has created a dislocation of 
social relations in the world, “so categories that synthesized past social experience are 
becoming increasingly obsolete,” therefore making, “it necessary to reconceptualize 
the autonomy of social demands, the logic of their articulation, and the nature of the 
collective entities resulting from them” (Laclau 2005: p.250).  Here lies the real task 
ahead.  According to Laclau’s analysis the Bolivarian Revolution therefore does 
exhibits the political logic of populism in many ways (as do almost every single 
political movement globally).  If we examine Venezuela, or a number of other 
countries worldwide, we witness new complex socio-political landscapes that might 
require us to move away from traditional notions of ‘working-class’ and ‘class 
struggle,’ and towards something along the lines of a collective will of a 
heterogeneous movement of social actors.  The fight against capitalism in Latin 
America is being led by a diverse range of social forces, including working-class, 
poor, unemployed, informal workers, women, and indigenous groups.   
It is important, therefore, to differentiate between the notion of ‘working-class’ 
in late industrial societies like the U.S. or Western Europe, and those that served as the 
basis for Marx’s analyses.  This applies equally to countries like Venezuela, where 
both society and the workers in them, are drastically different from those that Marx 
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observed.  In Venezuela only a small “working-class” in the sense that Marx was 
talking about actually exists.  Therefore, the Bolivarian revolutionary movement must 
not try solely appealing to and grounding itself in a working-class that does not really 
exist, but instead should appeal directly to and ground itself on the overwhelming poor 
and excluded majority.  
  The truth is that the working-class is not the only social force capable of 
serving as the revolutionary vanguard in a transition to socialism.  In Venezuela, while 
there is no vast organized class of wage-earning industrial workers, there certainly is a 
combined majority working-class, informal, and poor population that shares similar 
injustices and interests, and that is capable of mobilizing as a mass popular force, as 
has already been demonstrated.  In fact, the subjects of this revolutionary process are 
quite diverse, yet also share similar experiences of capitalist exploitation and 
domination.  In Venezuela, therefore, there is no traditional industrial working-class 
vanguard but instead a mass movement that emerged from the convergence of all 
oppressed sectors of the population (unemployed, working-class, poor, and informal 
workers) with a common struggle to create a socialist society.   Let us now examine in 
detail the development of the new form socialism in Venezuela simply referred to as 
“21st century socialism”, and assess its achievements and limitations, as well as 
potential strategies to deepen the social transformations that it has initiated.    
 
‘21st Century Socialism’ in Venezuela  
The construction of the long road towards socialism in Venezuela was made 
possible by the popular 1989 Caracazo uprising, which itself came to fruition from the 
interaction and amalgamation of various historical events in Venezuela, Latin 
America, and globally.  Yet the transition towards socialism in Venezuela would not 
formally get underway until after the passing of the new 1999 constitution, which was 
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approved by nearly three-fourths of the population.  In fact, several more years would 
pass before the first explicitly socialist projects would be implemented in Venezuela.   
The initial reforms made during the early Chavez years would serve as the 
preconditions for the deepening of the socialist transition in following years.  The new 
constitution was the first clear example of the progressive nature of the social 
transformation in Venezuela and of the attempt to dismantle the old elite’s power.  The 
rewriting of Venezuela’s constitution was made possible by the strong mandate that 
Chavez won in the presidential election of 1998.  Among the major reforms 
accomplished by the new constitution were, “the changing of the country’s name, 
adding two branches of government, introducing popular referenda, strengthening the 
presidency in some aspects, and introducing local public planning councils” (Wilpert 
2007: p.30).   
Other important articles of the 1999 constitution included: progressive 
principles to advance gender equality and protect women’s rights, such as giving 
women homemakers social security benefits for the work performed at home; 
committing the state to ensuring the protection of the environment; and recognition of 
the indigenous people’s right to exist for the first time in Venezuela’s history (Wilpert, 
2007).  The new provisions prohibit all forms of discrimination, whether intentional or 
not, based on race, sex, creed, or social standing, and require the reexamination and 
revision of public policies that are deemed to violate these new laws.  The 
implementation of these constitutional reforms to Venezuela’s entire political system 
has demonstrated that the constitution is not merely a formality on paper as some have 
suggested.  Most importantly, the new constitution has increased broad citizen 
participation and helped to advance social transformations in Venezuela.  It has 
provided the initial blueprints for envisioning and working towards creating a more 
participatory and just society in which class, gender, racial, ethnic, and other forms of 
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privileges cease to exist.   
The socialist transition in Venezuela is described by Wilpert (2007) as a 
“dialectic of counter-revolution and radicalization,” in which each effort by the old 
governing class to discredit Chavez caused a further rejection of Chavez by the middle 
class and increased support for efforts to remove him from power (p.19).  
Simultaneously every effort to overthrow Chavez led him and his movement to further 
radicalize, thus “further stiffening his opposition and feeding a growing vicious cycle 
of counter-revolution and radicalization” (Wilpert 2007: p.19).  The old political elite 
intensified its opposition to Chavez as it witnessed its state power and influence 
slowly eliminated.  With the victory of a majority of Chavez supporters to the National 
Assembly in July 2000 the national political arena that was formerly dominated by 
AD/COPEI political members had been completely replaced with the dominance of 
pro-Bolivarian Revolution adherents (Wilpert, 2007).  However, the social and 
economic policies of the Chavez administration were quite moderate to this point with 
no programs of expropriation or redistribution of wealth having been initiated yet 
(Wilpert, 2007).   
Progressively more radical reforms were begun with the 49-law decrees 
authorized by the National Assembly that saw the implementation of an agrarian 
reform program targeting land over 5,000 hectares, and the Hydrocarbons Law that 
increased the royalties on oil exploration by foreign companies (Wilpert, 2007).  The 
1999 constitution had formalized state control of the oil industry and had mandated 
that a majority of oil revenues be used to finance health care, education, and other 
social programs.  The 1999 constitution and the new policy of increasing royalties on 
foreign companies effectively formalized state ownership of the country’s oil 
company, PDVSA, although a complete nationalization of the oil industry was still far 
from complete.   
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Overall the new series of laws by the government combined with a global 
economic slowdown after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, paved the way for old elite’s April 
2002 coup attempt against Chavez.  The mobilization on the part of Chavez’s 
working-class, poor, and military supporters succeeded in reinstating him at the head 
of the Venezuelan government within 48 hours of being removed, thereby signaling a 
devastating defeat for the opposition (Wilpert, 2007).  The next major attempt to 
remove Chavez was the oil industry shutdown (Dec 2002 –March 2003) that while 
commonly referred to as a general strike, was actually a “combination of management 
lockout, administrative and professional employee strike, and general sabotage of the 
oil industry” (Wilpert 2007: p.25).  The cause of this managerial lockout had been the 
unwillingness of PDVSA administrators to accept the governments proposed reforms 
of the oil industry, which included the raising of taxes on oil companies, transparency 
in its international dealings, and the appointment of pro-Chavez officials to the 
PDVSA’s board of directors (Wilpert, 2007).  The positive effect of the oil industry 
shutdown was that it gave Chavez the power to fire 18,000 striking managers, 
engineers, administrative employees, and other professionals of PDVSA, and 
therefore, to initiate a series of reforms of the oil industry aimed at increasing state 
control of PDVSA, improving its strength in OPEC, and making it more accountable 
to Venezuelans and their well-being.  
Following the final unsuccessful attempt by the opposition to oust Chavez 
through a failed recall referendum in August 2004, the Bolivarian Revolution took a 
more aggressive turn.  A series of new social programs known as misiones, or 
missions, were commenced to deal with the most pressing problems faced by the 
country’s poor majority, including programs in the areas of education, community 
health care, literacy training, and subsidized food markets that granted access to health 
care, education, and cheaper food to millions.  It was only in 2005 that for the first 
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time the announcement was made that Venezuela would move toward ‘21st century 
socialism’- a new socialism that seeks to transform the mode of capital.   In his most 
precise explanation of what ‘XXI century socialism’ is Chavez stated that it entails, 
“the transformation of the economic model, increasing cooperativism, collective 
property, the submission of private property to the social interest and to the general 
interest,” and that the new communal system of production and consumption needs to 
be created, “from the popular bases, with the participation of the communities, through 
the community organizations, the cooperatives, self-management” (Wilpert, 2007: 
p.239).    
Chavez made it clear that the kind of socialism that was being constructed in 
Venezuela was organically homegrown and tailored to the particular historical social 
realities of the country, and not simply a pre-determined socialist recipe mechanically 
imported and transplanted onto Venezuela.  This coincides with Mariategui’s view of 
how socialism should be applied in Latin America: "We certainly do not wish 
socialism in America to be a copy and imitation.  It must be a heroic creation.  We 
must give life to an Indo-American socialism reflecting our own reality and in our 
own language” (Becker 2006: p.469 in Mariategui 1928).  In other words, socialism 
does not simply fall from the sky, but must be built (Lebowitz 2006).  What has 
become clear through Chavez’s words and actions is that the socialist program in 
Venezuela will have Marxist, Bolivarian, indigenous socialist, and Christian 
revolutionary influences (Ridell 2007: www.socialistvoice.ca/?p=149) 
The radicalization of the Bolivarian Revolution would proceed with Chavez’s 
reelection in Dec 2006.  This event would mark the start of the more radical era of the 
Bolivarian Revolution’s socialist transition, and thus the initiation of various new 
socialist projects.  The new transformations of Venezuelan society have included the 
nationalization of various key sectors of the economy, democratization of the media, 
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land reform (both urban and rural), initiation of an ‘ecological socialism’ process, 
creation of ‘popular defense units’, formation of a new labor federation (UNT), 
consolidation of the social base through the construction of the United Socialist Party 
of Venezuela (PSUV), initiation of an institutionalizing process for the 20,000 self-
governing and participatory ‘communal councils’, and the establishment of a social 
economy based on co- and self-management (Wilpert, 2007).  Following a brief 
examination of the projects mentioned previously, the latter two will be analyzed in 
depth in two final sections that deal with participatory democracy and alternative 
production systems, and with the human development that they help to foster.  As we 
will see, these series of new projects constitute the backbone of Venezuela’s socialist 
transition, which seeks to further dismantle the old ruling class’ power, create new 
forms of social organization, and establish an alternative political and production 
system.  We turn to an analysis of these new projects in order to illuminate the 
transformative nature of the socialist transition process in Venezuela.   
   
Nationalizations 
While many of the emerging alternative proposals have failed to mention 
nationalized economies (Quijano 2007), the Bolivarian Revolution has actually made 
this one of its top priorities.  In fact, one of the central issues of the Chavez 
government’s socialist program has been the nationalization of several key sectors of 
the economy.  Yet, despite making threats that he would nationalize certain industries 
early on, the process did not get underway until after his re-election.  For the first eight 
years of his presidency, Chavez did little to threaten the private sector.  In fact, it was 
not until January 2007 that Chavez first unexpectedly announced his decision to 
initiate a nationalization process in Venezuela.  In addition to judicial and progressive 
tax reforms, the nationalization drive has helped to serve the purpose of further 
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limiting the power of the country’s elite and increasing that of the Venezuelan state 
and people.  Since 2007 certain key industries have been nationalized in the country, 
including telecommunications, energy, oil production, cement, steel, and some private 
banks.   
Nationalization, however, has not been as radical as the mainstream media and 
opposition claim.  In fact, the exaggerated claims of threats to private property are 
unfounded, since the Venezuelan government has actually engaged in negotiations 
with and provided adequate compensation to the “nationalized” companies instead of 
actually expropriating them.  Compensating these companies at market rates has 
actually favored the private owners, who have largely been satisfied with the business 
transactions.  Moreover, many times the so-called nationalizations have in reality 
simply entailed the Venezuelan state’s taking of a larger share in the industries, as is 
the case with oil.  The nationalization of Venezuela’s oil production, or more 
appropriately re-nationalization, consisted of increasing the shares of Venezuela’s own 
PDVSA from a minority participation of 30% to a majority participation of 60% in the 
join-venture projects with other transnational oil companies (Wilpert, 2007).  Though 
fairly moderate, the nationalization process of the Bolivarian Revolution has greatly 
benefited the Venezuelan state and people with increased revenue for social projects, 
and served as a very symbolic triumph for the country as a whole.     
More recently, however, the nationalization drive in Venezuela has both sped 
up and radicalized.  In fact, the government has been forced to respond to the demands 
made by workers in the industrial heartland of Guayana for increased participation and 
ownership of their workplaces by announcing the nationalization of six iron briquette, 
ceramics and steel companies (Fuentes, 2009).  Moreover, in May 2009 a processing 
plant of the U.S. pasta company Cargill was taken over by the Venezuela government 
after it was found to be violating the regulations on price controls, which were 
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established to guarantee cheap food for poor Venezuelans.  The same occurred in the 
case of Venezuela’s rice-producing factory, Polar, which was temporarily taken over 
by the military for evading the price controls.  It is now up to the Venezuelan 
government to meet the growing worker demand for control of production that has 
resulted from the increased level of class consciousness among the working-class, 
which the state itself helped to develop.         
 
Media Democratization 
Other important decisions made by the Venezuelan government have also 
produced significant changes in the country.  One such action was the May 2007 non-
renewal of RCTV’s broadcast license.  As one of the country’s most popular television 
channels, RCTV had frequently violated broadcast regulations, actively participated in 
the oil industry shut-down and coup attempt, and promoted all types of violence 
against the government.  Therefore, contrary to the charges of suppression of freedom 
of expression on the part of the mainstream media and opposition, the decision had 
much more to do with the much needed democratizing and diversifying of the 
country’s media landscape.   
To help accomplish this task the Venezuelan government has also helped to 
create community media outlets, including hundreds of radio stations and numerous 
television stations, all of which are community-run.  This has effectively given 
communities ownership of their news and information, thus helping them to engage in 
and transmit those issues that most affect and pertain to them.  Thus, despite 
accusations of government restriction of freedoms, the attempt is to combat the private 
broadcast media’s usual distortion of news and information and strong manipulation of 
public opinion, thereby trying to eliminate the root cause of the ‘manufacturing of 
consent’ (Chomsky 1992) that helps to maintain the subservience of the masses and 
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dominance on the part of elites.  However, up to now most of the main mass media 
remains under private ownership and pro-U.S. elites.  The challenge now for 
Venezuelans is to further advance grassroots local media and rid themselves of private 
corporate media, a pre-condition of establishing participatory democracy.       
 
Land Reform (Rural and Urban) 
In terms of land reform, the Bolivarian Revolution can celebrate the 
redistribution of over 3 million hectares of land to over 200,000 families since the 
introduction of the 2001 Land Reform Act (Wilpert, 2007).  The major motives of the 
land reform are to achieve great equity and increase agricultural production by giving 
land to small family farms, and to completely do away with latifundios that have 
traditionally been the primary reason for the overconcentration of land.  As part of the 
reform, the government has encouraged and helped peasants to takeover unused and 
idle land, in order for them to then setup self-sustaining cooperatives.  While this is a 
significant sign of progress, it still does not correct the extreme disparity that allows 
5% of large landowners to maintain possession of 75% of Venezuela’s private 
agricultural land, while a dismal 6% of the land is held by small landowners (Censo 
Agricola 1998 in Wilpert, 2007).  Again the reform attempt is modest since it has 
largely entailed the redistribution of state-owned land and not that which is privately 
held.  Additionally, the government first gives large landowners the option of putting 
their land into production before deciding to expropriate it.  And in the case that the 
land is “expropriated” the landowners are always generously compensated for their 
land, which is purchased by the state at market value (Wilpert, 2007).    
More far-reaching has been the urban land reform program of the revolution, 
which had since 2005 given 126,000 families, or 600,000 people, titles to their homes 
(Wilpert, 2005: www.venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/1355).  The need for urban land 
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reform is obvious in Venezuela where the great majority of citizens (87%) live in the 
cities, and of that, 60% live in unsafe barrios or urban slums (Wilpert, 2007).  The 
granting of land titles to the inhabitants of the barrios, and thus effective turning over 
of legal ownership to them could end up affecting nearly ten million Venezuelans, or 
40% of the population (Wilpert, 2007).  To facilitate the process thousands of land 
committees have been created in barrios across Venezuela in order to represent and 
defend the interests of the communities.  If successful, this urban reform program has 
the potential to significantly alter property relations in the country, through the 
replacement of private property with self-governed communal property in the barrios, 
as demanded by many communities.  However, like agrarian reform, the urban land 
reform process has been slowed down by business opposition and bureaucratic 
wrangling and thus faces many obstacles.      
 
‘Ecological Socialism’ 
One critical priority for the forces of the Bolivarian Revolution, and for the 
entire Latin American 21st century socialist project, is attending to the ecological crisis 
of our times.  Although the emphasis on ecological protection has not been a very 
explicit endeavor or even goal of the Bolivarian Revolution, a more critical 
examination of some of its projects reveal that in fact there has been substantial 
progress made in the ecological arena.  While many of the projects of the revolution 
have stated goals that barely mention ecological issues, they have actually indirectly 
and directly benefited the natural environment of Venezuela.  For example, as part of 
the land reform process the social mission Proyecto Vuelta al Campo (Return to the 
Countryside Project) has made it possible for any Venezuelan citizen between the ages 
of 18 and 25 years of age or who is the head of a family household to apply for a 
parcel of land, as long as they willing to work the land (Wilpert, 2007).  The recipients 
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of the land are then provided with economic and technical assistance, and are granted 
land titles after they have productively cultivated the land for three consecutive years 
(Wilpert, 2007).   
What makes this ecologically innovative is the fact that the majority of the new 
owners have united and formed rural cooperatives for their self-subsistence, with the 
surplus agricultural product being sold in local markets.  Moreover, the growing of the 
crops has largely been done using organic methods, thus avoiding the damaging 
effects of pesticides and fertilizers.  Naturally, this more sustainable form of growing 
food crops places much less stress on the environment than that of traditional big 
agriculture, and contributes to the goal of food sovereignty.  But in the case of 
Venezuela where the overwhelming majority of its citizens live in the urban centers 
this program is even more ecologically favorable since it explicitly encourages urban 
dwellers to migrate to the countryside, thereby providing some relief to the extremely 
environmentally-stressed cities.    
 But it is in the area of sustainable human development that the major 
achievements have been made with regard to the ecological question.  This might 
surprise many who share the mentality of mainstream environmentalism and its 
overemphasis on mechanical strategies, particularly technological fixes, to deal with 
ecological problems.  Yet revolutionary action as it pertains to ecology can only be 
made possible when people are allowed to develop their human capabilities and social 
consciousness.  In his writings on the global environmental crisis under capitalism, 
John Bellamy Foster (2008) points out that Venezuela has “not only advanced 
revolutionary new social relations with the growth of Bolivarian circles, community 
councils, and increased worker control of factories, but has introduced some crucial 
initiatives…[ ] in the production and exchange of goods (p.9).  He refers to the 
emphasis on communal exchange and on community-level planning that meets the 
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needs of human beings as examples of important preconditions for advancing 
ecological transformations.  Foster (2008) therefore argues that addressing “the most 
pressing individual and collective requirements of the society related in particular to 
physiological needs,” raises the question of the relationship between humans and 
nature – “the absolute precondition of the creation of a sustainable society” (p.10).  
 The development of human potentials, therefore, is a fundamental aspect of 
any attempt at ‘ecological socialism’, which I envision as the practice of human beings 
interacting with the natural environment in a sustainable manner with minimal carbon 
footprint for the simple satisfaction of their physiological needs.  In forthcoming 
discussions on self-governance and self-management it will be demonstrated that the 
development of new human social relations is an essential component of the 
Bolivarian Revolution and its transition towards socialism.  In terms of ecology, 
human development allows the construction of more sustainable relations between 
humans and nature, thereby ensuring the survival and reproduction of humans and the 
homeostasis of the natural environment.     
 Despite these transformations, the Venezuelan government must do more to 
advance environmental protections and sustainability by putting into place explicit 
mechanisms and policies that help to deepen the level of ecological consciousness of 
its citizens.  Environmental education campaigns are needed throughout every single 
neighborhood in the country to correct the degradation of the environment caused by 
decades of neglect.  Serious ecological problems involving insufficient mass public 
transit, garbage disposal, contamination of water, and many others pose real threats to 
the advancement of a model of ecological socialism in Venezuela.  Fredys Teran, a 
recent candidate of the PCV (Partio Comunista de Venezuela) for the mayorship of 
Merida’s state capital, stresses the need to displace the “absurd mentality” of “each 
person in their home, disposing of solid waste by throwing it in the street without 
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worrying if it pollutes or if it causes a problem for their own neighbor,” rightfully 
arguing that working to solve the country’s ecological deterioration is “everybody’s 
problem” (Sugget 2008: www.venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/3971).  
 Thus far, the Venezuela government can be credited with making preliminary 
efforts to raise awareness among citizens of ecological problems by the creation of the 
Mision Arbol (Tree Mission) in June 2006.  The stated objectives of the program are to 
increase interest in the forests of the country, promote ecological equilibrium, and 
restore environmentally degraded spaces (Ministerio de Comunicacion e Informacion 
2007).  Moreover, it has put into practice a reforestation plan that will contribute to the 
recuperation and maintenance of the forests throughout the national territory.  
However, it does not include a much needed environmental education component that 
strives to raise the ecological consciousness of Venezuelans, and that helps them to 
see that the most revolutionary aspects of a socialist transition are its ecological 
transformations that protect the natural environment.  
Thus as the epicenter of the current leftist political wave in Latin America, 
Venezuela must push to make more radical ecological transformations that not only 
make agriculture practices “greener,” but that also fundamentally alters the way in 
which we view and thus interact with nature.  As we will see, this will require 
breaking with the inherently ecologically destructive ‘logic of capital’.  Moreover, it 
necessitates replacement of the extractivist model, in which natural resources are over-
exploited for the purpose of economic growth.  While in Venezuela preliminary 
attempts at achieving this have already been put into place, the dependency on the 
over-exploitation of natural resources, particularly petroleum, threatens to impede this 
necessary transformation.  . 
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‘Popular’ Citizen Militias 
As we saw earlier, attempts at socialist transitions need to deal with the very 
real possibility of reactionary internal and foreign aggressions.  Since taking office 
Chavez has seen an intense and well-organized counterrevolutionary attack against his 
government from elements of both the Venezuelan oligarchy and U.S. government.  In 
order to deal with this continuing threat, Chavez has worked to improve the strength of 
the 100,000 member armed forces by purchasing military equipment from Russia, 
such as assault rifles and helicopters.  He has also created mechanisms that promote 
civilian-military unity and that allow civilians to engage directly in military tasks.  
Thus more than 90,000 military reservists have been mobilized by the Venezuelan 
government, and are now serving on the reserve list of the Army, National Guard, and 
Navy (Wilpert, 2007).  But besides the national army, an interesting new force has 
been developed.  
Beginning in early 2005, Chavez announced the creation of the barrio-based  
‘popular defense units’ of various sizes to serve as parallel forces in the fight against 
possible armed intervention.  These new popular militias would be organized 
according to neighborhood and workplace, and would be headed by Chavez as their 
commander-in-chief (Wilpert, 2007).  Chavez himself has said, "popular defense units 
must be created in the barrio, in the factory, in units of different magnitude -- 10 
persons, 100 persons, 500 persons" per unit” (India Daily at 
www.indiadaily.com/editorial/1550.asp).  Although it was first estimated that they 
would try to recruit approximately one million Venezuelans into these new units, this 
figure was later increased to two million (Wilpert, 2007). While the new citizen 
militias are welcomed by the majority of Chavez supporters in order to curb possible 
destabilization attempts by the oligarchy or the U.S. government, the opposition 
simply regards them as eerily reminiscent of the Cuban Defense Committees of the 
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revolution and a further example of the militarization of Venezuelan society.  
Something which has yet to be achieved and that needs urgent attention is the task of 
institutionalizing these democratic forms of civilian participation in military affairs in 
order to ensure their long-term success and avoid centralization.  
 
A New Labor Federation – Union Nacional de Trabajdores de Venezuela (UNT) 
 The traditional conservative union federation of CTV that has been mentioned 
throughout this study finally witnessed a significant challenge to its dominance of 
organized labor following the split of progressive members from its ranks in 2003 and 
their subsequent setting up of the new labor federation, Union Nacional de 
Trabajadores de Venezuela (UNT).  As we saw earlier, the pro-capital CTV has 
historically been tied to the main two political parties in Venzuela, AD and COPEI, 
and has largely sided with them on most labor, political, and economic issues, thereby 
preventing the advancement of an independent and strong working-class movement in 
the country.  However, the decision by the leadership of CTV to actively support 
right-wing forces and participate in the attempted 2002 coup against Chavez and later 
the management oil industry shutdown, fueled discontent within the more progressive 
tendencies of the federation and led to the overall discrediting of the CTV.   
 During its founding, many unions decided to disaffiliate with the CTV and join 
the UNT, thereby allowing the UNT to become the largest labor federation in 
Venezuela.   The pro-revolution UNT currently represents the majority of the 
country’s unionized working-class, with nearly 3 million of the country’s 11 million 
workers affiliated to it (Janicke, www.venezuelanalysis.com/news/3362).  In its first 
couple of years, the UNT has proved to operate under a new form of unionism that is 
much more democratic than the political party-run business unionism model of the 
CTV.  This new form of social movement unionism with its explicit class oriented 
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approach, places few restrictions on workers and their ability to strike in the face of 
labor injustice by their employers.  A clear example of this was the decision by steel 
workers of the SIDOR firm to go on strike several times this year in protest of 
unwarranted firings of workers by management.  After directly confronting Chavez 
and demanding his support for their actions, the steelworkers achieved an incredible 
victory that witnessed the firing of the pro-business Labor Minister, expropriation of 
the Argentinean-owned steel plant, and granting of their demand for trade union co-
management (Petras, www.venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/3841).   
 However, there is much to worry about the new federation.  Despite promising 
internal elections to decide the national leadership of the UNT, the process has faced 
indefinite delays.  This is not necessarily negative, since the main reason for the delays 
have been the ongoing open and democratic debates between the different tendencies 
of the federation.  The debates have centered on how to balance union autonomy and 
cooperation with the government, and how to balance workers’ interests with those of 
communities and with national issues.  The problem has been the rifts that have been 
created among the different tendencies, with some even making moves to form a new 
labor federation.  These issues are putting major stumbling blocks in the unity of the 
federation and in the struggle to structurally advance the conditions of the country’s 
working-class.  We will have to wait to see what results will come from the UNT’s 
national congress and much anticipated upcoming internal elections of 2009.   
 
The United Socialist Party of Venezuela: The social base of the Bolivarian 
Revolution 
 One of the major changes in Venezuela that has received much attention lately 
has been the organization and consolidation of the social base of the Bolivarian 
Revolution, which has united the overwhelming majority of the country’s leftist and 
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progressive political parties into one large party - Partido Socialista Unido de 
Venezuela (PSUV).  From the very first announcement of PSUV’s creation opposition 
forces began screaming accusations of authoritarianism in Venezuela.  Yet, the 
irrationality of the members of the opposition did not allow them to comprehend the 
reality of the situation, which was not to turn Venezuela into a restrictive one-party 
state but to unite all of the 20-plus supporting political parties of the Bolivarian 
Revolution, known collectively as the Patriotic Alliance, into a single powerful and 
united pro-revolutionary party.  It was decided that Chavez’s previous MVR 
(Movimiento V Republica) party, which served as an umbrella organization for the 
country’s left political parties, served mainly as an electoral machine and therefore 
needed to be replaced.   
Thus the motive behind the creation of the PSUV was to “democratize the 
Bolivarian Revolution” and to “make its decision-making processes more efficient and 
transparent” (Wilpert 2007: p 220).  Through internal party debates and elections, the 
nominations of candidates and policy goals of the party would be democratically 
decided.  Ciccariello-Maher (2007) describes the timeline of PSUV’s formation as 
follows:   
 
the first stage, already underway, involves the selection of 11,000 "promoters," 
or activists chosen for their exemplary ethical values, whose task it will be to 
travel the country activating, in the second stage (beginning March 24th), 
"socialist battalions."  It will be these "promoters" and "battalions" who will 
carry out a census and registry of the new party in preparation for elections 
during the third stage (after June 24th).  This election will give rise to a fourth 
stage, in which a constituent party assembly will formulate the PSUV's 
program (between August and November), which will then finally be voted 
upon by the new party's membership in a nationwide referendum 
(www.venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/2305). 
 
 As in the case of the newly created labor federation (UNT) the main obstacles 
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to the consolidation of the PSUV have been the internal ideological and power 
struggle between different tendencies.  After successfully registering 5.7 million 
people to its ranks, including the more than 14,000 members of the grassroots 
‘battalions’, the internal elections for PSUV’s provisional national executive were held 
in the beginning of 2008 (Janicke, www.links.org.au/node/310).  The traditional or 
moderate left wing of the party came out victorious in this founding congress of 
PSUV, defeating both the more radical left and right tendencies.  However, not all of 
the parties of the Patriotic Union decided to dissolve and join PSUV as encouraged by 
Chavez.  In fact, three main parties of the coalition, PPT (Patria Para Todos), PCV 
(Partido Comunista de Venezuela), and Podemos, which together accounted for 
around 15% of vote in the 2006 presidential elections (Wilpert, 2007), refused to 
dissolve, with PPT and PCV now functioning as pro-Chavez parties externally from 
PSUV and Podemos abandoning its pro-Chavista position altogether.   
Instead of respecting their decision for autonomy and trying to work together 
to advance the Bolivarian socialist program, Chavez has publicly labeled those that did 
not want to join the PSUV as “cowards” and “counterrevolutionaries” (Wilpert 2007: 
p.220).  As a result of the tensions with PSUV, some of these dissenting political 
parties decided to run their separate candidates in the most recent municipal-state 
elections of November 2008.  It is likely that this negatively impacted PSUV 
candidates and helped to tip the scales in favor of the opposition in some of the more 
tight races.  In the end, opposition party candidates were victorious in the 
governorships races of two of the country’s most populous states, Zulia and Miranda, 
including the extremely important mayor’s office of greater Caracas.  According to 
George Ciccariello-Maher (2008: http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/cm261108.html) 
this opposition victory, especially of metropolitan Caracas, may have severe 
implications for the revolutionary forces since the newly elected far-right mayor of the 
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discredited old regime, Antonio Ledezma, might attempt to roll back important 
reforms that have been made in recent years and try to instigate warfare between the 
metropolitan police and revolutionary popular militias.     
Moreover, George Ciccariello-Maher (2008: 
http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/cm261108.html) is correct in arguing that the 
Chavista defeats in metropolitan Caracas and the neighboring state of Miranda will 
have significant repercussions for the future of the Bolivarian Revolution, given that 
the two Chavista candidates that lost, Aristóbulo Isturiz and Diosdado Cabello 
respectively, were regarded as the two most probable successors to Chavez himself.  
In metropolitan Caracas the defeat of Isturiz, former union leader and education 
minister, and one of the Bolivarian Revolution’s most respected figures, is a surprising 
and devastating blow to Chavismo.  On the other hand, the defeat of Chavez’s right-
hand man, Cabello, in the state of Miranda might in fact turn out to be a blessing to the 
Bolivarian Revolution in the long term.  The reason for this is that Cabello represents 
the worst elements within Chavismo, the so-called endogenous right, which has high 
political aspirations and seeks to moderate the more revolutionary tendencies within 
the Bolivarian movement.  Therefore, the defeat of Cabello might actually be 
beneficial in that it will serve as a roadblock to the growing right-wing faction within 
PSUV that so threatens the advancement of the social transformations of the 
Revolution.    
  Despite these modest victories and the exaggerated claims by the opposition-
controlled media in Venezuela and its U.S. counterparts that the Venezuelan 
opposition substantially gained ground and power, the reality is that PSUV achieved 
an overwhelming defeat over opposition political parties in the regional elections.  In 
fact, PSUV candidates won the overall majority of governorships (17 of 23) and 
mayorships in the country (Wilpert 2008: www.venezuelanalysis.com/news/3979), 
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thus signaling a triumph for Chavismo and the continued progression of 21st century 
socialism in Venezuela.  The task for PSUV now becomes multiplying its efforts to 
both meet the needs of the Venezuelan people and to strengthen the democratic 
communal councils that may one day replace the bureaucratic local and national 
government institutions.      
Instead of increasingly isolating and verbally attacking the independent pro-
Chavista parties, Chavez and his allies should work to find common ground with them 
in order to strengthen PSUV and the Bolivarian Revolution in general.  It is important 
to keep in mind that respect and promotion of political pluralism is essential for this 
and other attempts at social transformation.  As Lowy (1986; in Fagen et al. 1986) 
points out, “the free organization of all political parties that respect revolutionary 
legality is not a concession to the bourgeoisie but rather the condition for the existence 
of a real political life, a real confrontation of points of view and the possibility of real 
decisions by workers on matters essential to the country’s economic, social, and 
political life” (p.271).  In Venezuela, it is true that the independent pro-Chavez parties 
(Podemos, PCV, and PPT) have had their disagreements with PSUV and have 
launched political electoral and ideological challenges against it.  Yet, most 
importantly, they have all respected revolutionary legality.  This contrasts with the 
opposition parties and forces that have been found guilty on numerous occasions of 
conspiring to and carrying out undemocratic and illegal violations against the 
Bolivarian Revolution, and that therefore deserve to be reprimanded by the country’s 
revolutionary forces.     
   Another related task for the members of PSUV is finding ways to moderate 
Chavez’s rhetoric and unfounded attacks against these political allies, in order to 
maintain the unity of the socialist alliance and prevent the strengthening of opposition 
forces.  Equally important, is the need of the Venezuelan people and of the left-wing 
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of the pro-Chavez ranks to put pressure on Chavez in order to distance him from the 
pseudo-socialist right-wing elements within PSUV, which have increasingly gained 
ground within the party.  The discussion leads to larger issues related to the 
construction of a revolutionary party.  As the revolutionary party of the Bolivarian 
Revolution, PSUV plays a critical role in Venezuela’s ongoing transition towards 21st 
century socialism.  The success of PSUV in garnering the support of the masses and in 
advancing societal transformations is crucial for the long-term survival of the 
Bolivarian Revolution.   
The first task of constructing a revolutionary party from the bottom-up has 
already been accomplished through the selection of the 14,000 politically-conscious 
members of the grassroots ‘battalions’ and their nationwide organizing efforts guided 
by socialist values.  The task ahead for PSUV is to tap into its potential for developing 
real socialist consciousness amongst not only its membership, but all Venezuelans.  In 
his famous pamphlet, What is to Be Done? (1902), Lenin stresses the Party as the most 
important organization of the revolution.  Lenin was concerned with the issue of 
whether capitalist conditions lead workers to spontaneously become socialist, or if this 
requires the guidance of a Vanguard of socially conscious intellectuals (Hammond 
1987; in Larson & Nissen 1987).  Ultimately, Lenin believed that the combination of 
both the conditions of capitalism and the Party Vanguard would instill socialist values 
in workers.   
Yet, unlike his conception of the party as being restricted to a small group of 
so-called professional revolutionaries, the construction of PSUV in Venezuela is being 
accomplished in a much more grassroots and democratic fashion, despite some 
aforementioned contradictions (i.e. excessive powers of party directorate (led by 
Chavez himself) in choosing PSUV candidates for municipal/state elections).  
Moreover, members of the PSUV have stated that their goal is to teach socialist ideals 
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to Venezuelans through the creation of political cadres that can mobilize people and 
advance the socialist transition (Janicke 2008: www.links.org.au/node/310).  This 
appeal of PSUV to the Venezuelan masses is indispensable for its own development 
and carrying out of the Bolivarian Revolution’s transformative policies.  However, 
PSUV’s leadership must proceed with caution in order to avoid monopolizing the 
political life of Venezuela through administrative methods.  As Lowy (1986; in Fagen 
et. al 1986) warns, the one-party system “predominant, so far, in the states of 
[socialist] transition – is the direct source of bureaucratization and a decisive obstacle 
to effective democracy (p.271).  The goal, therefore, is to have a grassroots and 
popular revolutionary party like PSUV that incorporates all revolutionary viewpoints 
and gives its members direct decision-making powers, while at the same time 
deepening political pluralism by guaranteeing an open and democratic political arena 
that respects the Bolivarian socialist transition.    
Interestingly, one of the principal obstacles to creating this participatory and 
grassroots party is found internally within PSUV.  The historical prevalence of 
patronage and personalistic politics in Venezuela is one that continues to persist today.  
While important steps have been taken to cultivate mass participation within PSUV, 
Chavez and his small circle of advisors continue to have an overwhelming influence in 
the party’s decision-making and thus also on the Bolivarian project.  The combined 
charisma of President Chavez and intense admiration and support for him, have 
created a sort of personality cult around him.  He is increasingly seen as more 
indispensable to the success of the Bolivarian Revolution and to the struggle against 
the opposition.   
This idolization and overdependency on Chavez is clearly demonstrated in his 
own rhetoric, campaign slogans, and on popular graffiti which include sayings like 
“With Chavez everything, without Chavez nothing,” and “With Chavez we all govern” 
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(Wilpert, 2007: p.201).  While it true that Chavez deserves great credit for advancing 
the desires of the Bolivarian movement, the danger of overdependence on him is that it 
makes the entire Bolivarian program highly vulnerable due to its excessive emphasis 
on this one individual.  If the Bolivarian Revolution is to break with the country’s 
historic personalistic and patronage politics it must find ways to move beyond the 
individual by developing current and new leaders, and facilitating their participation in 
the crafting and implementation of the direction of the movement.  In other words, 
collective ownership of the Bolivarian Revolution must not only be a slogan but a 
concrete reality in order to allow Venezuelans to own their movement and to choose 
their next leader from among their ranks once Chavez’s term ends.  Recent 
announcements (November 2008) of re-election plans by Chavez himself have the 
possibility of greatly impeding this much needed change and of continuing the cycle 
of personalism in Venezuela politics.       
 
Bolivarian Revolution’s Successes & Limitations 
Since the taking of state power significant improvements have occurred in 
Venezuela as part of the revolution.  Besides increased participatory democratic 
processes and other aforementioned social transformations, statistical information also 
shows impressive advances in Venezuela.  For one, annual economic growth has 
remained steady at 18.3% in 2004, 10.3% in 2005, and 10.3% in 2006 (Hahnel 2007:  
www.monthlyreview.org/mrzine/hahnel301107.html).  Additionally, the 
unemployment rate has dropped from 18.4 % in June 2003 to 8.3% in June 2007, or 
more than half (Weisbrot, 2008).  Contrary to popular belief, while increasing prices 
of oil have greatly contributed to these successes most of the growth has actually 
occurred in the non-oil sectors of the economy.  This impressive economic growth has 
been made possible due to Chavez’s implementation of aggressive expansionary fiscal 
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and monetary policies in the face of neo-liberal critics that instead recommend a 
minimal role for government and fiscal austerity. 
Another significant success has been the reduction of poverty from 55.6% of 
households and 60.9% of the population in the pre-Chavez era in 1997, to 30.6% of 
households and 36.3% of the population by the end of 2006 (Hahnel 2007:  
www.monthlyreview.org/mrzine/hahnel301107.html).  Furthermore, from 1998-2006 
social spending per capita in Venezuela has increased by 314 percent (Weisbrot, 
2008).  Before Chavez came to power, there was only one primary healthcare 
physician per every 14,000 Venezuelans, compared to one for every 1,300 
Venezuelans by 2007, with many working in previously ignored poor rural areas and 
urban barrios (Hahnel 2007:  www.monthlyreview.org/mrzine/hahnel301107.html ).  
Additionally, the working-class and poor now count on 16,000 new stores that sell 
staples at a 30% reduced rate (Hahnel 2007:  
www.monthlyreview.org/mrzine/hahnel301107.html). 
 
 
 
TABLE 5 
Venezuela: Central Government Social Spending (1998-2006), in percent of 
GDP/a 
 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Total Public 
Spending 23.7 24.5 29.6 31.6 29.4 31.0 28.4 28.5 31.0 
Total Social 
Spending 8.2 9.4 11.0 12.1 11.2 12.1 11.8 11.6 13.6 
Education 3.4 4.1 4.5 4.8 4.8 4.6 4.8 4.1 5.1 
Health 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.8 
Housing 1.0 0.8 1.7 1.0 0.8 1.1 0.6 1.3 1.6 
Social Security 1.4 2.0 2.2 3.4 2.8 3.4 3.1 3.0 3.6 
Social 
Development & 
Participation 
0.8 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.8 1.1 1.2 0.9 1.0 
Culture & Social 
Communication 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
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TABLE 5 (Continued) 
 
Science & 
Technology 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.2 
Social 
Spending 
(% of 
Public 
Spending) 
34.7 38.5 37.3 38.4 38.2 39.0 41.4 40.6 44.0 
Source: Sistema de Indicadores Sociales de Venezuela (SISOV) and Banco Central de Venezuela 
(BCV); in Weisbrot, 2008 
Notes: 
/a Does not include social spending by PDVSA, the state oil company, which in 2006 contributed $13.3 
billion (or 7.3 percent of GDP) to social projects. 
 
 In terms of the major limitations of the Bolivarian Revolution a few clearly 
stand out.  One has been its surprising lack of advancement in terms of the rights of 
both the LBGT and Afro-Venezuelan community, two historically oppressed 
populations.  While the 1999 Ley Organica de Trabajo (Labor Organic Law) did 
prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation, strong opposition from the 
Catholic Church and other groups succeeded in removing anti-discrimination 
provisions from the final 1999 constitution.  Included in the constitutional reform 
package of the December 2007 national referendum was a constitutional article that 
would have made discrimination based on sexual orientation illegal.  However, the 
defeat of the 2007 referendum means that the LBGT community and its allies must 
intensify their struggle for equality and exert more pressure on Chavez, a known 
sympathizer of LBGT rights, to get constitutional legislation passed.     
   With regard to the rights of Afro-Venezuelans, despite Chavez’s recognition 
of his partly afro descent and proud acknowledgement of his roots, he has not 
aggressively pursued policies to institutionalize the protection of the rights of Afro-
Venezuelans.  The historically racist subjugation and disrespect of Afro-Venezuelans 
is evident even in the attacks against Chavez made by the predominately lighter 
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skinned members of the opposition who frequently refer to Chavez and his darker 
colleagues as ‘monkeys’.  Despite this and many other examples of the continued 
racism in Venezuela, the 1999 constitution merely stated that the ethnic cultures of 
Venezuela needed to be treated as equal.  It was not until the December 2007 
referendum on 69 constitutional reforms that the struggle of Afro-Venezuelans was 
finally put on the national stage with Article 100 that would formally have recognized 
and guaranteed the protection of Afro-Venezuelan culture and heritage.  Yet,again  
with the defeat of the referendum the plight of Afro-Venezuelans suffered a major 
setback.   
We will have to wait and see if Chavez decides to pursue the implementation 
of this reform (which his executive authority allows him to) despite the failure to pass 
the reform proposal of 2007.  Not only would this be beneficial for the Bolivarian 
Revolution, but it would give the Afro-Venezuelan community a victory that it has 
long sought and deserves.  Representatives from Venezuela’s Afro-descendants have 
been active members of the revolution, and even hold positions within the 
government.  They are hopeful that the Chavez government will pass legislation that 
will mandate the recognition of Afro-Venezuelan rights, just as it did with the 
indigenous communities, and that will provide educational reforms to make Afro-
indigenous history part of the school curriculum.  Ending racial injustice and ensuring 
that the Afro-Venezuelan population enjoys a high degree of participation in the 
decision-making of their communities and country will be a necessary component of 
Venezuela’s 21st century socialist project.    
Another key area of disappointment thus far with the Bolivarian Revolution 
has been its inability and unwillingness to more aggressively pursue the elimination of 
the exploitative and unjust class structures of Venezuela society.  That is, despite 
nationalizations and very progressive social missions that have increased popular 
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participation, well-being, and consciousness, Venezuela’s wealthy oligarchy backed 
by Washington and supported by the privately owned right-wing media, continues to 
enjoy its economic privileges.  At the same time, the working-class and poor majority 
that make up the vertebrae of the Bolivarian Revolution, have gained more decision-
making power in their workplaces and communities, but remain relatively exploited 
and subservient to the national elite capitalist class.  This has to do with the 
Venezuelan government’s tepid response to the need of converting private property 
into publicly and collectively owned property in order to break the overconcentration 
of wealth.     
Yet, there is one clear and promising sign of the breaking down of class 
distinction and privilege in Venezuela.  According to a recent research paper by Mark 
Weisbrot (2008), co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR), 
income inequality in Venezuela as measured by the Gini coefficient has dropped 
significantly during the Chavez years, contradicting opposition claims that inequality 
has worsened.  In fact, figures provided by National Statistics Institute’s (INE) 
Household Survey (Encuesta de Hogares por Muestreo) show that the Gini coefficient 
for Venezuela (see Table 6 below) has declined from 48.7 in 1998 to 42 in 2007 
(Weisbrot 2008).  While this decrease of 6.7 might appear minimal, it actually 
demonstrates a substantial closing of the gap in terms of income distribution within 
Venezuela over the past ten years of revolution.  Therefore, while the road towards 
achieving a classless society is both long and arduous, the reduction of income 
inequality in Venezuela during the past decade is a significant step forward in 
achieving this socialist goal.  
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TABLE 6 
Venezuela: Gini coefficient, various sources and years (%) 
 
 INE/1 CEPAL/2 WDI/3 
1981   55.82 
1987   53.45 
1989   44.08 
1990  47.10  
1993   41.68 
1996   48.79 
1997 48.74   
1998 48.65   
1999 46.93   
2000 47.72   
2001 45.73   
2002 49.38   
2003 48.11   
2004 45.59   
2005 47.48   
2006 44.63   
2007 42.00   
 
Source: 1/ Venezuelan National Statistics Institute (Instituto Nacional de Estadística);  
2/ United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean;  
3/ World Bank’s World Development Indicators;    
in Weisbrot, 2008. 
 
 The other major obstacle still facing the Bolivarian Revolution is its continued 
overdependency on oil.  Despite taking commendable steps in diversifying its 
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economy and creating innovative and alternative economic enterprises, Venezuela has 
been unable to move beyond its excessive dependency on oil revenues.  The reasons 
for this are no mystery considering that the Chavez government has never declared 
itself to be against the extractivist model, and has actually called for the increased 
extraction of petroleum for the generation of more wealth.  On top of this the 
government has increased control over the oil industry and has been greatly favored by 
higher oil prices in recent years that have built up its coffers and allowed it to ‘sow the 
oil’.   
 As a result, non-oil economic activity has been undermined, even though it 
continues to play a significant role in the economic growth of the country.   As with 
the overdependency on Chavez, that of oil production poses a serious threat to the 
long-term success of the Bolivarian Revolution.  Oil revenue is the main source of 
financing for the social projects and missions that have so aided working-class and 
poor Venezuelans. In fact, in 2006 alone the state oil company, PDVSA, contributed 
$13.3 billion or 7.3% of GDP to the social projects and missions of the Bolivarian 
Revolution, as part of its Social Fund for community projects  (Weisbrot, 2008).   
Therefore, recent and future drops in the price of oil could create huge problems for 
the movement as it finds itself increasingly strapped for cash to pay for its various 
social programs.  Only by moving beyond the extractivist model that over-exploits the 
natural environment and its resources and towards an ecologically sustainable non-oil 
economy that advances food security can Venezuelans ensure the successful long-term 
development of their socialist transition. 
 
The Bolivarian Revolution’s Embrace of Participatory Democracy and the 
Explosion of Communal Power 
 The liberal or representative democracy that has existed in Venezuela and that 
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is hegemonic around the world has recently begun to be challenged by a wide array of 
social actors and movements in the global South that seek social emancipation through 
alternative models of participatory democracy (De Sousa Santos 2007).  This 
confrontation between alternative conceptions of democracy is perhaps most 
pronounced in Venezuela, where the explosion of communal power has helped to push 
the country away from the limiting western liberal democracy and towards a dynamic 
and deeper form of participatory democracy.  Ciccariello-Maher (2007) argues that in 
trying to understand this process it useful to view it “through the Leninist concept of 
“dual power” – that is, the construction of an autonomous, alternative power capable 
of challenging the existing state structure” (p.42).  The clearest example of the 
building of this new ‘dual power’ has been the creation of the communal councils in 
all neighborhoods throughout Venezuela as part of the new alternative ‘social 
economy’ based on solidarity and community that seeks to move the country beyond 
capitalism and towards socialism. The organization and empowerment of these 
communal councils have begun to dismantle the traditional and repressive old state 
apparatus and to create a new form of socio-political organization, thereby also 
helping to deepen participatory democracy.  
 Special emphasis, therefore, needs to be placed on the construction of these 
communal councils, which are central to the socialist program of the Bolivarian 
Revolution.  Wilpert (2007) argues that these examples of self-governance possibly 
represent “the most far-reaching transformation of Venezuelan political life on a day-
to-day level” (p. 56).  While Local Public Planning councils (CLPP, Consejos Locales 
de Planificacion Publica) had already been operating prior to 2006, it was not until 
April of that year that the new communal council law was passed (Wilpert 2007).  The 
CLPPs that were first introduced via article 182 of the 1999 constitution would be 
modeled on the participatory local budgeting process founded in Porto Alegre, Brazil, 
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and would resemble similar schemes found in Kerala, India.  Among their goals was 
to “gather and evaluate proposals for community projects, to work on the municipal 
development plan, to develop a map of the community’s needs, to elaborate the 
municipality’s investment budget, and to coordinate with other municipalities and with 
state authorities, among others” (Wilpert, 2007: p. 56-57).  After running into several 
problems with the implementation of the CLPPs, and wishing to create citizen 
assemblies on a smaller community –scale to supplement the CLPPs, the Chavez 
government announced its decision to create communal councils in 2005.  
 When the new communal council law was finally passed in April 2006, 
communities across the country rapidly began setting up their communal councils.  
The second article of the 2006 law states that communal councils are “instances of 
participation, articulation, and integration between various community organizations, 
social groups, and citizens…[ ] to permit the organized people directly to manage 
public policy and projects oriented toward responding to the needs and aspirations of 
communities in the construction of a society of equity and social justice” (Ciccariello-
Maher 2007: p.45).  These new forms of participatory budgeting and local economic 
development, known in Venezuela as nuclei of endogenous development, are meant to 
serve as complements to the educational missions.  By the end of the first year the 
government had given existent communal councils grants for 653 community 
improvement projects (Wilpert, 2007).  In order to further their growth and 
transformative capabilities the newly created community councils were designed to 
integrate the various committees that had developed through the Chavez years.  
Therefore, communal councils now work side-by-side with a wide array of other 
committees (ie. health, land reform, housing) in the neighborhoods.   
In order to facilitate their management and ensure the participation of every 
family in political decision-making it was decided to set up communal councils in 
  
 169 
 
 
 
 
such a way as to have each comprised of only 200 to 400 families in urban areas and 
20 to 50 families in rural areas.  Moreover, they make decisions in their meetings by 
way of a general assembly that is elected by the participating families.  Most 
importantly, is the fact that these decisions that are made by the communal councils 
are binding, meaning that mayors must abide by the decisions made by the majority of 
the communal councils (Wilpert, 2007).  Additionally, at least 20% of all the members 
of the community must be present at the meetings in order for the decisions made by 
the general assembly to be valid (Wilpert, 2007).     
The empowerment of citizens through these communal councils has been 
significant.  For the first time in their history communities in Venezuela have the 
power to manage their own affairs and budgets according to their own priorities, and 
not those of outsiders.  By the end of 2007, nearly 20,000 communal councils had 
been registered throughout all of Venezuela, and federal grants provided for thousands 
of community-led initiatives (Wilpert 2007).  Moreover, the government increased the 
funding for communal councils from $5 billion in 2007, or 30% of total funds for local 
and regional governments, to 50% in 2008 (Wilpert 2007).  Thousands of communal 
banks have also been established alongside communal councils throughout the country 
in order to finance the various development projects of the communities.  
With these funds, the communal councils have been to execute much needed 
productive projects to help improve the socio-economic status of their communities.  
For example, this money has been used as micro-credit for the thousands of 
cooperatives that have recently been created and that directly benefit the communities 
in terms of investment and employment.  It has also allowed for the implementation of 
various community initiatives, including health clinics, street paving, recreational 
fields, and sewage and water systems.  It is estimated that by the end of 2008 another 
3,000 communal banks across Venezuela will receive nearly half a million dollars in 
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funding from the government’s Microfinance Development Fund (Albert, 2008: 
www.venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/3670). 
This devolving of power to local organs is helping to further eliminate the 
repressive old state structures and creating new forms of social organization based on 
communalism.   The increased ability of the popular classes to determine local public 
policy has initiated a process of reconstitution of state-society relations.  Yet, there 
still remains the threat posed by some local officials throughout the country that have 
resisted the efforts to institutionalize participatory budgeting.   Many of these elected 
officials are concerned that these new efforts will eliminate their traditional powers 
and privileges.  Their worries are legitimate since one of the principal purposes of 
creating these alternative democratic institutions is to eventually replace the 
bureaucratized levels of government. 
The goal now, however, must be on promoting and further institutionalizing 
these communal councils in order to give them decision-making power at the national 
level while also ensuring their autonomy from the state.  In other words, their potential 
for transforming the entire Venezuelan state and polity makes their institutionalization 
a must.  Although state-society relations have begun a process of transformation that 
gives Venezuelans greater participation in local public policy decision-making, the 
ability of the popular classes to determine national public policy remains minimal.  
The extension of this participation to all levels of public policy is seen as a necessary 
condition by Fagen et al. (1986) to all socialist transitions.  According to Jesus Rojas, 
one of the designers of the councils and an official from the Ministry of Popular 
Participation and Social Development, among the future reforms that are needed is the 
establishment of associations of communal councils, so that each communal council is 
able to send a spokesperson to a high-level body in order to coordinate large-scale 
projects for all of the member councils (Wilpert 2007).  This would effectively create 
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a direct democracy-based council system that would operate parallel to the traditional 
representative democratic structures, a goal that Chavez himself has said constitutes 
one of the Bolivarian Revolution’s next major processes for its socialist transition 
(Wilpert, 2007).       
 
The Bolivarian Revolution as Alternative to Development or Development 
Alternative? 
 As we just saw, new forms of social organization are being created and 
implemented in Venezuela as a result of the progressive and transformative reforms of 
the Bolivarian Revolution.  The other remaining critical issue that needs analyzing is 
whether the Venezuelan case constitutes a ‘development alternative’, in which 
economic growth is not rejected but complemented by various other alternative tools, 
or an ‘alternative to development’ that rejects the concept of economic growth and the 
entire paradigm altogether (De Sousa Santos 2006).  Anibal Quijano (2006) argues 
that the necessity of an ‘alternative production system’ to construct a non-exploitative 
society is not a relatively new idea.  Several historical proposals and experiements 
throughout the world have attempted to replace the exploitative capitalist system.  
While some aspects of capitalism have definitely changed throughout time due to 
globalization, its overall fundamental features remain the same.   
For this reason, Quijano (2006) argues that in the search for alternative 
production systems it is still necessary to take capitalism as reference point.  Despite 
the trend of many groups to fashion their programs as “alternatives to the prevailing 
economic system” few, if any, actually constitute ‘alternative production systems’ or 
‘modes of production’ (Quijano 2006: p.424).  The socialist transition of the 
Bolivarian Revolution presents an interesting experiment in the envisioning and 
construction of alternative economic systems.  As we will see, despite incorporating a 
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series of transformative social, economic, and political reforms the Bolivarian 
Revolution still represents a development alternative since it continues to operate 
under the global capitalist framework based on the accumulation of capital and 
economic growth.  At the same time, however, the combination of certain elements do 
constitute an ‘alternative to development’ within the Bolivarian Revolution that reject 
the concept of economic growth altogether and replace the logic of capital with a 
functioning rationality based on the satisfaction of human needs and the development 
of human potentialities (Fagen et al. 1986).   
    From the beginning, the Chavez government has stated the need to lose its 
over-dependency on oil by diversifying its economy and developing its industrial and 
agricultural sectors.  Chavez’s original national development plan, which resembled 
the theory of ‘neostructuralism’ of Osvaldo Sunkel (Wilpert, 2008), maintained that 
these goals were to be achieved through a combination of private and state initiatives 
and investments, and by seeking to ‘democratize capital’ while continuing to stimulate 
private capital through the creation of more favorable conditions for investment 
(Lebowitz 2006).  The plan also included the promotion of micro-enterprises and 
cooperatives, and the democratization of land ownership.  This clearly did not fall 
within an alternative anti-capitalist economic framework, but instead an attempt to try 
to make capitalism more ‘humane’ by reducing the most egregious injustices of the 
system.  However, Chavez’s own radicalization and that of the Bolivarian Revolution 
caused the movement towards a more anti-capitalist program.   
The question therefore is, what are the components of this new economic 
model that do fundamentally transform the basic underlying structures of the capitalist 
economy? To help answer this question we must turn our attention to one of the most 
important components of the economic plan - the creation of the alternative ‘social 
economy’ based on solidarity and community, whose purpose it is to help Venezuela 
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lose its dependency on oil and move beyond capitalism (Wilpert, 2007).  This 
“alternative and complementary road” (Lebowitz 2006: p.91) to the private sector is 
designed to provide support for the family, cooperative, and self-managed micro-
enterprises, worker-state co-managed large enterprises, and democratized rural and 
urban land ownership (Wilpert, 2007).  The ultimate goal of the social economy, 
therefore, is to move towards public/collective ownership of the means of production 
as well as the achievement of mass participation and control over the social, political, 
and economic institutions.  The participatory nature of this economic model clearly 
diverges from the neo-liberal model of free markets, privatization, and diminished 
government interference, as well as from broader capitalist values.    
 The problem is that the social economy occupies only a secondary role behind 
private and state activities, despite aggressive government efforts to further develop it.  
Wilpert (2007) argues that the sheer size and power of the capitalist economy and of 
the oil industry has made it extremely difficult for the social economy to gain a more 
important role in the economy of Venezuela.  Among the goals of organizing the 
cooperative and self- and co- management sectors is the attempt to incorporate the 
mass of workers from the informal sector into the social economy.  The government 
has facilitated this task by strongly promoting the creation and maintenance of 
cooperatives in the country and providing greater revenues in the form of education, 
loans, microfinance, and technical support.  It has also enabled willing workers to take 
over unproductive, bankrupt, and idle factories and organize into self-managed 
enterprises like cooperatives. 
 There are many interrelated programs to the new social economy, all of which 
are based on the idea of endogenous development that demands that all “resources, in 
terms of skills and materials, come from within the country or community that is being 
developed (Wilpert, 2008: p.80).  That is, this new form of developing communities 
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takes into account their specific historical and material conditions, and exiting 
capacities and necessities.  It can most clearly been seen in the Nuceli of Endogenous 
Sustainable Development (Nudes), which are communities (a total of 149 by March 
2005) that have been selected by the government to receive educational services and 
financial support for projects related to agriculture, tourism, industrial production, 
infrastructure, and services (Wilpert, 2007).  Among these, the most well-known and 
successful is the Nucleus Fabricio Ojeda, where hundreds of workers in the 
community decided to unite their cooperatives in the area of an abandoned factory and 
create a joint-cooperative project to meet the needs of the entire neighborhood (Albert, 
2008).   Included within the larger social economy’s program is the already mentioned 
redistribution of urban and rural land to poor and working-class Venezuelans, as well 
as the provision of micro-credit for their creation of their own small enterprises.  
 Later, in order to assist the Nudes, the government established the Mision 
Veulvan Caras (MVC- Mission About Face), later changed to Mision Che Guevara, 
which functions to provide skills and training to unemployed Venezuelans.  The goal 
here is twofold: to reduce unemployment and the ills associated with it, and to 
promote the creation of new cooperatives.  According to some estimates from the 
Minister of Popular Economy, the number of Venezuelans to have made use of the 
MVC program and to have found employment through it, will have exceeded the one 
million mark by 2006 (Wilpert, 2007).  This initiative alone has helped to ease the 
burden of those employed in the informal economy (45-50% of the population) and 
unemployed Venezuelans.  The long-term goal of this program is to set up local 
economic production networks in which cooperatives are connected with one another 
based on similar functions (Wilpert, 2007).   
 Another integral program of the social economy has been the development of 
economic entities, known as Social Production Enterprises (EPS), which are intended 
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to transcend the individual self-interest and greed characteristic of both production and 
consumption processes.  The goal of the EPS is to ensure that the social concerns of 
communities are met through participative planning and communally-based 
production of goods and services that eliminate hierarchies and privileges in the 
workplace (Albert, 2008).  Among the requirements that must be fulfilled by EPS are 
a ‘one person, one vote’ system of decision-making, equal remuneration for workers 
regardless of the work performed, and the investment of a portion of their profits to 
the local community.  By the middle of 2006, there already existed 500 registered EPS 
and another 7,000 in the process of development (Wilpert, 2007) 
  Essentially, the model of self-management does challenge a fundamental 
premise of capitalism - the sacredness of private property.  By stressing and 
implementing the concept of public/communal property and cooperativism the social 
economy has begun a process of overcoming the private ownership of the means of 
production, thereby helping to eliminate a main source of capitalism’s social injustice 
(Wilpert, 2007).  The changing nature of property relations from private to public 
hands, though minimal thus far, is a significant step forward for advancing the 
socialist transition in Venezuela.  While the social economy does represent the 
government’s most radical effort to distance itself from capitalism and towards a 
model of self-management, it does not constitute an anti-capitalist approach by itself.   
 Yet, if the economic program of the Bolivarian Revolution was not a challenge 
to capitalism then why did the national and foreign capitalists react so aggressively 
against the Venezuelan government?  Lebowitz (2006) argues that the reason is that 
“as a package, these new laws – oriented toward meeting human needs and integrated 
through this specific ideology- were  an attack on capital as such” (p.95).  In other 
words, the economic strategies constituted not just separate and isolated changes but 
are a part of a larger comprehensive package of reforms, which the national oligarchy 
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and its foreign allies saw as a major threat to the dominance of finance capital and to 
“the previous trajectory towards of the privatization of the oil industry” (Lebowitz 
2006: p.95).  Thus all of the aforementioned projects (nationalization, land reform, 
rural self-sustaining cooperatives, self-managed enterprises in a social economy, and 
self-governed communal property and councils) together are what form the Bolivarian 
Revolution’s ‘alternative to development’ program and what constitute its challenge to 
capitalism.   
Of particular importance has been the combination of two fundamental 
concepts of social transformation: self-governance and self-management.  The 20,000 
self-governing communal councils and the 100,000+ self-managed cooperatives (with 
nearly 1 million members) are the two pillars of the socialist nature of the revolution 
in Venezuela.  These two ideas based on the principles of sovereignty, cooperation, 
and justice are regarded as direct challenges to the neo-liberal model of development 
and to the logic of capital, which promotes the endless accumulation of capital at the 
expense of human and ecological destruction.  The reason for this is that the 
fundamental goal of self-management and self-governance is not economic growth, 
but the complete human development of people (both individual and collective) – the 
quintessential element of constructing an alternative mode of production and socialist 
society.  Therefore, communal councils and self-managed enterprises help to produce 
the new rich human beings described by Che Guevara in his 1965 book man and 
Socialism in Cuba that are selflessly dedicated to the betterment of society and that 
replace capitalism’s alienated and solitary women and men.  This follows Lebowitz’s 
argument that, “socialism is not the goal, but rather, the goal is the full development of 
human potential (2006; 116-117).  
  This transformation gets to the heart of the Venezuela socialist transition.  The 
Bolivarian Revolution’s creation of mechanisms to satisfy the needs of human being 
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over those of capital is what constitutes its radical nature and divergence from 
capitalism.  Moreover, the establishment of communal property (both urban and rural) 
through land reform is a direct challenge to capitalism’s idolization of private 
property.  Additionally, the communal councils and self-managed enterprises orient 
production and distribution towards satisfying the needs of the majority of 
Venezuelans, and not those of capital.  Moreover, they break down unjust divisions of 
labor characteristic of capitalism and replace them with more egalitarian and just 
modes of decision-making and remuneration.  These elements combined constitute an 
alternative to capitalism because the needs of capital are subjugated to the needs of 
human beings.  
 In other words, the rejection of the capitalist system takes place when the 
explicit goals of a society shift from the growth of capital towards human development 
and the growth of human capacities.  This perspective can be seen in Venezuela’s 
constitution with, “Article 299's emphasis upon 'ensuring overall human development', 
in the declaration of Article 20 that 'everyone has the right to the free development of 
his or her own personality' and in the focus of Article 102 upon 'developing the 
creative potential of every human being and the full exercise of his or her personality 
in a democratic society' (Lebowitz 2005: 
mrzine.monthlyreview.org/lebowitz280705.html).  It is also true that the satisfaction 
of people’s basic needs in terms of health care, housing, food, and education, will in 
large part be used by Venezuelans to judge the Bolivarian Revolution (Lebowitz 
2006).  This explains the implementation of the unique endogenous development 
approach on the part of the Venezuelan government that takes into account the specific 
conditions of the country in order to be able to meet the needs of Venezuelans.  
Among the main strategies of the program are providing education in cooperation and 
self-management in order to prepare its citizens for new productive relations 
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(Lebowitz 2006).  The goal is to emphasize collective property, reject wage-labor, and 
“attack the division between those who think and those who do” (Lebowitz 2006; 
p.100).   
 In sum, there have been both reformist and potentially transformative policies 
with the Bolivarian Revolution.  The first set of redistributive policies have been 
social democratic and Keynesian in nature, and include thing such as land reform, 
progressive taxation, and an abundance of social programs (Wilpert 2007).  They have 
focused on increasing state intervention in the capitalist economy, but do not 
“fundamentally alter the capitalist dynamic of private capital accumulation and of 
market competition” (Wilpert, 2007: p. 101).  These constitute the Bolivarian 
Revolution’s ‘development alternative’.   
On the other hand, there have been far fewer reforms of the potentially 
transformative kind capable of changing “the capitalist dynamic of competitive private 
capital accumulation into a dynamic that is instead based on human needs and 
cooperation” (Wilpert 2007: p.101).  These have included worker cooperatives, self-
sustaining agricultural cooperatives, and worker self-managed enterprises.  The 
difficulty now lies in putting into place mechanisms that will allow these more 
democratic, yet less financially profitable and competitive institutions to be 
economically viable in the long-run.  Only by finding ways to link these enterprises to 
each other “within a cooperative framework of solidarity and mutuality” can the 
capitalist market dynamic be replaced (Wilpert, 2007: p.101).  This will require the 
replacement of privately owned capitalist businesses with co- and self-managed 
enterprises through expropriation.  Naturally, this transition that includes the 
transformation of property relations and ownership over the means of production will 
not be smooth, but will entail intense class conflict.  
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
The main difficulty in carrying out this research has been the fact that it is not 
simply an armchair study of the remote past but an immediate inquiry and intervention 
to a contemporary social revolution.  Thus the focus of this analysis has been on the 
historical process of the Bolivarian Revolution as it is being made.  While it is 
ignorantly and unfortunately dismissed by many as just simply being an example of 
traditional Latin American populism, caudillismo, or state-directed development, I 
have attempted to uncover the complex nature of the Bolivarian Revolution in order to 
acquire a more nuanced understanding of this exciting social process.   
The first and possibly most important task of this research has been the attempt 
to take into account the multiple historical influences that shaped and allowed the 
Bolivarian Revolution to take place.  This challenge required examining interrelated 
and historical global, national, and local events, ideologies, structures, and relations 
and trying to make sense of how these influenced one another and contributed to the 
development of the Venezuelan counter-movement.  The main purpose of this section 
was to examine the historical formation of a particular social configuration in 
Venezuela in order to better understand the country’s political dynamics and 
possibilities available for social change.   
To accomplish this objective I provided the historical context of Venezuela 
from the colonial period to 1935.  I found that Quijano’s (2000) notion of the 
‘coloniality of power’ would persist throughout Venezuela’s history, thus greatly 
shaping the country’s overall socio-political landscape even to this day.  The 
deliberate setting up of a Eurocentrist and racist hierarchical system of social 
stratification and division of labor based on skin color, allowed white criollos to 
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achieve and maintained elite status and restrict the social mobility of so-called darker 
inferiors.   
   Most importantly, the historical analysis confirmed what Anderson (1986) 
had argued was the existence of a weak working-class and fragmented landowning 
elite in Venezuela.  The overwhelming influence of the oil industry in the country 
meant the obstruction of both the industrialization process and the development of a 
strong industrial working-class.  Is also signified the failed consolidation of a powerful 
landowning elite and of a united peasant movement, due to the greatly decreased 
influence of land and agriculture.  Thus the relatively fragmented nature of these 
important social groups, traditionally strong in most other Latin American countries, 
enabled the imposition of a liberal bourgeois form of governance that ruled Venezuela 
for nearly four decades.  Besides helping to shape the country’s social structure, the 
dependency on oil also meant that the Venezuelan state assumed the principal role in 
the accumulation of capital, thus producing a weak civic society and a paternalistic 
national political culture whereby citizens looked towards the state for the satisfaction 
of their needs.  These historical factors, therefore, explain the social and political 
stability and overall lack of social unrest that made Venezuela such a special case in 
Latin America.   
My analysis of the socio-political trajectory of Venezuela from the political 
opening caused by the end of the Gomez dictatorship in 1935 until the Caracazo 
uprising in 1989 details the puntofijismo liberal bourgeois governing structure that was 
established and that endured for nearly four decades.  I argue that the aforementioned 
weakness of civic society, clientelism associated with the state and oil revenues, along 
with the systematic exclusion of leftist political parties and organizations were the 
main factors in the survival of this bourgeois political system.  Though there was a 
brief attempt by a guerrilla movement in Venezuela to take state power, it is my 
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opinion that the guerrilla forces failed to accurately assess the historical conjuncture in 
the country.  It was impossible to expect Venezuelans to support the guerrilla cause at 
a time when the country had recently rid itself of a decade long Perez Jimenez 
dictatorship and had democratically elected the Betancourt government.   
Another significant topic that I examined was the development paradigm, 
which principally took the form of a strong state ISI political economic strategy in 
Latin America from the 1930’s to the 1960’s and that resulted in the region’s ‘Golden 
Age’.  The uniqueness of Venezuela’s ISI strategy, rapid speed at which it developed 
from initial to later stages, and relative short duration in comparison to other Latin 
American ISI experiences are all issues that were described in detail in this section.  
As Perez Sainz & Zarembka (1979) noted, despite some industrial branches being able 
to complete import substitution the overall ISI process of Venezuela was stifled 
because of the continuing dependence on the extraction and export of petroleum and 
on the influx of oil revenues.   
With the debt crisis of Latin America and overall collapse of the 
developmentalist framework, the capitalist world-system commenced a new phase of 
accumulation known as neo-liberalism.  In this chapter I pointed out the importance of 
not treating this situation as an unprecedented occurrence of the capitalist world-
system, since as Arrighi (1994) explains, the capitalist world economy requires 
continuous reorganization and reconstitution following long periods of crisis and 
discontinuous change.  My analysis of neo-liberalism focused on the main ideological 
tenets of this political-economic school of thought and set of policy prescriptions, and 
on its particular manifestation in Venezuela.  I provided an overview of the specific 
neo-liberal policies, commonly referred to as the Washington Consensus, that were 
imposed on Venezuela, along with their effects on Venezuelan society.  My findings 
demonstrated that the benefits of the Washington Consensus were largely concentrated 
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among the upper echelons of socio-economic ladder, and more importantly, that it in 
fact contributed to the rising insecurity among the working-class and poor, increased 
ecological damage, and expansion of the informal economy. 
After describing the crisis of neo-liberalism I proceeded to situate Chavismo 
within the Latin American experience of resistance.  I argued that the political opening 
and birth of the mass popular Bolivarian movement in Venezuela was made possible 
due to the combined implementation of IMF-approved economic policies, discrediting 
of the two traditional political parties AD and COPEI, and increased agony and unrest 
on the part of the poor and working-class.  Yet before looking closely at the 
complexities of this contemporary attempt at social transformation I reviewed the 
influential ‘focoist’ strategy of social change in Latin America that dominated in the 
cycle of struggles from the 1960s to the 1980s with its call for armed insurrectionary 
taking of state power and revolution.  Though these struggles achieved significant 
social and political changes in the region, the exploitative capitalist system survived, 
thereby guaranteeing the continued suffering of the poor and working-class majorities.   
In trying to understand the origins and nature of Chavismo I examined the 
ideological influences of Gramscian notions of hegemony, and of Latin American 
nationalism and populism.  As it turns out, Gramsci’s idea of creating a broad system 
of alliances that unites diverse social forces in order to combat and dismantle the 
institutionalized hegemony by the dominant class is a very useful concept to capture 
the socio-political realities and struggles of Venezuela.  A review of Leclau’s (2005) 
interpretation of populism is also helpful in understanding the nationalist and populist 
tendencies of Chavismo.  What I discovered is that as a consequence of not fulfilling 
the set of heterogeneous popular demands of the population an antagonistic frontier, 
the ‘people’, was established in opposition to traditional puntofijismo political 
authority.   
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After taking all of these ideological influences into account I determined that 
the most appropriate characterization of Chavismo, and of the Bolivarian Revolution 
in general, is that of a united and broadly based popular movement that largely 
consists of the working-class and poor majorities, and that exhibits socialist, 
nationalist, and anti-imperialist ideals.  I have argued that although the subjects of this 
revolutionary process can be said to be very diverse, they do share similar experiences 
of capitalist exploitation and domination.  Thus instead of the traditional industrial 
working-class vanguard what exists in Venezuela is a mass movement that is the result 
of the convergence of all oppressed sectors of the population.  Thus we see the 
unemployed, working-class, poor, and those in the informal economy converged into a 
mass popular force with a common struggle to create a socialist society.     
The final section of this study concentrated on examining the specific social 
transformations that have been accomplished as part of the Bolivarian Revolution.  
What I have discovered and subsequently attempted to demonstrate is that the 
transition towards socialism in Venezuela is enabling the creation of new paths toward 
alternative forms of social organization and political-economic decision-making and 
management that need to be carefully examined worldwide by others seeking a more 
just and sustainable society.  The Bolivarian Revolution has brought to light the 
failures of the capitalist model of development and the need for real and profound 
change to the current world order.  Although the Bolivarian Revolution has achieved 
significant social and political-economic transformations that challenge capitalist 
values, there still has yet to be a fundamental overcoming of the capitalist system.  The 
socialist political project has been leading Venezuela towards something completely 
different than neo-liberalism, but it faces many obstacles including the 
institutionalization of popular control over social, political, and economic decision-
making.  As Wilpert argues, “Venezuela is recuperating the utopian energies, which 
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became exhausted with the failures of state socialism, of social democracy, and of 
neo-liberal capitalism, merely by trying a different and as yet relatively unexplored 
path” (p.217). 
In determining whether the Bolivarian Revolution constitutes a ‘development 
alternative’ or ‘alternative to development’, I concluded by arguing that it in fact 
represents a ‘development alternative’ since it operates under the global capitalist 
framework based on the accumulation of capital and economic growth.  That is, the 
Bolivarian Revolution consists of one set of redistributive policies, which have been 
social democratic and Keynesian in nature, and that include thing such as land reform, 
progressive taxation, and an abundance of social programs (Wilpert 2007).  These 
reformist policies have tended to focus on increasing state intervention in the capitalist 
economy, and not on fundamentally altering the capitalist structures of accumulation.   
Yet at the same time I maintained that the combination of certain elements 
does constitute an ‘alternative to development’, since together they reject the concept 
of economic growth altogether and replace the logic of capital with a functioning 
rationality based on the satisfaction of human needs and the development of human 
potentialities (Fagen et al. 1986).  Within this combination of transformative policies 
is the establishment of communal property (both urban and rural) through land reform 
– a clear and direct challenge to capitalism’s sanctity of private property.  There is also 
the creation of self-governed communal councils and self-managed enterprises 
oriented towards satisfying the needs of the majority of Venezuelans, and not those of 
capital.  The main point to be made about these two pillars of the Bolivarian 
Revolution is that they break down unjust divisions of labor characteristic of 
capitalism and replace them with more egalitarian and just modes of decision-making 
and remuneration.   
What all this goes to show is that much more emphasis is being placed on the 
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meeting the needs of human beings than on those of capital, as should be the case.  
However, the main challenge facing the Bolivarian Revolution now is putting into 
place the necessary mechanisms that will allow these more democratic and 
participatory forms of social organization and production to be institutionalized.  
Failure to institutionalize the transformations that have been made thus far leaves open 
the possibility of reversing these reforms with a change in government administration.  
Moreover, while there are several guiding principles for 21st century socialism 
(sovereignty, equality, cooperation, human development, justice) there is not a 
predetermined recipe of what this new system must or must not contain.  Instead 
Venezuelans are advancing with the construction of a homegrown form of socialism 
that in time through trial and error will become clearer in its structure.  In other words, 
it is a learning process that as Chavez has noted will require “shuffling, searching, 
creating, and inventing” (Sugget 2007:  http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/news/4515). 
This means that Venezuelans have a significant amount of liberty in proposing 
and deciding what kinds of institutions they would like to see built in their country.  
Trying to envision what the institutionalization process of the revolution will look like 
is a difficult task. Yet, the ideals of the Bolivarian Revolution and the transformations 
that have already been achieved provide us at least with a starting point.  To be clear, 
the problem lies principally in the fact that the social policies of the revolution are 
generally not guaranteed by law, even though they are guaranteed by the constitution 
(Wilpert, 2007).  For example, the educational missions, urban land reform, and 
subsidized food program for the poor (Mission Mercal) have all been passed simply by 
presidential decree and are thus not guaranteed by laws (Wilpert, 2007).  This lack of 
legal guarantees makes the reforms extremely vulnerable to the whims of whoever has 
state power.     
It is my opinion that if the goal of the Bolivarian Revolution is to create a 
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socialist society, then naturally capitalism’s main structures and institutions must be 
replaced with those that promote and defend the ideals of the revolution.  Therefore, I 
propose working towards the abolishment of production organized through private 
ownership of the means of production, and its replacement with communal/public 
ownership.  Secondly, I support Wilpert’s (2007) position of the need to replace the 
regulation of the exchange and distribution of products and labor by the competitive 
market.  That is rather than let the market determine wages, production, and allocation, 
and pit producers and consumers against each other something new must be built to 
replace markets.  Lastly, the supplanting of the liberal representative democratic 
model of governance by a participatory one needs to be institutionalized so that 
decision-making, from the local to national level, lies in the hands of the Venezuelan 
people and not in those of a select few who generally end up making decisions behind 
closed doors that do not favor the people they are supposed to represent. 
The institutionalization of these reforms for the socialist movement in 
Venezuela will require the construction of new political and economic institutions 
and/or the solidification of certain current institutions.  In terms of the social reforms 
that have been carried out, those that exist simply because of presidential decree must 
be instituted through the creation of new laws that can be directly accepted by 
Venezuelans through the electoral process.  There is also an urgent need to 
institutionalize the political advances that have been made with regard to participatory 
democracy, in particular the communal councils.  The transformative and 
revolutionary potential of these councils is evident thus far by the fact that for the first 
time ever the popular classes are determining local public policy and reconstituting 
state-society relations.  Chavez has even called on Venezuelans to work to strengthen 
their communal councils because as he argues, they “cannot be appendices of the 
mayor's offices, the governorships, the ministry, or President Chávez,” since they are 
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the property of the people (Sugget 2007:  
http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/news/4515).  
However, in order to advance this form of socio-political organization and 
eliminate the traditional bureaucratized and repressive state structures it is not enough 
to concentrate solely on the local level of governance.  Up to now the 
institutionalization of local participatory budgeting has begun to challenge the power 
of local officials, many of whom are worried about losing their long held privileges.  
The mission now, however, must be on pushing to institutionalize these communal 
councils at the national level as well in order to give them national decision-making 
power.  One possible way of accomplishing this is to do as Jesus Rojas, one of the 
designers of the councils and an official from the Ministry of Popular Participation and 
Social Development, suggests.  Rojas argues that what is needed is the establishment 
of associations of communal councils, in which each communal council is able to send 
a spokesperson to a higher-level body that in turn would coordinate large-scale 
projects for all of the member councils (Wilpert 2007).  This would effectively create 
a direct democracy-based council system that would operate parallel to the traditional 
representative democratic structures, a goal that Chavez himself has said constitutes 
one of the Bolivarian Revolution’s next major processes for its socialist transition 
(Wilpert, 2007).   
Most recently, it was announced by Chavez on the June 11, 2009 broadcast of 
his presidential talk show ‘Alo Presidente’ dealing with the need for socialist theory 
and conscious-building, that the revolution is at a point in which communes must be 
constructed in order to “give birth to socialism” (Sugget 2007:  
http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/news/4515).  Although he acknowledged the 
advances already made through the development and strengthening of communal 
councils, Chavez reiterated the importance of communities taking the initiative to help 
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build these new communes.  He emphasized the role of communal councils as “nuclei 
of future communes” and of the necessity for these new communes to acquire 
complete ownership over the means of production (Sugget 2007:  
http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/news/4515).  Although Chavez himself admits that 
there is yet to be one commune in existence in all of Venezuela, the current emphasis 
on building and institutionalizing theses structures is significant. The next step must 
be on reforming the 2006 Law of Community Councils by engaging Venezuelan 
communities in open and public nation-wide debate, a process which has already 
begun.  The task now is on improving the current communal council structure by 
developing strategies to create and institutionalize communes all over Venezuela in a 
manner that links these structures to one another through a national network.     
The construction of this Leninist concept of ‘dual power’ would therefore 
serve to begin the radical transformation of existing state structures (Ciccariello-
Maher, 2007).  The main goal of this ‘dual power’ model is to build forces capable of 
attacking those elements of the existing state which oppose the social transformations.   
In addition to the institutionalization of the communal councils at the local and 
national level, what is also of utmost importance is the replacement of the police and 
army by citizens’ militia.  This challenge to the state’s monopoly of violence entails 
establishing security and defense committees at the local level through communal 
councils and a centralized popular armed organization at the national level.  These 
popular defense forces will not only challenge the state military apparatus, but will 
serve as the main line of defense for the social transformations of the revolution.  
Chavez himself has called on Venezuelans to create popular citizens’ militia, and his 
Defense Minister has encouraged the expansion of the reservist force (currently at 
about 880,000) to a strong autonomous popular army of 15 million reservists, or more 
than half of the population (Ciccariello-Maher, 2007)   Although various armed self-
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defense organizations outside of the state structure do already exist in Venezuela (i.e. 
Revolutionary Tupamaro Movement, and Bolivarian Liberation Front), especially 
among the poor, the government and citizens must continue working together to help 
consolidate and institutionalize popular armed organizations like citizens’ militia and 
the reservist army.           
In the case of the social economy with its worker cooperatives, self-sustaining 
agricultural cooperatives, and worker self-managed, institutionalization will include 
finding ways to link these enterprises to each other and the continued replacement of 
privately owned capitalist businesses with co- and self-managed enterprises by way of 
expropriation.  This last point signifies the socialization of the means of production, 
whereby workers themselves own and control every single aspect of their workplace 
and are accountable to the communities for which they produce.  It is also very 
important to mention that the internal dynamics within the new self-managed 
economic institutions must be completely democratic so that there is equal 
remuneration for work and so that every worker has equal decision-making power 
regardless of the job that she/he performs.   
Another important component of the institutionalization in the economic 
sphere is the replacement of markets with participatory planning suggested by Wilpert 
(2007).  This monumental task mainly entails the creation of both worker councils and 
federations and consumer councils and federations that out of mutual respect and 
cooperation determine what is to be produced, at what cost, and for whom.  By jointly 
crafting a production plan producers and consumers will appropriately determine 
supply and demand in terms of the needs of communities. The first step in making this 
a reality has already taken place in Venezuela through the linking up of communal 
councils and worker-run and co-managed enterprises.  That is, these economic 
enterprises are already required to produce goods for the communities in which they 
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operate and to invest a certain percentage in the development of these communities.    
This endogenous model of development whereby communal councils and worker 
managed and co-managed enterprises jointly decide upon the production and 
consumption needs of their own communities needs to be institutionalized and 
guaranteed through the passing of new laws.  
While there have already been important nationalizations, these have mainly 
been limited to increasing the government’s share in the revenue that is generated 
from these industries.  The challenges ahead for the Bolivarian Revolution, therefore, 
include the further transformation of property relations so that private ownership over 
the means of production is replaced with public/collective ownership.  This will 
require more radical policies of forced expropriation of private enterprises in order to 
wrestle away the economic power of the oligarchy and generate more equality among 
Venezuelans.  By ridding itself of the capitalist division of labor and private 
ownership of the means of production the working-class can gain direct control over 
production and over other aspects of their lives.  Thus the push must be made to 
intensify the reforms that can advance Venezuela towards an ‘alternative to 
development’ in which the full development of human beings becomes the main 
preoccupation and fundamental goal instead of economic growth.   
In light of all this, I argue that the Bolivarian Revolution must attempt to 
deepen its anti-capitalist transformations and further dismantle the oligarchy’s political 
and economic power if is to continue its path towards a new socialist society.  
Naturally this radicalization will lead to intensified confrontation between the poor 
and working-class majority and the small capitalist class, since social transformation 
requires conflict.  Chavez’s own words are very telling with respect to this issue.  He 
has assured Venezuela’s oligarchy on numerous occasions that the Bolivarian 
Revolution has “no plan to eliminate the oligarchy” (Wilpert 2007: 
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www.venezuelanalysis.com/news/2426).  Even more distressing is Chavez’s belief 
and assurance to the bourgeoisie that it can live peacefully with the revolution in 
Venezuela as the past eight years have demonstrated.  Chavez does, however, warn the 
bourgeoisie that it must not engage in attacks against the Venezuelan government or 
people if it does not want to face a counterattack by the revolutionary forces of the 
movement.   
What this all means is that although the oligarchy has been removed from key 
state structures of power, it has been allowed to continue enjoying its privileges and 
exploitation through its accumulation of capital.  Its vast amounts of private property 
and concentration of capital have been minimally affected by Chavez’s reforms, thus 
perpetuating class, gender, and racial antagonisms.  This also poses a serious threat to 
Venezuela and its revolution, since it maintains wealth inequality and leaves a main 
force of possible aggression with its financial power intact.  It also leaves open the 
possibility of the wealthy oligarchy fleeing the country with the assets that it 
accumulated from the exploitation of the working-class and poor; a process that has 
already begun.   
 The truth is that the transition to socialism in Venezuela is an extremely long 
and complex process that constantly needs to be reexamined and reformulated in order 
to displace its shortcomings (over-concentration of power in the executive, delayed 
institutionalization of popular participation at the national level, continued 
overdependence on oil industry, and lack of environmental protection policies) and 
develop more fully its accomplishments (dismantling of the elite’s wealth and power, 
providing increased access to social services for the marginalized populations, 
breaking down of ethnic, gender, and racial discrimination, creation of mechanisms to 
increase political participation, and institutionalizing more democratic and popular-
communal forms of production and social organization).  Most importantly of all, 
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strategies that raise the level of popular consciousness within counties attempting 
social transformations, like Venezuela, must be created and supported in order to 
advance towards creating a new and more democratic society.  
 The raising of people’s social, political, and ecological consciousness must 
also be combined with a strategy of ‘internationalism’ that establishes international 
links and partnerships, as well as deepens regional integration to counter imperial 
aggression.  Thus I argue that of utmost importance for the Bolivarian Revolution (and 
all popular attempts at social transformation) is the continued effort to implement a 
strategy of internationalism that deepens the integration, cooperation, and solidarity 
among sympathetic nations and promotes popular consciousness in the populations of 
Latin America.  Venezuela has, for example, established strong links with Cuba, 
thereby allowing Cuba to receive much needed oil at a discounted price.  In return 
Cuba has provided Venezuela with thousands of Cuban teachers, sports instructors, 
and doctors that have gone into Venezuela’s traditionally ignored slums and rural 
areas.  The Cuban doctors have allowed Venezuela to strengthen its Mission Barrio 
Adentro, which provides free medical care to poor neighborhoods throughout 
Venezuela, by giving poor Venezuelans access to medical assistance for the first time 
in their lives.  Venezuela has also deepened its ties with China and Russia, signing a 
number of joint-energy and military accords and increasing trade with these two 
nations.  These new alignments mark an important advance in trying to break the 
dependency on the U.S. in the region and its treatment of Latin America as its 
backyard.   
The purpose of this strategy of internationalism is to make Venezuela and 
Latin America in general, more independent and sovereign in the face of North 
American imperialism. Although it is true that this thesis has focused almost 
exclusively on the Bolivarian Revolution, it is important to note that it is by far not the 
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only example of the search for alternative social options and political economic 
visions in the world today.  In fact, the neo-liberal development project, with its ‘self-
regulated market Utopia’, as described by Polanyi (2001), is witnessing the emergence 
of various alternative initiatives, such as small rural local production units, 
organization of worker-led cooperatives, progressive macro-economic policies, and 
regional political-economic blocs built on solidarity and cooperation (De Sousa 
Santos, 2006).  While the social justice movement is occurring on a global scale, the 
greatest challenge to the neo-liberal development project is coming from one of the 
world’s most exploited and struggling regions - Latin America.  The hegemony of 
global capital and neo-liberal ideology has met its match, as the region’s social and 
political movements progressively voice their opposition and gain strength, “be it 
through the ballot box or direct mass action” (Renique, p.1).  
 The contemporary wave of struggles that began in the southeastern corner of 
Mexico in 1994 with the Zapatista uprising, gained momentum with the 1998 electoral 
victory of Chavez in Venezuela and takeoff of the Bolivarian Revolution, and is 
currently proceeding full steam ahead with diverse mass social organization and 
movements throughout the region.  An essential element of these popular movements 
is the vision of creating a new society where technological advances are used to help 
solve social problems and not to destroy the environment and the human species.  It is 
important to note, as Bravo & Melet (1991) do, that this new society will require that 
we change the mental schemas of comfort that have been imposed on us, so that 
instead of working tirelessly to satisfy our extravagant habits of consumption we begin 
living with more austerity, modesty, without luxuries, and more happily.  
 Fortunately, there has been a very promising springing up of a wide and 
diverse array of initiatives throughout the Latin American region to integrate the 
diverse yet interrelated social projects.  The social and economic integration of the 
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people of Latin America has been consolidating through initiatives like teleSur, 
UNASUR, MERCOSUR, ALBA, and Banco del Sur.  To challenge the U.S.-
dominated media in Latin America, Venezuela launched teleSUR, a progressive new 
network that established links between Latin American nations and provides its people 
with alternative media.  There are also currently talks in Latin America of establishing 
an alternative ‘non-aligned’ worldwide media network to challenge the “international 
communicational order” and to “balance information and democratize the presence of 
the countries of the South in worldwide communication,” modeled after the Caracas-
based teleSUR (Sugget 2008: www.venezuelaanalysis.com/news/3617) 
  The regional trade agreement known as MERCOSUR and composed of four 
member countries (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay) and five associate nations 
(Venezuela, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru) addresses the important need 
for establishing common markets among the Latin American nations and of providing 
preferential treatment and mutual arrangements between members.  The Venezuelan-
created initiative, called ALBA, is intended to counter the neo-liberal trading bloc that 
is promoted by the Free Trade Area of the Americas FTAA.  Thus far, ALBA’s 
membership consists of Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Dominica.  One 
major benefit of ALBA has been the reduction or elimination of tariffs between 
member countries, and the creation of a variety innovative trade deals.  
 Of particular worry for those who control the global capitalist system are the 
challenges that have begun against their main two instruments of power: the IMF and 
World Bank.  In order to combat the hegemony of the IMF and World Bank, Latin 
American nations recently inaugurated the Banco del Sur, or Bank of the South.  On 
December 9, 2007 the governments of Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Ecuador, Paraguay, 
Uruguay y Venezuela signed the founding of the Banco de Sur.  The idea is avoid 
borrowing money from the IMF and World Bank, and instead to set up a monetary 
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fund with funding from each member country so that lending can be achieved for 
social programs and infrastructure in Latin America.  Yet the divergent opinions of the 
participating governments have delayed the putting into motion of this institution that 
promotes and reinforces the integration of Latin American nations.  The hope is to 
diminish the influence of the IMF and World Bank by completely replacing these 
entities with the Banco de Sur, possibly creating a Southern Monetary Fund, and 
establishing a single Latin American currency.    
The most recent and potentially far-reaching plan of this ongoing integration 
process of Latin American nations is the newly created Unión de Naciones 
Suramericanas (UNASUR) or Union of South American Nations, an 
intergovernmental union modeled after the European Union.   Officially established in 
May 2008, UNASUR will be comprised of 12 member nations, have as its central 
bank the Banco del Sur, and integrate Mercosur and the Andean community trading 
bloc, Comunidad Andina (CAN) or Andean Community of Nations.  Globally of 
course, is the amalgamation of social movements that meets yearly as part of the 
World Social Forum, in which members of the movements share their experiences and 
ideas from around the world and seek to strengthen their organizing capabilities in an 
atmosphere of mutual respect, solidarity, and democracy all under the sentiment of 
‘another world is possible’.  Among these is the dynamic and growing international 
social movement of peasant organizations known as Via Campesina, which represents 
over 150 million small producers from five continents and has become the leading 
force in the fight against the poverty- and hunger- producing capitalist economic and 
political policies and for food sovereignty and security.  These regional and 
transnational movements and integration schemes are essential for the survival and 
strengthening of the popular movements throughout Latin American and the world.  
The Bolivarian Revolution, therefore, must continue working to forge connections and 
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alliances across multiple arenas of struggle, both nationally and internationally.   
 With imperial wars raging across the Middle-East, ecological destruction 
threatening the survival of the planet and human species, food shortages around the 
world, and increasing levels of insecurity and suffering among the world’s working-
class and poor majorities, there is a need to combat the perverse logic of endless 
accumulation of capital that proceeds at enormous cost to humanity’s future.  While 
some predict that the current global financial crisis will bring an end to the dominant 
fundamentalist doctrine of so-called free-markets, there remains the need for social 
movements to aggressively force the opening of the space for alternative visions.  
Capitalism’s ability to continually reinvent and reproduce itself when faced with crisis 
is always a constant threat to the creation of an alternative world.  What is certain is 
that Latin America’s left will most likely provide the most serious challenge to the 
tenets of neo-liberalism and capitalism itself in the upcoming years, as nations struggle 
to create alternatives strategies of development that place human needs above those of 
capital, thereby ensure the vision of ‘another world is possible’.   
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